Alexander v. Johnson’s Empirical Analysis
742 F.2d 117 · 1984
Citation profile
18 federal appellate · 1 district · 12 state decisions
How this case has been cited
Cited by 37 later decisions — most recently March 2019 · most notably 26 Va. App. 299 - Ohree v. Commonwealth (1998), 20 Cal. 4th 327 - California Teachers Assn. v. State (1999)
18 federal appellate · 1 district · 12 state decisions
Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.
Relationships
Applies 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996) · 28 U.S.C. § 636 · 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Civil Rights Act of 1871 / Section 1983 (Ku Klux Klan Act))
Relies on Gideon v. Wainwright · Preiser v. Rodriguez · Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Authority · Jones v. Cunningham · Bearden v. Georgia
Most-quoted passages
The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 37 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.
“From the Supreme Court's pronouncements in James, Fuller, and Bearden , five basic features of a constitutionally acceptable attorney's fees reimbursement program emerge. First, the program under all circumstances must guarantee the indigent defendant's fundamental right to counsel without cumbersome procedural obstacles designed to determine whether he is entitled to court-appointed representation. Second, the state's decision to impose the burden of repayment must not be made without providing him notice of the contemplated action and a meaningful opportunity to be heard. Third, the entity deciding whether to require repayment must take cognizance of the individual's resources, the other demands on his own and family's finances, and the hardships he or his family will endure if repayment is required. The purpose of this inquiry is to assure repayment is not required as long as he remains indigent. Fourth, the defendant accepting court-appointed counsel cannot be exposed to more severe collection practices than the ordinary civil debtor. Fifth, the indigent defendant ordered to repay his attorney's fees as a condition of work-release, parole, or probation cannot be imprisoned for failing to extinguish his debt as long as his default is attributable to his poverty, not his contumacy. [ Alexander, supra at 124 (emphasis added).]”
5 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the dissente.g. Hanson v. Passer · People v. Willey“The [S]tate assumes the status of a judgment lien creditor against the assets of an indigent defendant who has accepted court-appointed counsel and been found guilty of the offense. The lien is not valid unless the indigent defendant was given both notice of the [S]tate’s claim and the opportunity to resist its perfection in a hearing before the trial court. The lien is collectable through normal civil debt recovery procedures, but those assets and wages of the indigent necessary for his own or his family’s support and existence are not subject to garnishment or attachment.”
1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the dissent“an inmate violating any monetary requirement of his probation or restitution regiment cannot be imprisoned if his non-compliance results from poverty alone.”
1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the dissent
How this case has been treated — in progress
Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.