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← 748 F.2d 411 - Corbin v. Coleco Industries, Inc.

Corbin v. Coleco Industries, Inc.’s Empirical Analysis

748 F.2d 411 · 1984

Citation profile

56
cited by 56 later decisions
8
states following
June 2018
most recently cited

18 federal appellate · 2 district · 24 state decisions

How this case has been cited

Cited by 56 later decisions — most recently June 2018 · most notably Wheeler v. John Deere Co. (1991), O'Sullivan v. Shaw (2000)

18 federal appellate · 2 district · 24 state decisions

2501984199020002010decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

Relationships

Relies on California State Board of Equalization v. Western Marina Corp. · ITT Continental Baking Co. v. William Inglis & Sons Baking Co. · Ratcliff v. Bruce · Dague v. Piper Aircraft Corp. · Barnes v. Mac Brown and Company, Inc.

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 56 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

  1. “"Whether a danger is open and obvious depends not just on what people can see with their eyes but also on what they know and believe about what they see. In particular, if people generally believe that there is a danger associated with the use of a product, but that there is a safe way to use it, any danger there may be in using the product in the way generally believed to be safe is not open and obvious."”
    11 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
  2. “a defective condition unreasonably dangerous,”
    2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
  3. “While we are thus persuaded that the Indiana legislature intended for the statute to govern products liability actions based on a theory of negligence, we are unclear what the legislature meant by “govern,” when the statute contained no substantive provisions concerning negligence. One possibility is that it intended to abolish negligence as a theory of products liability and to require such theories to be restated as strict liability theories or be stricken. A second possibility is that it intended that if any provisions of the statute limit or modify the common law principles of negligence, then those provisions would augment or displace those common law principles. On this interpretation, even though the statute lacked substantive provisions for negligence, the time limitations set forth in it, for example, would govern products liability actions based on negligence as well as those based on strict liability. No third possibility occurs to us. The second possibility is facially plausible, and it gives the statute some actual effect on products liability actions based on negligence. We therefore, adopt it as our interpretation of the meaning of “govern,” in the absence of any affirmative evidence that the legislature intended to take the drastic step of abolishing negligence as a theory of products liability.”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority

How this case has been treated — in progress

Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.