<p>1.—Murder—Continuance.</p> <p>Where, upon trial of murder, the application for continuance showed a want of diligence and that some of the testimony was hearsay, there was no error in overruling same.</p> <p>3.—Same—Evidence—Experiment.</p> <p>Upon trial of murder, there was no error in permitting witnesses to testify about making a test with the iron rod alleged to have been used in the homicide to see if one could strike the wall with it and make the indentation in the wall, striking where the defendant said the man stood whom he claimed struck the blows on deceased’s head.</p> <p>3. —Same—Rule Stated.</p> <p>If experiments, as to any disputed facts testified to at the trial appear to have been made, under conditions similar or approximately similar to those which surround the original transaction, and such experiments would serve to shed any light upon that transaction, proof of the result of same is admissible. Following Speers v. State, 55 Texas Grim. Rep., 368, and other cases.</p> <p>4. —Same—Evidence—Declarations of Deceased.</p> <p>Upon trial of murder, there was no error in sustaining an objection to the question whether the witness had not heard her mother (the deceased) say long before the homicide that if it were not for the children she and her husband would get along all right, as this was hearsay; defendant denying being a responsible agent for her death. Following Johnson v. State, 66 Texas Crim. Rep., 586, and other cases.</p> <p>5. —Same—Evidence—Imputing Crime to Another.</p> <p>Upon trial of murder, where defendant was charged with the killing of his wife who had been divorced from her former husband several years before the homicide, and it was not shown that the said first husband either had the motive or opportunity or was placed in such proximity to the homicide as to show he may have been guilty thereof, there was no error in excluding remote acts and threats by certain parties who were in no way identified. Following ICunde v. State, 22 Texas Crim. App., 65, and other cases.</p> <p>6. —Same—Evidence—Declarations of Deceased.</p> <p>Upon trial of murder, there was no error in excluding testimony as to statements alleged to have been made by deceased to others some eight or ten days before the homicide that she loved her husband, the defendant, and that the children were the cause of the trouble; that defendant had rescued her when she was about to drown while bathing, etc., the defendant having been permitted to testify to all these things.</p> <p>7. —Same—Evidence—Declarations of Defendant.</p> <p>Upon trial of murder, there was no error in not admitting testimony as to a statement by the defendant made some time prior to the homicide that he would not let his wife, the deceased, drive a certain horse because it would kill her; besides, the defendant himself testified to this fact.</p> <p>8. —Same—Rule Stated—Declarations of Deceased—Hearsay.</p> <p>Where, upon trial of murder, the defendant was permitted to show the relations between deceased and himself before the homicide by persons who testified to same by their own knowledge thereto, there was no error in excluding testimony as to what they were told by the parties.</p> <p>9. —Same—Evidence—Charge of Court—Invited Error.</p> <p>Where the son of the deceased testified that he was asleep when his mother was struck the fatal blows, but was awakened by the defendant, when he heard his mother speak, and the State was permitted to show that he told other witnesses that his mother did not speak, and defendant was then permitted to show that said witness about half an hour after the injury had been inflicted stated that he heard his mother speak, there was no error in the court limiting such testimony to the credibility of the witness; besides, if error, the same was invited by the defendant and was favorable to him. Davidson, Judge, dissenting.</p> <p>10. —Same—Buie Stated.</p> <p>It is the general rule of law that when counsel has requested the court to charge a given proposition of law and it is given, such error can not be taken advantage of by the party whose counsel made the request. Following Cornwell v. State, 61 Texas Crim. Rep., 122.</p> <p>11. —Same—Harmless Error—Evidence—Declarations by Deceased.</p> <p>Where defendant contended that the deceased, after having received the fatal blow, raised up in bed and spoke, and there was nothing in what it was claimed she said that would even tend to show whether defendant was the person who inflicted the injury or would throw any light on the question as to who struck the blow, the court’s charge with reference to limiting the testimony to the credibility of defendant’s witness, if error, was harmless. Davidson, Judge, dissenting.</p> <p>13.—Same—Charge of Court—Murder in the First Degree.</p> <p>Where the reading of the court’s charge on murder in the first degree showed that the defendant’s complaint thereto was without foundation, when considering the charge of the court as a whole, there was no reversible error.</p> <p>13. —Same—Circumstantial Evidence—Charge of Court.</p> <p>Where, upon trial of murder, the court’s charge on circumstantial evidence was according to approved precedent, there was no reversible error. Following Ramirez v. State, 43 Texas C rim. Rep., 455, and other cases.</p> <p>14. —Same—Exculpatory Statements—Charge of Court.</p> <p>Where the State introduced the statement of the. defendant to the effect that he had just returned to his bed and was dozing when someone struck the deceased, his wife, etc., and the court properly instructed the jury that the State was bound thereby, unless the falsity of same was proven, etc., and that this could be done by circumstantial evidence, there was no error; besides, the objections to the charge was too general. Following Quintana v. State, 29 Texas Crim. App., 401, and other cases. Davidson, Judge, dissenting.</p> <p>15. —Same—Charge of Court—Exculpatory Statements.</p> <p>Where the court’s charge on exculpatory statements was sufficient, and besides, defendant’s special requested charge thereon was also submitted, there was no reversible error.</p> <p>16. —Same—Imputing Crime to Another—Charge of Court—Article 743.</p> <p>Where, upon trial of murder, there was no testimony which raised the issue that the crime was committed by any other than the defendant and the court submitted a sufficient charge on circumstantial evidence, the reasonable doubt and that the statements of the defendant denying the homicide must be shown to have been false, there was no reversible error, especially under article 743, Code Criminal Procedure, in the absence of other requested charges. Following Crutchfield v. State, 7 Texas Crim. App., 65, and other cases. Davidson, Judge, dissenting.</p> <p>17. —Same—Charge of Court—Husband and Wife.</p> <p>Where the defendant was charged with the murder of his wife, there was no error in refusing a requested charge that the law indulged an additional presumption of innocence because of the relationship of husband and wife.</p> <p>18. —Same—Charge of Court-—Requested Charges.</p> <p>Where the requested charges were fully covered by the court’s main charge, and the one relating to the remarks of the district attorney was not based upon a bill of exceptions, there was no error.</p> <p>19. —Same—Verdict—Extension of Term of Court.</p> <p>Upon trial of murder, there was no error in receiving the verdict and entering judgment after the regular term of court had expired, but was extended under article 1726, Revised Statutes.</p> <p>20. -—Same—Decisions of Other States.</p> <p>See opinion for discussion of decisions of other States as to declarations of deceased.</p> <p>21. —Same—Imputing Crime to Another—Evidence—Rule Stated.</p> <p>A person charged with homicide may show as a defense that another did the killing, but before such proof is admissible, it must first be shown that such person is in such proximity to the person slain that he could have committed the offense. Following Dubose v. State, 10 Texas Crim. App., 230, and other eases.</p> <p>22. —Same—Sufficiency of the Evidence.</p> <p>Where, upon trial of murder, the evidence, although circumstantial, sustained the conviction, there was no reversible error.</p> <p>23. —Same—Evidence—Declarations of Deceased.</p> <p>Where, upon trial of murder, defendant was permitted to testify to the fact that he and deceased had gone in bathing and after he had gone out of the water and was putting on his clothing, his wife, the deceased, got into deep water and was 'about to drown when he rushed into the water and saved her, and the State offered no proof to contradict this testimony, and all persons who knew anything about the fact were permitted to so testify, there was no error in excluding testimony as to statements either made by him or the deceased to others. Davidson, Judge, dissenting.</p> <p>24. —Same—Rule Stated—Narrative Statements.</p> <p>The rule does not permit the introduction of a narrative of past events made after the events are closed by either the party injured or by the defendant. Davidson, Judge, dissenting.</p> <p>25. —Same—Evidence—Declarations of Deceased.</p> <p>Upon trial of murder, where the State had been permitted- to show a separation between the defendant and the deceased, the relationship existing between the defendant and the deceased, his wife, as bearing on the question as to whether he desired her death, could not be proved by statements of the deceased made to others some time before the homicide to the effect that she loved her husband, etc.; no permanent separation having been shown, and if any difference had existed between the parties, a condonation had taken place prior to that time. Davidson, Judge, dissenting.</p>
