Ex Parte Austin’s Empirical Analysis
1988
Citation profile
28 state decisions
How this case has been cited
Cited by 28 later decisions — most recently June 2016 · most notably Grunsfeld v. State (1992), Heath v. State (1991)
28 state decisions
Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.
Relationships
Relies on Santobello v. New York · DeRusse v. State · Houlihan v. State · Shannon v. State · Bass v. State
Most-quoted passages
The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 28 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.
“(a) The provisions of Sections 3 and 3c of this Article do not apply: (1) to a defendant adjudged guilty of an offense defined by the following sections of the Penal Code: (A) Section 19.03 (Capital Murder) (B) Section 20.04 (Aggravated Kidnapping) (C) Section 22.021 (Aggravated Sexual Assault) (D) Section 29.03 (Aggravated Robbery); or (2) to a defendant when it is shown that the defendant used or exhibited a deadly weapon as defined in Section 1.07(a)(ll), Penal Code, during the commission of a felony offense or during immediate flight therefrom. Upon affirmative finding that the defendant used or exhibited a deadly weapon during the commission of an offense or during immediate flight therefrom, the trial court shall enter the finding in the judgment of the court. Upon an affirmative finding that the deadly weapon the defendant used or exhibited was a firearm, the court shall enter that finding in its judgment. (Emphasis added).”
1 later decision quote this exact passagee.g. Graves v. State“[U]pon the entry of an affirmative finding of a deadly weapon in the judgment the applicant was not eligible for “regular” probation by the trial court and the trial court was without “power” to grant the same. If applicant was not eligible for “regular” probation because of the affirmative finding, ... then he was not eligible for shock probation ... because he could be granted shock probation only if he was “otherwise eligible for probation under this article.””
1 later decision quote this exact passagee.g. State v. Posey
How this case has been treated — in progress
Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.