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← 742 F.2d 209 - Futo v. Lykes Bros. Steamship Co.

Futo v. Lykes Bros. Steamship Co.’s Empirical Analysis

742 F.2d 209 · 1984

Citation profile

60
cited by 60 later decisions
1
states following
November 2015
most recently cited

31 federal appellate · 1 district · 2 state decisions

How this case has been cited

Cited by 60 later decisions — most recently November 2015 · most notably Randolph v. Laeisz (1990), Kerr-Mcgee Corporation v. Ma-Ju Marine Services, Inc., Dorothy E. Lyons, Cross-Appellant v. Kerr-Mcgee Corporation, Defendant-Third Party Plaintiff-Appellant-Cross v. Ma-Ju Marine Services, Inc. (1987)

31 federal appellate · 1 district · 2 state decisions

2501984199020002010decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

Relationships

Applies 33 U.S.C. § 901 · 33 U.S.C. § 902 · 33 U.S.C. § 905

Relies on Seas Shipping Co. v. Sieracki · Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York City · Scindia Steam Navigation Co. v. De Los Santos · West v. United States · Gay v. Ocean Transport & Trading, Ltd.

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 60 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

  1. “[t]he independent contractor created the hazard and was in the better position to correct it. The scaffold was not an appurtenance of the ship but was rather a temporary structure created and used entirely by the independent contractor to perform its work. It belonged to and was controlled by the contractor. The lack of a railing was a transitory condition on this temporary structure, and its absence and the danger posed thereby were open and obvious to the contractor and its employees. There was no affirmative act of negligence by the shipowner nor even any expression of acquiescence in the use of the unsafe scaffold. The shipowner assumed no duty with respect to the scaffold. Under the circumstances, we find no basis for imposing liability on the shipowner even if it had the character of actual knowledge....”
    2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
  2. “abolished the longshoreman's right to recover for unseaworthiness and the stevedore’s obligation to indemnify the shipowner.”
    2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
  3. “does not ... extend to an open and obvious transitory condition”
    2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority

How this case has been treated — in progress

Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.