Mitchell v. State’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

101 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 101 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable search or seizure, shall not be violated; and no warrant shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the person or thing to be seized.”

   17 later decisions quote this exact passage
   e.g. Carmen Nicolle Harbaugh v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.) · Richelle Marie Whitenack v. State of Indiana

2. “independently from federal Fourth Amendment jurisprudence.”

   5 later decisions quote this exact passage
   e.g. Francis v. State · Lewis v. State

3. “Although “the brevity of the invasion of the individual’s Fourth Amendment interests is an important factor in determining whether the seizure is so minimally intrusive as to be justifiable on reasonable suspicion,” United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 709 , 103 S.Ct. 2637, 2645 , 77 L.Ed.2d 110, 122 (1983), there is no “bright line” for evaluating whether an investigative detention is unreasonable, and “common sense and ordinary human experience must govern over rigid criteria.” United States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675, 685 , 105 S.Ct. 1568, 1575 , 84 L.Ed.2d 605, 615 (1985). In Sharpe , the Court explained: In assessing whether a detention is too long in duration to be justified as an investigative stop, we consider it appropriate to examine whether the police diligently pursued a means of investigation that was likely to confirm or dispel their suspicions quickly, during which time it was necessary to detain the defendant. A court making this assessment should take care to consider whether the police are acting in a swiftly developing situation, and in such cases the court should not indulge in unrealistic second-guessing. A creative judge engaged in post hoc evaluation of police conduct can almost always imagine some alternative means by which the objectives of the police might have been accomplished. But the fact that the protection of the public might, in the abstract, have been accomplished by less intrusive means does not, by itself, render the search unreasonable. The ”

   4 later decisions quote this exact passage
   e.g. Payne v. State · State v. McCaa