Seubert v. State’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

12 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 12 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “[Wjhatever his race, a criminal defendant has standing to challenge the system used to select his grand or petit jury, on the ground that it arbitrarily excludes from service the members of any race, and thereby denies him due process of law. This certainly is true in this case, where the claim is that Negroes were systematically excluded from jury service. (emphasis added)”

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage
   e.g. Ortiz v. State · Clarke v. State

2. “To begin this process, a trial judge has a duty to examine and evaluate the State’s explanation using a three-part test: First, the trial judge must determine whether the explanation is facially adequate; second, whether the explanation is refuted by the record; and finally, if both prior questions are resolved in the affirmative and negative, respectively, his decision turns on the credibility of the witnesses. See Slappy v. State, 503 So. 2d 350 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1987). An appellate court evaluates the trial court’s findings and conclusions following this three-pronged test keeping in mind that the first two prongs require evaluation as questions of law. In essence, whether the explanation is facially adequate or refuted by the record is a question of law. ... When the State gives its explanation, a trial court cannot view its role as simply evaluating the evidence from a believability standard. Simply concluding that the State’s response is racially neutral and that the State intended no harm are inappropriate conclusions. This approach overlooks the first part of the evaluation process and permits the third area, concerning the credibility of the State’s response, to predominate the evaluation. A prosecutor may not rebut a defendant’s prima facie case merely by denying a discriminatory motivation, or by affirming his good faith in individual selections. It is incumbent upon the prosecutor to articulate a clear and reasonably specific neutral explanation related to the part”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the concurrence
   e.g. Williams v. State

3. “Batson nevertheless guides our decision. Except for the same race requirement that is irrelevant in reviewing Sixth Amendment and due process claims, Bat-son is a practical model to follow in this case. The Batson procedure was followed here. The prosecutor was challenged concerning her decision to strike Mr. Oliver; she knew nothing of him except his race; she struck him without questioning him or seeking to question him; she gave no racially neutral reason for striking him. Batson requires more than silence to justify the State’s peremptory strike of a black venire member. We conclude that appellant made a prima facie showing of racial discrimination in the striking of venireman Oliver, and the State did not rebut that inference.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the dissent
   e.g. Ortiz v. State