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← 75 BR 37 - In Re 268 Ltd.

In Re 268 Ltd.’s Empirical Analysis

1987

Citation profile

4
cited by 4 later decisions
1
states following
July 1990
most recently cited

1 state decisions

Relationships

Applies 11 U.S.C. § 506

Relies on Amfac Mortgage Corp. v. Arizona Mall of Tempe, Inc. · Joseph F. Sanson Investment Co. v. 268 Ltd. · Recanzone v. Nevada Tax Commission · State ex rel. Bartlett v. Brodigan · National Acceptance Company v. Samuel J. Zusmann, Sr., Trustee in Bankruptcy for Walter R. Thomas, Athens, Inc., Bankrupt

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 4 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

  1. “The language of section 107.030(7) indicates that the attorney’s fees are limited to a reasonable amount. In section 107.030(7), “reasonable” modifies “expenses of the trust” and counsel fees are included among the “expenses of the trust”. The legislature’s intent is clearly to include attorney’s fees among the expenses of the trust. The expenses of the trust that, pursuant to the covenant, are to be paid from the sale proceeds, must be reasonable. The legislature could easily have indicated that the attorney’s fee provision was not among the expenses of the trust. For instance, it could have used the word “plus” instead of the word “including”. The legislature, however, used the word “including”. Accordingly, although the statute allows, and in fact encourages, the parties to designate a percentage of the unpaid principal as counsel fees, those fees, like the other expenses of the trust, must be reasonable. The evident purpose of section 107.030(7) also suggests that the attorney’s fees allowed under that section are limited to a reasonable amount. The purpose of such an attorney’s fee provision is to compensate the secured party for the costs of the foreclosure. See, e.g., McLane v. Abrams, 2 Nev. 199, 208 (1866) (analyzing a similar, non-statutory provision in a note).”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the concurrence
  2. “We doubt extremely the policy of enforcing any [emphasis in original] contract whereby the mortgagor makes himself responsible for counsel fees. We think it has a tendency to encourage extortionate and oppressive contracts, and is at war with the best interests of society. But all the cases we find reported on this subject hold that a reasonable [emphasis in original] counsel fee may be contracted for in such cases, and a Court of equity will enforce the agreement. In all the cases called to our attention in which this point has arisen, the Courts have allowed the [emphasis in original] counsel fee charged, but have generally used some expression indicating that the charges allowed were reasonable, and that if unreasonable counsel fees were allowed, the Court would interpose its authority to protect the mortgagor [emphasis added].”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the concurrence

How this case has been treated — in progress

Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.