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740 N.E.2d 149

Hollen v. State

Indiana Court of Appeals

Decided February 14, 2001

Indiana Court of Appeals · decided 2001-02-14

Cited by 4 later decisions — most recently September 2014

4 state decisions

Key passage — most relied on by later courts

“Properly understood, the rule stands for the proposition that a trial court may impose a fully enhanced sentence upon an adequate showing of a single aggravating factor. The rule allows a trial court to focus on the factor or factors that truly warrant an enhanced sentence, without fear that a reviewing court will reverse the court's sentence for lack of sufficient aggravation. The rule should not, however, encourage trial courts imposing enhanced sentences to simply compile a list of virtually every potentially aggravating factor, secure in the belief that even if some of the aggra-vators identified are later found to be invalid, a higher court will separate the wheat from the chaff and still uphold an enhanced sentence on the basis of the general rule that a single aggravator may support an enhanced sentence. We reiterate that it is the trial court's job to identify valid aggravating and mitigating factors, explain why they qualify as such, weigh those factors, and articulate its reasons for imposing its sentence. When, as here, a trial court identifies a number of aggravating factors and explains that they support an enhanced sentence, we must assume that the court considered each factor to have some aggravating value. Unless the trial court either assigns a specific weight to each aggravator in terms of the proportion of an enhancement, or says that any one of the aggravators identified could individually support the enhancement, we are left to guess at the respective wei”

quoted by 1 later decision, including Hollen v. State

“suggestion that the trial court is obliged to assign to each aggravating factor a specific proportional weight.”

quoted by 1 later decision, including Hollen v. State

Relies on Prowell v. State · Bish v. State · Noojin v. State

Good law ✅— No negative treatment on recordhow we know

Decided 2001-02-14

View the full empirical analysis of this case →

*162MATTINGLY, Judge,

¶1concurring with opinion

¶2I fully concur with the majority that Hollen was not prejudiced by the Deputy's testimony about Hollen's threats or by the admission of cumulative evidence in the form of the Deputy's handwritten notes. However, I write separately to address the majority's suggestion that a trial court considering a sentence enhancement based on aggravating cireumstances is obliged to assign "a specific weight to each aggravator in terms of the proportion of an enhancement." Such an obligation is, I be-leve, inconsistent with our well-established standard of review of sentencing decisions and with the rule that a single aggravator may support an enhanced sentence even if other aggravators are determined to be invalid.

¶3We are routinely involved in the review of sentences, but our standard of review remains highly deferential. While sentencing decisions are not "per se unreachable on appeal," the trial court "is afforded the broadest of discretion in making the sentencing decision within the confines of the statutory limitations." Johnson v. State, 455 N.E.2d 897, 902 (Ind.1983). Appellate courts have the constitutional authority to review and revise sentences, Ind. Const. art. VII, § 4, but will not do so unless the sentence imposed is "manifestly unreasonable in light of the nature of the offense and the character of the offender." Ind. Appellate Rule 17(B); Noojin v. State, 730 N.E.2d 672, 679 (Ind.2000). The standard is "not whether in our judgment the sentence is unreasonable, but whether it is clearly, plainly, and obviously so." Id., quoting Prowell v. State, 687 N.E.2d 568, 568 (Ind.1997).

¶4The majority's suggestion that the trial court is obliged to assign to each aggravating factor a specific proportional weight seems to me inconsistent with this broad discretion and inappropriate in light of the inherent complexity of the weighing process. An appellate court will not revise an enhanced sentence where the trial court has found aggravating cireumstances, the sentence is authorized by statute, and the sentence is not manifestly unreasonable: "We are not bound to conduct a de novo review of the sentencing hearing and assess or reweigh the trial court's findings and conclusions regarding aggravating and mitigating cireumstances." Bish v. State, 421 N.E.2d 608, 620 (Ind.1981).

¶5Assigning a proportional weight to each aggravating circumstance could serve only to encourage such inappropriate appellate reweighing and reassessment of the trial court's sentencing decision, and to encourage appeals premised on the trial court's improper assignment of, or failure to assign, proportional weight to the aggravating factors. In light of the Bish holding and the breadth of the trial court's disceretion in sentencing decisions I believe we cannot and should not require the trial court to articulate the proportion by which each aggravating circumstance supported a sentence enhancement.

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