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← 740 NE2D 1225 - Carroll v. State

Carroll v. State’s Empirical Analysis

2000

Citation profile

11
cited by 11 later decisions
1
states following
December 2015
most recently cited

11 state decisions

Relationships

Relies on Miranda v. State of Arizona Vignera · Brady v. State of Maryland · Giglio v. United States · Kyles v. Whitley · Grupo Mexicano Desarrollos v. Alliance Bond Fund Inc

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 11 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

  1. “Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 , 83 S.Ct. 1194 , 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963) held that “suppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused upon request violates due process where the evidence is material either to guilt or to punishment, irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the prosecution.” Brady applies to evidence impeaching the credibility of State’s witnesses. See United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 676 , 105 S.Ct. 3375 , 87 L.Ed.2d 481 (1985) (citing Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150, 154 , 92 S.Ct. 763 , 31 L.Ed.2d 104 (1972)). The United States Supreme Court has recently summarized three components óf a Brady violation: (1) the evidence at issue must be favorable to the accused, either because it is exculpatory or because it is impeaching; (2) the evidence must have been suppressed by the State, either willfully or inadvertently; and (8) prejudice must have ensued. Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 281-82 , 119 S.Ct. 1936 , 144 L.Ed.2d 286 (1999).”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage
  2. “Evidence is material only if there is a reasonable probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding would have been different. Bagley, 473 U.S. at 682 , 105 S.Ct. 3375 . A “reasonable probability” is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome. Id. In proving materiality, it is not necessary for the defendant to show that “after discounting the inculpatory evidence in light of the undisclosed evidence, there would not have been enough left to convict.” Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 434-35 , 115 S.Ct. 1555 , 131 L.Ed.2d 490 (1995). Rather, the defendant must show that the “favorable evidence could reasonably be taken to put the whole case in such a different light as to undermine confidence in the verdict.” Id. at 435 , 115 S.Ct. 1555 (footnote omitted).”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage
  3. “suppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused upon request violates due process where the evidence is material either to guilt or to punishment, irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the prosecution.”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage

How this case has been treated — in progress

Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.