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← 746 S.W.2d 678 - Blevins v. Johnson County

Blevins v. Johnson County’s Empirical Analysis

1988

Citation profile

20
cited by 20 later decisions
2
states following
November 2017
most recently cited

13 state decisions

How this case has been cited

Cited by 20 later decisions — most recently November 2017

13 state decisions

1001988199020002010decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

Relationships

Relies on Texas Co. v. Aycock · Moore v. Cole · State v. Rascoe · City of Memphis v. Hood · Denny v. Wilson County

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 20 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

  1. “`The words `actual notice' do not always mean in law what in metaphysical strictness they import; they more often mean knowledge of facts and circumstances sufficiently pertinent in character to enable reasonably cautious and prudent persons to investigate and ascertain as to the ultimate facts.'”
    3 later decisions quote this exact passage
  2. “In a negotiated taking or in a condemnation suit, the same issue must be resolved as to whether the subsequent damages to the land from which a severance was taken were foreseeable and contemplated by the parties to the deed or to the suit so that the consideration would encompass payment for the injury suffered. Incidental damages are sometimes called “severance damages, i.e., if only a portion of a single tract is taken the owner’s compensation for that taking includes any element of value arising out of the relationship of the part taken to the entire tract,” State ex rel. Pack v. Walker, 220 Tenn. 661, 662-663, 423 S.W.2d 473, 473 (1968), and “[t]he recital in the deed, that the consideration for it is in Ml of all damages that the grantor may suffer, is an estoppel and a bar against his right later to sue for such damages.” Denny v. Wilson County, 198 Tenn. 677, 685 , 281 S.W.2d 671, 674 (1955). The unanticipated injury exception to the general rule thus depends on what the parties to a taking knew or should have known at the time of the execution of the deed and of what a subsequent purchaser can be said to have adequate notice ....”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage
  3. ““Estoppel by deed is a bar which precludes one party to a deed and his privies from asserting as against the other party and his privies any right or title in derogation of the deed, or from denying the truth of any material facts asserted in it.””
    1 later decision quote this exact passage

How this case has been treated — in progress

Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.