¶1concurring.
¶2The majority reaches the only result appropriate in this case-vacation of the guilty plea conviction. I am not sure, however, that the conclusion as to the "involuntariness" of the plea is entirely accurate. To be sure, the plea was reversibly tainted. However, I am unable to agree that it was "involuntary." Rather, the plea was conditional, ie., subject to perfection of an appeal upon the suppression ruling.
¶3Because the plea was conditioned upon occurrence of a future event, it should not have been accepted. If the condition had been fulfilled, the plea could perhaps be validated. But, under the cireumstances, the plea may not be held to insulate the State from reversal of the conviction.
¶4I recognize that if the trial court had refused the conditional guilty plea, and if this court had refused to accept jurisdiction over an interlocutory appeal of the suppression ruling, the parties would have been subjected to an arguably needless full-blown trial. Such expenditure of time and resources would seem ill advised in light of Lineberry's willingness to plead guilty, subject only to his suppression argument. In essence, then, an interlocutory appeal upon the merits of the suppression ruling would seem to be essential to a common sense and expeditious resolution of the issues.
¶5This case scenario appears to fall in the procedural cracks created by Ind. late Rule 14. It does not fall within those interlocutory orders from which an appeal may be taken of right pursuant to App. R. 14(A). Furthermore, under App.R. 14(B), the trial court is not required to certify such interlocutory orders for appeal; nor *1159is the Court of Appeals required to accept such appeals. It would seem appropriate to create some procedural tool to accomplish the task.
¶6Subject to these comments, I concur in the reversal of the conviction.