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← 747 SO2D 101 - State v. Sloan

State v. Sloan’s Empirical Analysis

1999

Citation profile

9
cited by 9 later decisions
1
states following
July 2012
most recently cited

9 state decisions

How this case has been cited

Cited by 9 later decisions — most recently July 2012

9 state decisions

60199920002010decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

Relationships

Relies on Price v. Georgia · 498 So. 2d 701 - State v. Mayeux · 372 So. 2d 1202 - State v. Cook · State v. Eames · 380 So. 2d 59 - State v. Thibodeaux

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 9 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

  1. “In prosecutions for illegal carrying of weapons, the state must prove that a defendant specifically intended to conceal the weapon on his person. Because a defendant’s guilt is based on his intent to conceal, rather than the extent of his concealment, his conduct would be such that he either did or did not commit the substantive offense. In other words, the nature of the |soffense is such that proof of the attempted offense proves the substantive offense, as the elements of the attempted offense are the same as that of the substantive offense. Hence, it is obvious that attempted concealment, comprising the identical elements, cannot be a “lesser grade” of La. R.S. 14:95(A)(1). Proof of the elements of attempted concealment would not be proof of a “lesser offense” under La. R.S. 14:5 but would be proof of the greater offense alone. Accordingly, we agree with the trial judge’s ruling that there can be no attempt to carry a concealed weapon.”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage
  2. “The reasoning of Dyer, supra, is applicable to the instant case. The nature of the offense of communication of a false bomb threat is such that proof of the attempted offense proves the substantive offense, as the elements of the attempted offense are the same as that of the substantive offense. Additionally, as a matter of policy, to extend this offense further does not accomplish any legislative intent and serves only to add confusion. We find that attempt to communicate false information concerning an alleged attempted arson is not a lesser or responsive charge. There is no such crime. The trial court therefore erred in instructing the jury that attempt was a responsive verdict.”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage
  3. “conveyance, . . . by the use of the telephone, . . . of any threat or false information knowing the same to be false, including bomb threats . . . concerning an attempt or alleged attempt being made, or to be made, to commit either aggravated or simple arson.”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage

How this case has been treated — in progress

Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.