Conrad v. State’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

26 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 26 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “[A] defendant convicted of unlawful possession of a firearm by a serious violent felon may not have his or her sentence enhanced under the general habitual offender statute by proof of the same felony used to establish that the defendant was a "serious violent felon."”

   9 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the dissent
   e.g. Mills v. State · Lewis v. State

2. “A conviction for possession of contraband may rest upon proof of either actual or constructive possession. In order to prove constructive possession, the State must show that the defendant had both the intent to maintain dominion and control and the capability to maintain dominion and control over the contraband. To prove the intent element, the State must demonstrate the defendant's knowledge of the presence of the contraband. This knowledge may be inferred from either the exclusive dominion and control over the premises containing the contraband or, if the control is non-exclusive, evidence of additional cireum-stances pointing to the defendant's knowledge of the presence of the contraband. To establish the second element of constructive possession, the evidence must demonstrate the capability to exercise control over the item, that is, the ability to reduce the item to his personal possession or to otherwise direct its disposition or use. Control in this sense concerns the accused's power, by way of legal authority or in a practical sense.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the dissent
   e.g. Person v. State

3. “The dispositive question is whether the serious violent felon statute’s deprivation of the liberty and property interest protected by Article I, Section 32 of the Indiana Constitution is without rational basis. We again conclude that “[t]he legislative decision to prevent serious violent felons from possessing potentially deadly weapons cannot be said to be without rational basis” and, thus, Conrad’s substantive due process challenge fails.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the dissent
   e.g. Robert E. Redington v. State of Indiana