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← 744 F.2d 1323 - Whiteside v. Scurr

Whiteside v. Scurr’s Empirical Analysis

744 F.2d 1323 · 1984

Citation profile

34
cited by 34 later decisions
1
cited 1 times by the Supreme Court
9
states following
June 2004
most recently cited

19 federal appellate · 1 district · 11 state decisions

How this case has been cited

Cited by 34 later decisions (1 by the Supreme Court) — most recently June 2004 · most notably Nix v. Whiteside (1986), Wilson v. Mintzes (1985)

19 federal appellate · 1 district · 11 state decisions

270198419902000decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

Relationships

Relies on Strickland v. Washington · Cuyler v. Sullivan · United States v. Cronic · Picard v. Connor · Sanders v. United States

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 34 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

  1. “"Appellant first argues that counsel improperly acted on the basis of mere suspicion that appellant would testify falsely. The reason why counsel believes that the defendant intends to testify falsely is an important threshold question because `"[w]here ... the veracity or falsity of the defendant's testimony is conjectural, the ethical dilemma does not arise."` Butler v. United States, 414 A.2d at 850 , citing Johnson v. United States, 404 A.2d at 164 . Both ABA Model Rule 3.3 and ABA Proposed Defense Function Standard 4-7.7 presuppose that defense counsel knows that the defendant's testimony will be false on the basis of either independent investigation or prior discussions with the defendant or both. Mere suspicion or inconsistent statements by the defendant alone are insufficient to establish that the defendant's testimony would have been false.... Counsel must act if, but only if, he or she has `a firm factual basis' for believing that the defendant intends to testify falsely or has testified falsely.... It will be a rare case in which this factual requirement is met. Counsel must remember that they are not triers of fact, but advocates. In most cases a client's credibility will be a question for the jury." [Citations omitted].”
    3 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
  2. “"Counsel must act if, but only if, he or she has `a firm factual basis' for believing that the defendant intends to testify falsely or has testified falsely.... It will be a rare case in which this factual requirement is met. Counsel must remember that they are not triers of fact, but advocates. In most cases a client's credibility will be a question for the jury." 857 F.2d at 445 , citing Whiteside v. Scurr, 744 F.2d 1323, 1328 , rev'd on other grounds sub nom., Nix v. Whiteside, supra . (Emphasis added).”
    3 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
  3. “[C]ounsel's actions in threatening to withdraw, advise the state trial judge and testify against appellant if appellant testified falsely, impermissibly compromised appellant's right to effective assistance of counsel. Despite counsel's legitimate ethical concerns, counsel's actions were inconsistent with the obligations of confidentiality and zealous advocacy.”
    3 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority

How this case has been treated — in progress

Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.