741 F. Supp. 298 - A. Johnson & Co. v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co.’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

4 federal appellate · 10 district · 9 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 34 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “[to pay] on behalf of the insured all sums which the insured shall become legally obligated to pay as damages because of [[Image here]] ... property damage to which this insurance applies, caused by an occurrence”

   3 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. 874 F. Supp. 1406 - Interex Corp. v. Atlantic Mutual Insurance Co. · 950 F. Supp. 24 - United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. Goodwin

2. “The Supreme Judicial Court of Maine has recently addressed and resolved the substantive issues presented by these motions. Choosing to style its role as “simply to determine the meaning of a private contract between the parties, not to foster or retard environmental goals,” the Law Court allied itself with those jurisdictions which have found that the insurer has no duty to indemnify or defend in environmental disputes such as this. Before turning to the implications of Marois for this case, the Law Court’s delphic explanation of the role of a court applying Maine law in this context bears some explication. Commentators have identified as particularly pronounced in the environmental area the fashioning of “judge-made insurance,” a trend characterized by “judicial decisions in a number of environmental liability insurance disputes that have created coverage even in the face of contrary policy language.” What appears to have animated the development of judge-made insurance in the environmental area is the desire to spread the very substantial costs of environmental clean-up. This development has had an unintended consequence: the virtual disappearance of environmental liability coverage in part because the potential for broad judicial interpretation has made the scope of the risks for writing such insurance unknown and unknowable. The Law Court’s desire “simply to determine the meaning of a private contract” rather than to influence environmental goals appears to reflect a cons”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. CPC International, Inc. v. Northbrook Excess & Surplus Insurance

3. “[I]n light of the consciously restrained manner in which the Law Court now approaches the issue of environmental insurance coverage, I am satisfied that, once definitively stated, Maine law on the subject of this old pollution exclusion clause will join the “emerging nationwide judicial consensus that the ‘pollution exclusion’ clause is unambiguous and that an insured who is accused of causing injury or property damage by the intentional discharge of pollutants over an extended period of time is bound by the terms of the exclusion and is not entitled to be defended or indemnified by its insurer.””

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. CPC International, Inc. v. Northbrook Excess & Surplus Insurance