748 So. 2d 370 - Curtis v. State’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

36 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 36 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “[T]he second level of a police encounter involves the Terry stop or the temporary investigative "stop and frisk". A Terry stop is permissible if the detention is temporary and reasonable under the circumstances and only if the police officer has a well-founded suspicion that the individual detained has committed, is committing, or is about to commit a crime. This temporary detention is deemed to be a less intrusive invasion of privacy than a formal arrest and, therefore, may be constitutionally accomplished merely on articulable or founded suspicion of criminal activity. The founded suspicion needed to justify an investigatory stop is fact specific to each case, but it is to be based upon the totality of the circumstances as viewed by an experienced police officer . . . Additionally, the officer may detain the individual even at gunpoint and/or by handcuffs for the officer's safety without converting the Terry stop into a formal arrest.”

   3 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the dissent
   e.g. 780 So. 2d 288 - GAM v. State · 769 So. 2d 404 - Williams v. State

2. “[An appellate court] is required to accept the trial court's determination of disputed issues of fact in a motion to suppress, as the trial court is vested with the authority to determine the credibility of the witnesses and the weight of the evidence. Although [appellate courts] are required to accept the trial court's determination of the historical facts leading to the search, a defendant is entitled to a de novo review of whether the application of the law to the historical facts establishes an adequate basis for the trial court's finding of reasonable suspicion or probable cause.”

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the dissent
   e.g. Fuentes v. State · 957 So. 2d 111 - Manning v. State

3. “A finding of probable cause does not require absolute certitude. The test for probable cause is whether the facts and circumstances within an officer’s knowledge are sufficient to warrant a person of reasonable caution to believe that an offense has been committed. Curtis contends that the facts in his case are nearly identical to Doney and require that the crack cocaine be suppressed. We disagree. Officer Winfrey’s belief that what he visualized was crack cocaine is sufficient for probable cause even though he concedes that the substance could have been something else. Winfrey’s acknowledgment that the substance could be something other than crack cocaine does not necessarily convert his belief to bare suspicion. To the extent that our opinion conflicts with Doney , we hereby recede from Doney .”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the dissent
   e.g. State v. Lafond