Volume 75 — Connecticut Reports

<p>Action to enforce the specific performance of an agreement for the division of certain real estate conveyed to the defendant, brought to the Superior Court of New Haven County where a demurrer to the complaint was overruled CRalph Wheeler, J.j and the cause was afterwards tried to the court, Gteorge W. Wheeler, J.; facts found and judgment rendered for the plaintiffs, and appeal by the defendant for alleged errors in the rulings and findings of the court.</p> <p>The three plaintiffs and the defendant are brothers and sister, the next of kin and only heirs-at-law of their uncle, Nicholas Verzier, now deceased. March 9th, 1892, the uncle, then a childless widower residing in the household of the defendant, where two of the plaintiffs also resided contributing to the household expenses, conveyed to the defendant the real estate in question. The deed was in the usual form of a warranty deed, and was expressed to be “ for a valuable consideration in dollars.” It conveyed the premises as free from all incumbrances except a mortgage for $1,900, which the .defendant, as a part of the consideration," assumed and agreed to pay. Following the description was this language : “ provided always, and this deed is given upon this express condition, that the said grantee shall provide the said grantor a suitable and comfortable home, clothing, board, medical attendance in case of sickness, and a suitable and proper burial at his decease, and fully pay and discharge the cost and expense of such home and other things to be provided under this condition without charge .or expense to said grantor in his lifetime, or to his estate after his decease.” Then followed a provision for re-entry for condition broken. There was no consideration for the conveyance other than that expressed in the condition and assumption of the deed. The defendant thereupon took possession of said conveyed premises, which were rented, and thereafter continued sjich possession, receiving the rentals thereof and making the needed repairs thereon.</p> <p>The uncle lived until February, 1898. During all this time he continued to live in the defendant’s household, and she faithfully observed all the obligations on her part expressed in said deed, and after his death buried him as agreed. At what expense this was to the defendant is not disclosed by the record, save that shortly after his death she mortgaged the property for an additional $800 to pay, in part, household bills and funeral expenses.</p> <p>The plaintiffs claim that the deed in question was executed and delivered to the defendant upon an agreement made with the uncle by her that she would take charge of the property, provide him with support, etc., as expressed in the condition of the deed, and upon his death would divide the property into four equal parts and convey one part to each of her brothers, the plaintiffs, retaining the other part herself. The court has, against the defendant’s contention, found that this agreement was made. It is also found that this agreement and the consequent conveyance resulted from an effort on her part to prevent her uncle from selling the property, as he was endeavoring to do, and taking the proceeds and going to France to spend the remainder of his days. It is also found that this agreement did not involve the assumption by the defendant of the $1,900 mortgage, which was in fact made in the conveyance. This agreement is found to have been made no otherwise than verbally, the only writing in any way connected with the matter being the deed in question.</p> <p>The judgment of the court was, in effect, that the defendant pay off said $800 mortgage and convey to each of the plaintiffs a one undivided one-fourth part of said premises, subject to the $1,900 mortgage.</p>

Action to recover possession of certain real estate, brought to the Superior Court in New Haven County and referred to the Hon. Edwin B. Gager, as a committee, to hear and report the facts. The defendants filed a remonstrance to the acceptance of the report, which was overruled {Shumway, J.j, and thereafter, the original defendants having died, the court {Robinson, J.~) permitted the plaintiff to substitute other persons as defendants, and to amend his complaint accordingly.

Petition for a recount of ballots cast for selectmen at the annual town meeting in Norwalk on the first Monday of .October, 1901, and for a determination as to the legality of certain ballots cast for the respondent, brought to and heard by the Ron. Ralph Wheeler, a judge of the Superior Court; facts found and judgment rendered for the respondent, and appeal by the petitioner for alleged errors in the rulings of the judge. The case is sufficiently stated in the opinion.

Action to foreclose a mortgage of certain real estate, brought to the Superior Court in Fairfield County and tried to the court, Robinson, J.; facts found and judgment rendered setting aside the mortgage upon the ground that it had been given in fraud of the creditors of the mortgagor, as claimed by the latter’s trustee in insolvency, and appeal by the plaintiff for alleged errors in the rulings of the court.

Action in the nature of trespass qu. el.fr. to determine the title to a triangular strip of land along the shore of Long Island Sound, brought to the Court of Common Pleas in Fairfield County and tried to the court, Curtis, J.; facts found and judgment rendered for the defendant to recover $10 damages, upon her counterclaim, and appeal by the plaintiff for alleged errors in the rulings and findings of the court. The case is sufficiently stated in the opinion.

Action to obtain a new trial for mispleading, for the reformation of a written contract, and for an injunction and other equitable relief, brought to the Court of Common Pleas in Fairfield County and tried to the court, Case, J.; facts found and judgment rendered for the defendants, and appeal by the plaintiff for alleged errors in the rulings and findings of the court. The case is sufficiently stated in the opinion.

; facts found and judgment rendered confirming the action of the lower court, and appeal by the applicant for alleged errors in the rulings of the court. April 25th, 1899, Bennett Seeley died, intestate, leaving a widow and only child, the latter of whom became the duly appointed and qualified administratrix upon his estate. The inventory showed estate amounting to about $17,000, of which $5,000 was in realty and about $12,000 in personalty, only a part of which was cash.

Action of replevin to recover the possession of certain ^articles of jewelry and other personal effects, brought to the 'City Court of New Haven and tried to the court, 'Dow, J.; facts found and judgment rendered for the defendant, and appeal by the plaintiff for alleged errors in the rulings and findings of the court. The case is sufficiently stated in the opinion.

Action for damages for causing the death of the plaintiff’s intestate, brought to the Superior Court in New Haven County. After a judgment for the plaintiff for $4,000 damages had been set aside by this court (74 Conn. p. 343), and the cause had been remanded, the plaintiff moved to be allowed to amend his complaint and claimed a new trial of the cause upon the complaint when amended.

Petition alleging the due election of the plaintiff as aider-man of the city of Derby, and .praying for a certificate thereof,, brought to and heard by the Hon. Milton A. Shwmway, a judge of the Superior Court; facts found and judgment rendered. for the plaintiff, and appeal by the defendant for alleged errors in the rulings of the court. The case is sufficiently stated in the opinion.

<p>Information for theft of a heifer, brought to the Supe-? rior Court in New London County and tried to the jury before Thayer, J.; verdict and judgment of guilty, and appeal by the accused for alleged errors in the rulings and charge of the court.</p> <p>The information charges the theft of one heifer of the value of $20, on or about the 1st day of September, 1900.</p> <p>A statute passed in 1893 makes the theft of a heifer, irrespective of its value, punishable by imprisonment in the State’s prison. Prior to that time punishment for such theft was graded according to the value of the animal stolen, and the imprisonment provided was in jail when that value was under $50.</p> <p>During the year 1900 Horace T. Knight, the owner of the stolen property, occupied a farm adjoining a tract of some 700 or 800 acres of land used by the owners thereof in common, for pasturage, and had the right to pasture his cattle on said tract; and the defendant occupied a farm adjoining said tract with the right to pasture his cattle thereon.</p> <p>It was admitted by the claims of the State and defendant, that a yearling red heifer, which was the subject of the alleged theft, was, in the spring of 1900, turned upon said tract of land to pasture for the season ; that late in the fall this heifer was driven by the defendant from said tract of land to his farm adjoining, and remained in his possession until June, 1901, when it was replevied at the suit of the said Knight; that at the time it was replevied it had a hole punched through its left ear; that several years before the defendant had adopted and had recorded as a mark for his cattle a hole punched through the left ear.</p> <p>The State offered evidence to prove and claimed to have proved that said Knight in May, 1900, owned and possessed a yearling red heifer, having marks by which it could be and was identified, and turned said heifer with other yearlings belonging to him into said tract for pasturage during the season; that late in the fall defendant feloniously took said heifer from said tract of land, where, she was in the possession of said Knight, he, the defendant, knowing her to be the property of Knight, and drove her to his- farm and held her there, claiming her as his own until she was replevied as aforesaid; that the defendant at the time he so took said heifer, viz., late in October, 1900, and immediately after he had so driven her to his farm, punched a hole in her left ear; that during the years of 1899 and 1900 the defendant did not own any red heifer.</p> <p>The defendant offered evidence to prove and claimed to have proved that in 1899 he raised a red heifer, and on May 30 th, 1899, when said heifer was eight weeks old, marked her with a punch through the left ear; that in the spring of 1901 he turned said heifer, so marked, with other yearlings belonging to him, into said tract of land for pasturage; that ■said red heifer remained there until late in the fall, when he took her to his farm and kept her until replevied as stated; that said red heifer was his property; that he took her from said tract to his farm openly ; and that he had openly claimed ownership of her to Knight and others.</p> <p>The defendant made no request to charge. Upon the matter of a felonious taking the court charged as follows and not otherwise : “ . . . The information charges that on the first day of September, 1900, he (the defendant) feloniously stole and drove away a heifer, the property of Knight. To constitute the crime here charged there must have been a wrongful taking and driving away of the heifer with the felonious intent of depriving the owner of the heifer by appropriating her to the use of another. A mere taking and driving her away would not constitute the crime, therefore, although, the taking might have been wrongful or unlawful. A person may wrongfully take another’s property through mistake, in which case it would not constitute a crime, although it might render the person taking it liable in a civil action. To make it a crime it must have been taken with a criminal intent. Where a person, knowing that a thing is the property of another, secretly takes it from that other's possession with the intention to deprive him of it and appropriate it to "the taker’s own use, there is a criminal intent—a felonious faking. To drive away another’s cattle from a pasture where he had placed them, with such knowledge and intent, would constitute the crime charged—a theft of such person’s cattle. . . . And they claim to have proved by a number of witnesses that the heifer which was then replevied was the one which Knight turned into the pasture and which was in the; pasture during the summer. And thus the State claims to-have proved the ownership of the heifer in Knight, that the-accused wrongfully stole, took and drove her away out of the pasture where shé rightfully was, and that he did it knowingly with criminal intent to appropriate her to his own use and so deprive Knight of his property. This, if proved, would establish the guilt of the accused.”</p> <p>“ Counsel for defendant in argument was about to state to-the jury the punishment prescribed in Chap. 113, Public Acts of 1893, on which this information is based, when the State’s Attorney objected and the court sustained the objection.. Thereupon the defendant’s counsel proposed to read the whole of said statute to the jury for the purpose of getting before them the punishment prescribed for the crime charged in the information. The State’s Attorney objected to the reading of that portion prescribing the punishment, and the objection was sustained. The defendant’s counsel duly excepted to the ruling in each instance.”</p> <p>The appeal assigns error in the charge on the subject of a felonious taking, and in failing to call the attention of the jury to facts the defendant claimed to have proved, namely, that he took the property openly, claiming it as his own, and that a taking under such circumstances was not a felonious-, taking ; it further assigns error in not permitting counsel to-read to the jury that part of the statute describing the punishment for the offense charged, and errors in certain rulings., on admission of evidence.</p>

Action by a wife against her husband for an order of main-' tenance for herself and her infant child. The first trial was reported in 72 Conn. 157. On the second trial, Thayer, J.> she obtained judgment that he pay her $40 a month, beginning from and after the institution of the action, and that execution issue monthly on the twentieth day of each month after the date of the judgment “for the amount of any payment or payments then unpaid.” Appeal by defendant.

Action to recover the amount of a promissory note, brought to the Court of Common Pleas in New London County and tried to the court, Noyes, J.; facts found and judgment rendered for the plaintiff, and appeal by the defendant for alleged errors in the rulings of the court. The case is sufficiently stated in the opinion.

Action to recover for medical care and treatment of an injured employee of the defendant, brought before a justice -of the peace and thence by the defendant’s appeal to the ■Court of Common Pleas in New London County, and tried •to the jury before Noyes, J.; verdict and judgment for the plaintiff for $15 damages, and appeal by the defendant for .alleged errors in the rulings and charge of the court. The case is sufficiently stated in the opinion.

Writ of error to reverse a judgment of the Superior ■Court for Hartford County, rendered upon a hearing in damages after a default, awarding the defendant in error $2,500 damages for the death of his intestate caused by the alleged negligence of the plaintiff in error. The specific error relied upon was the action of the trial ■court, Elmer, J., in overruling the demurrer of the railroad company to the complaint in the original action.

<p>A testator gave the residue of his estate to a publication society of the Advent Church, charging it to use the gift in counteracting—chiefly by publications—what he, in common with the other members of that denomination, believed to be “the unscriptural, unreasonable,</p> <p>, and pernicious doctrine of the immortality of the soul.” The legatee was a corporation empowered to receive and hold property for its corporate purposes, among which was that referred to by the testator in his will. Held: —</p> <p>1. That the legatee took the legacy absolutely and not in trust, although</p> <p>it was to be expended for the particular corporate purpose indicated by the testator.</p> <p>2. That the gift was not affected by the statute against perpetuities,</p> <p>nor was it contrary to public policy.</p>

<p>Action by the payee against the makers, to recover the amount of a promissory note, brought to the Court of Common Pleas in Hartford County and tried to the court, Coats, J. ; facts found and judgment rendered for the plaintiff, and appeal by the defendant Linda H. White for alleged errors in the rulings and findings of the court.</p> <p>The case is sufficiently stated in the opinion.</p>

Suit for an injunction to restrain the city of New Haven from selling or conveying certain land to either one of two of its codefendants, brought to the Superior Court in New Haven County; cross-complaint by said codefendants praying that the city be required to make said conveyance to one of them; demurrers to both the complaint and cross-complaint;' case reserved by the court, Case, J., for the advice' of this court upon the questions of law involved.

Information for resistance to an officer in the discharge of his duty, brought to the Criminal Court of Common Pleas in New London County and tried to the jury before Noyes, J.; verdict and judgment of guilty, and appeal by the accused for alleged errors in the rulings and charge of the court. The case is sufficiently stated in the opinion.

Action for breach of covenant of warranty, brought to the Court of Common Pleas in Hartford County and tried to the court, Case, J.; facts found and judgment rendered for the defendant, and appeal by the plaintiffs for alleged errors in the rulings of the court. The case is sufficiently stated in the opinion.

<p>To entitle a plaintiff to treble damages for a collision on the highway due to the defendant’s violation of the law of the road (General Statutes, §§ 2689, 2690, Rev. of 1902, §§ 2035, 2036) it is essential that the complaint should allege in some form that the defendant’s vehicle was one “for the conveyance of persons,” as prescribed by the statute. A description of the vehicle merely as a “ wagon ” or “team” is insufficient.</p> <p>The plaintiff, a physician, testified on his direct examination that he was driving to see a patient at the time of the collision. Held that upon his cross-examination he might be asked if he did not have a very large practice; also if he had not talked about the case with a person whose deposition was afterwards taken; and whether he had had any trouble with the defendant, or had said to him that he would secure his removal from his place in the post-office.</p>

<p>In granting or refusing a new trial for a verdict against evidence this court is necessarily confined to the printed testimony. Unlike the trial court, it cannot draw inferences from the appearance of witnesses, their manner of testifying, and other conditions of the trial, and therefore the decision of the trial judge upon this question is entitled to consideration and weight in the deliberations of this court.</p> <p>Accordingly, unless the manifest injustice of the verdict and utter want of reasonable ground for the jury’s action clearly appear from tbe printed evidence, this court cannot affirm that there was error in the refusal of the trial judge to grant a new trial.</p> <p>The supervision which a trial judge has over the verdict is an essential part of our jury system.</p>

<p>Action to recover damages for fraud and imposition practiced upon the plaintiff’s ward whereby she was induced to convey her real estate without consideration, brought to the Court of Common Pleas in Fairfield County and tried to the court, Curtis, J.; facts found and judgment rendered for the plaintiff for |500 damages, and appeal by the defendant for alleged errors in the rulings and findings of the court.</p> <p>The case is sufficiently stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Inasmuch as this court has repeatedly held that it has no power under the Constitution to retry pure questions of fact adjudicated by the trial court, parties should refrain from presenting such questions for review upon motion to correct the finding, a practice not only useless to them, but one which involves the injection into the record of a mass of unnecessary and confusing matter.</p> <p>An ultimate conclusion of fact is reviewable by this court, only when it appears that the trial court, in drawing its inferences from conceded, subordinate or evidential facts, has violated the plain rules of reason, or when some one or more of the material facts found are legally inconsistent with the conclusions reached.</p> <p>The defendants owned and operated a freight elevator of standard design, in good condition, used to carry freight from the floor of the basement to the sidewalk above. It was enclosed on three sides, in a lighted room, and left in the exclusive care of a clerk, with a notice posted warning persons against interfering With it. The plaintiff’s intestate had been specially warned not to meddle with it, but, when off duty, and in the absence of the clerk in charge, attempted to operate the elevator, knowing the dangers and in disobedience of orders. He was afterwards found thereon dead. Erom these facts, together with the position of the elevator and the body when found, the condition of the basement, and the method of conducting the defendants’ business, the court below found that there was no negligence on the part of the defendants, and that the negligence of the plaintiff’s intestate contributed to the injury. Held that the specific facts found fully warranted these conclusions. It appeared that the elevator was not provided with a gate, that it did not strictly comply with the city ordinance, that the deceased was at times employed more than ten hours, and that the elevator might be started by one stumbling and grasping its rope. Held that these facts were not legally inconsistent with the conclusions of the trial court as to negligence and contributory negligence.</p>

<p>A city charter required the treasurer to deposit all funds of the city in a bank designated by the board of finance. While treasurer of New Haven, the defendant did not deposit its funds in the bank so selected, and the city failed inconsequence to receive a considerable sum that would otherwise have been paid as interest on such deposits. In an action to recover this loss it was held :—</p> <p>1. That the city was not limited to an action on the defendant’s official bond, but had a concurrent remedy in an action at law to recover damages caused by his breach of duty.</p> <p>2. That further provision of the charter, requiring sealed bids for city work or supplies, did not apply to the selection of a depositary of city funds by the board of finance, although it was required to obtain the highest rate of interest consistent with the safety of the deposits.</p> <p>3. That inasmuch as the charter expressly required all city funds to be thus deposited, the treasurer’s duty to so deposit was ministerial and not discretionary.</p> <p>4. That the action of other city officials in auditing the treasurer’s accounts and in not requiring' him to deposit his funds as aforesaid, and their knowledge that lie did not so deposit, was not a waiver of the right of the city to sue nor an estoppel against its recovery.</p>

Action to foreclose a judgment lien; brought to the Superior Court for New Haven County. Demurrer to the complaint sustained, Oase, J., and appeal by plaintiffs. The case is sufficiently stated in the opinion.

<p>Action to recover for services as a broker in procuring a loan of f300,000, brought to the Superior Court in New Haven County and tried to the court, George W. Wheeler, J.; facts found and judgment rendered for the plaintiff against the defendant Clowes, and appeal by him for alleged errors in the rulings and findings of the court.</p> <p>The case is sufficiently stated in the opinion.</p>

Action to recover for services rendered in obtaining a mortgage loan of $44,000, on defendant’s real estate, brought to the City Court of New Haven and tried to the court, Bishop, J., after demurrer to the amended complaint had been overruled;'facts found and judgment rendered for the plaintiff for $390, and appeal by the defendant.

Action for an injunction, brought to the District Court of Waterbury, and tried to the court, Cowell, J.; facts found and case reserved for the advice of this court.

Action for injury to goods received for transportation; brought to the Court of Common Pleas for New Haven County, and tried to the jury before Hubbard, J.; verdict and judgment for defendant, and appeal by the plaintiff. The case is sufficiently stated in the opinion.

Action to recover damages for personal injuries claimed to have been caused by the defendant’s negligence, brought to the Superior Court in New Haven County where successive demurrers to portions of the complaint were sustained (Elmer, J.j, and upon a subsequent demurrer the complaint itself was held insufficient (Case, J.j and judgment was rendered for the defendant to recover its costs, from which the plaintiff appealed for alleged errors in the rulings of the court.

Action of summary process, brought before a justice of the peace and by transfer to the City Court of Waterbury, and tried to the court, Welch, J.; facts found and judgment rendered for the defendant, and appeal by the plaintiffs for alleged errors in the rulings of the court. The case is sufficiently stated in the opinion.

<p>Action to subject tbe equitable interest of two of the defendants in certain real estate, to a lien in favor of the plaintiff for a judgment debt of $107, and for other relief, brought to the District Court of Waterbury and tried to the court, Cowell, J.; facts found and judgment rendered for the plaintiff, and appeal by the defendants for alleged errors in the rulings of the court.</p> <p>The case is sufficiently stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Action to recover damages for injuries to land adjoining a highway, resulting from a change in its grade, brought to the Superior Court in New Haven County where a demurrer to certain paragraphs of the answer was sustained (8hum way. J.) and the case afterwards tried, to the jury Bor aback, J.; verdict and judgment for the plaintiffs for $300 damages, and appeal by the defendant for alleged errors in the rulings and charge of the court.</p> <p>The case is sufficiently stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Action to recover for services rendered as a real estate broker, brought to the City Court of New Haven and tried to the jury before Bow, J.; verdict and judgment for the plaintiff for $2.60, and appeal by him for alleged errors in the rulings and charge of the court.</p> <p>The case is sufficiently stated in the opinion.</p>

Information for breach of the peace, for an. assault, andl for resisting and obstructing an officer in the discharge of his-duty, brought to the Town Court of Orange and thence by the defendant’s appeal to the Criminal Court of Common Pleas in New Haven County and tried to the jury before-Hubbard, J.; verdict and judgment of guilty upon two-counts, and appeal by the accused for alleged errors in the rulings of the court. The case is sufficiently stated in the opinion.

Information in four counts charging conspiracy to defraud, and obtaining money by false pretenses, brought to the Superior Court in Fairfield County and tried to the jury before Shumway, J.; verdict and judgment of guilty on the first -count only, and appeal by the defendant Gannon for alleged errors in the rulings and charge of the court.

Application to Hon. Charles B. Andrews, as a judge of the Superior Court, for the appointment of appraisers of certain water rights in Litchfield County, to be taken under the plaintiff’s charter; motion to dismiss denied, and a demurrer to application overruled, after which the application was, heard and an order passed appointing appraisers, who rer turned a report of their appraisal to the Superior Court in Litchfield County.

Action to recover money claimed to have been loaned to ■one of the defendants through the agency of his wife, the •other defendant, brought to the City Court of New Haven, .and tried to the jury before Bishop, J.; verdict and judgment for plaintiff, and appeal by one of the defendants, Charles E. Woodward, for alleged errors in the rulings and charge of the •court. The case is sufficiently stated in the opinion.

Petition of the selectmen of the town of Plymouth to the railroad commissioners, to compel a change of grade in a highway in said town at a point where it was crossed at grade by the railroad of the appellant. The commissioners ordered the highway to be carried under the railroad, three quarters of the expense to fall on the appellant and the rest on the town.

Complaint for cruelty to animals, brought originally before a justice of the peace and thence, by appeal of the defendant, to the Superior Court in Middlesex County and tried to the jury before Ralph Wheeler, J.; verdict and judgment of guilty, and appeal by the accused for alleged errors in the rulings and charge of the court. The case is sufficiently stated in the opinion.

; facts found and judgment rendered sustaining the action of the county commissioners, and appeal by the applicants for alleged errors in the rulings and findings of the court. The case is sufficiently stated in the opinion.

<p>Action for damages for bodily injuries alleged to have been caused by the defendant’s negligence, brought to the Superior Court in Hartford County and tried to the jury before George W Wheeler, J.; verdict and judgment for the plaintiff, and appeal by the defendant.</p> <p>The ease is sufficiently stated in the opinion.</p>

Application in the nature of an appeal from the doings of the board of relief of the town and city of Hartford, brought to the Superior Court in Hartford County and tried to the court, Thayer, J.; judgment for appellees, and appeal by the applicants. The case is sufficiently stated in the opinion.

Action to recover the amount of a legacy, brought to the Court of Common Pleas for Hartford. County where a demurrer to the complaint was sustained ( Coats, •/.) and judgment rendered for the defendant, from which the plaintiff appealed. Johann Ludwig Carl Fritsche dying left a will which was duly probated by his wife, the defendant herein, who was named as executrix, and who duly qualified as such and settled the estate in due form.

Action to recover damages for personal injuries resulting in the death of the plaintiff’s intestate, brought to the Superior Court in Hartford County and heard in damages to the court, Gager, J.; facts found and judgment for the plaintiff for $1,500, and appeal by the defendant. The case is sufficiently stated in the opinion.

<p>A husband assigned a life insurance policy upon his life, payable to his executors, administrators, or assigns, to his wife, and subsequently she released her interest to him by written instrument reciting that the consideration which she had given for the assignment to her had been fully paid and satisfied. Held that upon the husband’s decease his administrator was entitled to the insurance money.</p> <p>The trial court is not bound, as matter of law, to believe the testimony of an unimpeached witness, even where it is uncontradicted and unaffected adversely by any other evidence; much less so, where, .as in the present case, there is evidence having an adverse tendency or effect.</p>

Action to recover for services as a surveyor, brought to the City Court of Hartford and tried to the court, Stanton, Acting Judge; facts found and judgment rendered for the plaintiff for $177, and appeal by him for alleged error of the court in refusing to allow interest on the account. This action is brought to recover the price and value of services rendered and materials furnished by the plaintiff to the defendant.

• Appeal from an order and decree of the Court of Probate for the district of Hartford, approving and admitting to probate a certain instrument as the last will and testament of Henry Kennedy of Hartford, deceased, taken to the Superior Court in Hartford County and tried to the court, Thayer, J.; facts found and judgment rendered affirming the decree of the Court of Probate, and appeal by the plaintiffs for alleged errors in the rulings and findings of the court.

<p>Action for an injunction to restrain the defendant from acting as guardian of the property of the plaintiff’s minor son, brought to the Superior Court in Middlesex County where a demurrer to the complaint was sustained (Case, J.'), and, after a motion to amend the complaint had been denied (Ralph Wheeler, judgment was rendered for the defendant, from which the plaintiff appealed for alleged errors in the rulings of the court.</p> <p>The case is sufficiently stated in the opinion.</p>

'). From the subsequent refusal of the court, Ralph Wheeler, J., to set aside the nonsuit, the appellant appealed. The case is sufficiently stated in the opinion.

Action to recover possession of a certain tract of land, brought to the Superior Court in New London County and tried to the court, Ralph Wheeler, J.; facts found and judgment rendered for the defendant, and appeal by the plaintiffs. The case is sufficiently stated in the opinion.

Indictment against the defendant jointly with Thomas M. Wormsley, for murder in the first degree. Having asked and been granted a separate trial, he was tried to the jury (George W Wheeler, J.'). Verdict of guilty of murder in the second degree and sentence to imprisonment for life in the State’s Prison, from which he appealed, alleging errors in the conduct of the trial. The case is sufficiently stated in the opinion.

Action for lumber sold and delivered, brought to the Superior Court for New Haven County and tried to the court, Shumway, J. Judgment for plaintiff to recover $2,586.03, from which it appealed.

<p>The right of the owner of property to dispose of it as he pleases is an incident of ownership. If deprived of that right by a fraudulent conspiracy, equity will afford relief, although he may have sustained no direct pecuniary loss.</p> <p>What honor and good faith require a man to ask of a court of equity, for the profit of others, will not be refused without strong cause.</p> <p>The plaintiffs, with other owners of real estate in a residential neighborhood, understood and recognized that their common interests required the exclusion of personally undesirable or objectionable tenants, and the keeping of their respective premises from business uses or other purposes which might render the locality less attractive for private residences. The defendants, who were aware of this neighborhood understanding, and that 0, who desired to purchase the property for use as a hoarding-house, was an objectionable person to the plaintiffs, agreed between themselves to obtain the property by falsely pretending that it was desired as a private residence for the partner of one of them, who was a desirable neighbor; and by means of this fraud gained an apparent title which was immediately conveyed to C. Held that a court of equity had power to restore the parties to their original position, by setting aside, as void, the deed or deeds so obtained, and compelling a reconveyance of the paper title acquired under them.</p>

Action for obstructing a highway so that the plaintiff, an abutting pi’oprietor, owning the fee in the highway, was deprived of reasonable access to or use of his premises ; brought to the Court of Common Pleas for Fairfield County. The defendant suffered a default and moved to be heard in damages, which hearing was had before Hon. Charles B. Andrews as a committee.

Action for false imprisonment, brought to the Superior Court for Middlesex County. The defendants answered, justifying, one as a justice of the peace and the other as a deputy-sheriff, under a sentence of the plaintiff by the former to imprisonment for a contempt of court. A demurrer to the material part of this defense was overruled (Prentice, J.j. The plaintiff then replied, and the reply was held insufficient on demurrer (Prentice, J.').

Appeals from the refusal of the county commissioners for Hartford County to grant liquor licenses, taken by the respective applicants to the Superior Court in said county and tried to the court, Thayer, J.; facts found and judgment rendered dismissing the appeal in each case, and appeal by the applicants for alleged errors in the rulings of the court. The case is sufficiently stated in the opinion.

Action of foreclosure, brought to tbe City Court of Hartford, wliere successive demurrers to the complaint and amended complaint were overruled, and the case was tried to the court, Morse, J.; facts found and judgment rendered for possession only, and appeal by each party for alleged errors in the rulings and judgment of the court.

Action to recover damages for breach of contract, brought to the District Court of Waterbury and tried to the jury before Cowell, J.; verdict and judgment for the plaintiff for $590 damages, and appeal by the defendant for alleged errors in the rulings and charge of the court. The case is sufficiently stated in the opinion.

Action for damages for personal injuries claimed to have been caused by the defendant’s negligence, brought to the Court of Common Pleas in New Haven County and heard in damages to the court, Cable, J.; facts found and judgment rendered for the plaintiff for $700, and appeal by the defendant for alleged errors in the rulings and findings of the court. The case is sufficiently stated in the opinion.

William S. Case, a judge of the Superior Court, who sustained the defendant’s demurrer and dismissed the application, from which judgment the' plaintiff appealed. The substance of the application is as follows: The respondent, and its predecessors in title, for many years prior to 1884, and to the present time, have owned a tract of land and water-privilege on the Naugatuck River, about two miles southerly from Waterbury.

<p>In an action to recover for injuries to the person, a demurrer to the • complaint was sustained, and, upon the plaintiff's refusing to amend, judgment was rendered for the defendant. Thereupon the plaintiff brought another suit for the same cause, which the defendant defaulted and, upon a hearing in damages, offered in evidence the former judgment as a bar, as a result of which the plaintiff obtained a judgment for nominal damages only, amounting with costs to $118.44. The plaintiff then brought a writ of error and succeeded in reversing the judgment in the first action, and upon a retrial recovered a judgment for $3,000. In the present action, in the Superior Court for New Haven County, to enforce the payment of both judgments, it was held: —</p> <p>1. That upon the reversal of the erroneous judgment in the first action there was nothing to support the judgment for nominal damages rendered in the second; and therefore the plaintiff was not entitled to recover on the second count of his complaint, which set forth such judgment.</p> <p>2. That the amount of the matter in demand ($118.44), as described in that count, being less than $500, the Superior Court had no jurisdiction.</p> <p>Section 811 of the General Statutes (Rev. 1902, §551) provides that distinct claims founded on contract may be joined in one complaint, each being stated in a separate count, and that all courts whose jurisdiction is limited by the amount in demand may render judgment for the amount found due on each count, if such sum does not exceed the jurisdiction of the court. Held that the purpose of this provision was not to confer upon the court jurisdiction of each of the claims, but to allow a court of limited jurisdiction to render a judgment for claims which, in the aggregate, might exceed the maximum limit of its jurisdiction.</p>

Action in the nature of interpleader to determine what part or proportion of a fire insurance loss each of the defendants should equitably pay, brought to the Superior Court in New Haven County and reserved by that court, Thayer, J., upon an agreed statement of facts, for the consideration and advice of this court. The case is sufficiently stated in the opinion.

; facts found and judgment rendered disallowing the claim, and appeal by the claimant. The case is sufficiently stated in the opinion.

Action against the sureties upon a probate bond, brought to the Superior Court in Fairfield County and tried to the jury before Robinson,' J.; verdict and judgment for plaintiff for $7,000, and appeal by the defendants for alleged errors in the charge of the court. The case is sufficiently stated in the opinion.

Action for the removal of a lien, as a olond upon title, brought to the Court of Common Pleas in Fairfield County and reserved by that court, Ourtis, J., upon a demurrer to the complaint, for the advice of this court. The case is sufficiently stated in the opinion.

<p>Action to secure the removal of ajerice claimed to have been maliciously erected with intent to injure and annoy the plaintiffs in the use of their adjacent land, brought to the Court of Common Pleas in Fairfield County and tried to the court, Curtis, J.; facts found and judgment rendered for the plaintiffs, and appeal by the defendant.</p> <p>The case is sufficiently stated in the opinion.</p>

Action to foreclose a mortgage, brought to the Court of Common Pleas in Fairfield County and tried to the court, Downs, Deputy-Judge; facts found and judgment rendered for the plaintiff, but disallowing interest on the note, and appeal by her for alleged errors in the rulings of the court. The case is sufficiently stated in the opinion.

Action to recover for personal injuries claimed to have been caused by the defendants’ negligence, brought to the Superior Court in Fairfield County and heard in damages to the court, Ralph Wheeler, J.; facts found and judgment rendered for nominal damages only, and appeal by the plaintiff for alleged errors in the rulings and findings of the court. The case is sufficiently stated in the opinion.

Action to recover the amount of a promissory note, brought to the District Court of Waterbury and tried to the court, Cowell, J.; facts found and judgment rendered for the defendant, and appeal by the plaintiff for alleged errors in the rulings of the court. The note sued upon is as follows:— “ 335.00/100.

; facts found and judgment rendered reducing the assessment against the plaintiff to $5,823, and appeal by the defendant for alleged errors in the rulings of the court. A bill of exceptions was filed by the plaintiff, which was allowed and made part of the record. The case is sufficiently stated in the opinion.

Action for goods sold and delivered, brought before a justice of the peace for Litchfield County, and thence by the defendant’s appeal to the Court of Common Pleas in said county and tried to the court, Welch, J. Judgment for plaintiff for less than its demand, from which it appealed. The case is sufficiently stated in the opinion.

Petition for a recount of ballots and a judicial determination that the petitioner, instead of the respondent, had been duly elected selectman of New Milford at its annual town election in October, 1902, brought to and heard by the Ron. George W. Wheeler, a judge of the Superior Court, who rendered judgment for the petitioner, from which the respondent appealed for alleged errors in the rulings of the court.

Action upon the common counts, brought to the Court of Common Pleas for Hartford County and tried to the court, Peck, J.; facts found and judgment rendered for the plaintiff, and appeal by the defendant for alleged errors in the rulings of the court. ' The plaintiff sued upon the common counts, and filed his bill of particulars showing debit items to the amount of $710.33. The largest of the items was for a steam engine priced at $475.

Action in the nature of an appeal from the order of the railroad commissioners in allowing the defendant to lay a creo-resinate wood pavement between its tracks for a limited distance on Main Street in the city of Hartford, brought to the Superior Court in Hartford County where the defendant’s demurrer to a portion of the complaint and its motion to dismiss were sustained by the court, Ralph Wheeler, J., from which rulings the plaintiff appealed.

Action for damages for breach of contract to deliver to plaintiffs possession of a certain store leased to them by the defendant, brought to the Superior Court for Litchfield County and heard in damages, after a default, to the court, Ralph Wheeler, J. Judgment for substantial damages, and appeal by defendant.

Action to foreclose a judgment lien, brought to the Court of Common Pleas in Fairfield County and tried to the court, Curtis, J.; judgment for plaintiff, and appeal by defendant Lena Brown for alleged errors in the rulings and findings of the court. The case is sufficiency stated in the opinion.

Action to recover rent reserved under a written lease, brought to the Superior Court in Fairfield County where a demurrer to the answer was overruled, Robinson, J., and one to the reply was sustained, Ulmer, J., and judgment was rendered QGrager, J.') for the defendant, from which the plaintiffs appealed. The case is sufficiently stated in the .opinion.

Action under General Statutes, Rev. 1902, § 4053, by an execution creditor who had levied on certain real estate, to ascertain and establish his title; brought to the Superior Court for Fairfield County and reserved (Gager, J”.), on a finding of facts, for the advice of this court. The case is sufficiently stated in the opinion.

Action to restrain the defendants from remodeling the existing city hall in Bridgeport and from making any appropriation or laying any tax therefor, brought to the Superior Court in Fairfield County where a demurrer to the complaint was overruled proforma, Elmer, J., and the case was afterwards tried to the court, Gager, J.; facts found and judgment rendered granting a permanent injunction, and appeal by the defendants for alleged errors in the rulings of the court.

<p>Action to recover for the support of a pauper, brought to the Court of Common Pleas in Fairfield County and tried to the court, Scott, Acting-Judge; facts found and judgment rendered for the defendant, and appeal by the plaintiff for alleged errors in the rulings of the court.</p> <p>The case is sufficiently stated in the opinion.</p>

Action to recover damages for breach of contract to sell steel turnings to the plaintiff, brought to the City Court of New Haven and tried to the court, Bishop, J. ; facts found and judgment rendered for the plaintiff for $68, and appeal by the defendant for alleged errors in the rulings of the court. The case is sufficiently stated in the opinion.

Actioh to recover the possession of land, brought to the Superior Court in New Haven County and tried to the court, Elmer, J.; facts found and judgment rendered for the defendants, and appeal by the plaintiffs. The facts are sufficiently stated in the opinion.

Action upon the statute to recover damages for fraud in concealing property from attachment, brought to the City Court of New Haven, where the defendant filed a plea to the jurisdiction upon the ground that the complaint contained no ad damnum clause, and the plaintiff thereupon asked leave to amend; the court, Dow, J., denied the motion, sustained the plea and dismissed the cause, and the plaintiff appealed.

Action to recover for meals furnished to the members of the board of registration of the town of New Haven, and their assistants, upon the order of the board, brought to the City Court of New Haven and tried to the court, Bishop J. ; judgment rendered for the plaintiffs, and appeal by the city. The case is sufficiently stated in the opinion.

<p>An electric light company is bound to exercise a very high degree of care in using a highway bridge for its own purposes ; and in determining what precautions are reasonably necessary it is bound to consider all the uses to which the bridge is customarily put.</p> <p>If boys are accustomed to use it as a bathing place and diving stage, with the knowledge of and without objection from the municipal authorities in charge of the bridge, the electric wires must be strung over or across it with reasonable regard to their safety.</p> <p>A boy of sixteen is not necessarily chargeable with knowledge of the different modes of insulating electric wires, and their comparative effects.</p> <p>In an action for negligence causing death, the only proof on the point of damages was that the intestate was a bright, active, intelligent boy of sixteen, five feet and two inches high, who for three years had been a general clerk in a village grocery store. Held that this was not insufficient to uphold a judgment for $5,000, as it would be presumed that the court found that his net earnings annually, after he would have come of age, would have exceeded the amount of the ■ interest which could probably be obtained during the same period on that sum, and that due allowance was made for the anticipation of these earnings by force of a judgment immediately payable.</p> <p>Courts may take judicial notice of the probabilities disclosed by mortality tables.</p> <p>When the evidence and rulings of the triai court are made part of the record, this court is authorized, under § 797 of the General Statutes of 1902, to examine the entire record for the purpose of determining whether the appellant is injured by the exclusion of a particular question.</p> <p>In an action for negligence in stringing electric wires over a highway bridge, whereby the plaintiff’s intestate was injured, the defendant’s superintendent, having testified that the cross-arm on the pole nearest the point where the injury was suffered was fifteen feet lower than the cross-arm on the pole standing next in line, and that this was done to lessen the strain on the first-mentione.d pole, was asked on cross-examination what it would cost to put in an intermediate pole for the purpose of elevating the wire across the draw. Held that this was proper cross-examination, as in determining the reasonable limits within which the defendant was bound to guard this place, tlie expense of adopting another mode of stringing the wires was a legitimate subject of consideration.</p> <p>An expert who examined the line some months after the accident was asked, as a preliminary to showing by him that it was properly constructed at the time of the accident, to describe it as it was when he saw it. Held that it was within the discretion of the court to exclude this question as too remote.</p>

Action by the receiver of an insolvent life insurance company against two of its principal officers and directors, to recover damages resulting from the alleged wrongful and negligent conduct of the defendants in making a loan of its funds unauthorized by law, brought to the Superior Court in New Haven County and tried to the court, Thayer, J.; judgment for the plaintiff, and appeal by the defendants.

Action to foreclose a judgment lien, brought to the Superior Court in New Haven County; facts found and case reserved, Rorabaek, J., for the consideration and advice of this court. The facts are sufficiently stated in the opinion.

Action for negligence causing the death of the plaintiff’s intestate, brought to the Superior Court in New Haven County and heard in damages to the court, Thayer, J.; facts found and judgment rendered for $5,000 damages, and appeal by the defendant. The case is sufficiently stated in the opinion.

Petition for a new trial for newly-discovered evidence, brought to and tried by the Superior Court in Fairfield County, Shumway, J.; demurrer to petition sustained, and appeal by the plaintiff. The case is sufficiently stated in the opinion.

<p>The ultimate purpose of statutes regulating the exercise of the right of suffrage is to secure an orderly and faithful expression and registration of the popular will upon the questions submitted for decision. If ballots are to be rejected and voters thereby disfranchised, it should be because the legislature has seen fit to require it in the interest of an honest suffrage, and has expressed that requirement in unmistakable language. It should not result from doubtful judicial construction, from a too strict regard for the mere letter of the statute, or from a resort to nice or technical refinements in the interpretation or application of the law.</p> <p>Ballots valid on their face and cast in good faith for one of two candidates of the same political party, each of whom with some reason and color of right claimed to be its official nominee, are not to be rejected merely because the moderator, or even a court after full investigation, is of the opinion that the other nominee was technically the regular party candidate, and therefore had the sole right to use the party designation at the head of the ticket. Such factional disputes within the party organization must sooner or later be decided, for the most part, by the verdict of the voter, as the machinery of the law is not adapted to their timely settlement.</p>

Action in the nature of an appeal from the doings of the board of relief of the town of Roxbury, in adding a mine or quarry to the plaintiff’s tax list, brought to the Superior Court in Litchfield County and tried to the court, George W. Wheeler, J.; facts found and judgment rendered confirming the action of the board of relief, and appeal by the taxpayer. The case is sufficiently stated in the opinion.

Appeal by the administrator of the estate of Mabel I. Stevens, deceased, from a decree of the Court of Probate for the district of New Haven, disapproving a final administration account; taken to the Superior Court for New Haven County, by which (Thayer, •/.) the decree of the Court of Probate was confirmed, and appeal by the administrator.

Action against husband and wife for goods furnished, brought to the City Court of New Haven and tried to the court, Bishop, J.; judgment for plaintiffs for $200, and appeal by the wife.

Action to recover damages for personal injuries, brought to the Court of Common Pleas in New Haven County and tried to the court, Qable, J.; judgment for the defendant, and appeal by the plaintiff for alleged error in striking the case from the jury docket.

Action to redeem mortgaged real estate, brought to the Superior Court in New Haven County where a demurrer to the answer was overruled (Skumway, J.') and the case was afterwards tried to the court, Thayer, J.; judgment for defendant, and appeal by plaintiffs.

<p>Action for goods sold and delivered, brought to the Court of Common Pleas in New Haven County where the plaintiff was required (Cable, J.') to amend his bill of particulars, and the cause was thereafter erased from the. docket (Hubbard, J.) for want of jurisdiction, from which ruling the plaintiff appealed.</p>

Action for diverting the water of a stream to the injury of plaintiff’s mill-privilege, and for fouling the stream above his premises, brought to the Superior Court in New Haven County, where a demurrer to the complaint was overruled (Prentice, J.j and the cause was afterwards tried to the court, Thayer, J.; judgment for the plaintiff upon the first count for $50, and upon the second for $5, and appeal by the defendant.

<p>The defendant leased certain floor space in its retail department store to one G, who was to carry on there, as owner, the crockery and house-furnishing business. The lease provided, however, that its existence should not be disclosed by either party, and that the busiJ ness should be conducted in such a manner as to indicate to the public that it was a mere branch or part of the defendant’s business. Preparatory to opening this department G bought certain goods of the plaintiff on credit, representing himself as an agent and buyer for the defendant. Belying upon these representations, the goods were billed and shipped by the plaintiff to the defendant, who paid the freight and turned them over to G for sale in his department. About three months later G became insolvent and left town, and upon the plaintiff’s request for a remittance the defendant for the first time disavowed its responsibility for (?’s purchase. Held that if the agreement did not impliedly confer upon G the right to use the name and credit of the defendant in the purchase of necessary stock, its prolonged silence and acquiescence, under the circumstances disclosed by the finding, constituted a clear case of ratification of his purchase, and rendered the defendant liable therefor.</p>

Actions of replevin by a receiver in bankruptcy for certain horses and carriages, brought to the Court of Common Pleas in New Haven County and tried to the court, Cable, J.; judgment for defendant in each case, and appeal by the plaintiff.

Action for treble damages for a vexatious suit resulting in the appointment of a conservator over the plaintiff, brought to the Superior Court in New Haven County, where judgment was rendered (Shumway, J.) for the defendants, upon the plaintiff’s admissions in his reply to the defendants’ answer, from which the plaintiff appealed.

, in favor of the plaintiff, to which the appellee filed a plea in abatement, on the ground that the appeal was not seasonably taken.

Action to settle the title to real estate, brought to the Superior Court in Hartford County and reserved by that court, Shumway, J., upon an agreed finding of facts, for the consideration and advice of this court. Paul Revoir died childless in 1869, seized and possessed of an estate in fee simple in the real estate in controversy. He left a will which was duly probated and of which his widow, Bertha Revoir, became the duly qualified executrix.

Writ of error to reverse an order of the Superior Court in New Haven County (Ralph Wheeler, •/.) erasing a cause from the docket of said court. The defendant in error filed a plea in abatement, on the ground that no bond with surety for tbe prosecution of the writ had been taken at the time the writ was issued; to which plea the plaintiff demurred. By consent the case was heard at the same time upon the demurrer and upon the merits.

Action to set aside, as void, judicial proceedings by virtue of which, the defendant had acquired the apparent title and possession of certain real estate, brought to the Superior Court in New Haven County; facts found and judgment rendered ( Gager, J.) for the plaintiff, and appeal by the defendant. In 1893 the defendant brought suit against her brother, James Doolan, returnable to the Court of Common Pleas in New Haven county, and recovered judgment.

Suit for an injunction and other equitable relief, and for damages, on account of a structure projecting over the plaintiff ’s land, constructed by the defendants on their land adjoining ; brought to the Court of Common Pleas for Fairfield County by appeal from the Town Court of Norwalk, and tried to the court, Curtis, J. Judgment that the defendants remove the structure, and appeal by them.

<p>It is not essential to the setting aside of a conveyance made without consideration and to defraud existing creditors of the grantor, that the grantee should have had knowledge of the grantor’s fraudulent purpose; and therefore proof of such knowledge, although not averred in the complaint, is harmless.</p> <p>The plaintiffs, creditors of G, sought to foreclose a judgment-lien upon land the paper and record title to which had been transferred by G to his wife pending the indebtedness, alleging in their complaint that such transfer was without consideration and fraudulent as against them. Held that it was not necessary to the validity of a judgment in favor of the plaintifEs that the complaint should state accurately and in detail all the acts of G in his attempt to defraud his creditors by placing the property in question in his wife’s name.</p>

Suit to restrain the defendant stockholders of the plaintiff corporation from electing additional directors prior to the annual meeting, and from changing the by-laws for that purpose, brought to the Court of Common Pleas in Fairfield County and reserved by that court, Curtis, J., upon a demurrer to the complaint, for the advice of this court.

<p>Material averments of a sworn application to correct a finding, should be denied—if any denial is intended—at least before the argument of the cause begins, although the seven days ordinarily to be allowed under the rule (Rules of Court, Ed. of 1899, p. 95, § 14) has not then elapsed.</p> <p>The plaintiff alleged that it was the actual, bona fide owner of the claim in suit, by virtue of a written assignment executed and delivered to it (describing the instrument). Held that while a general denial of such paragraph admitted the due execution and delivery of the writing, it put in issue the plaintiff’s right to sue as the actual and bona fide owner of the claim.</p> <p>To establish such right the assignee must show that he owns the claim in his own right and for his own benefit, without accountability.</p> <p>An order of the trial court setting aside a verdict as against evidence is entitled to great weight, and all reasonable presumptions are to be made in its support. This is especially true where, as in the present case, the order was promptly made by the court of its own motion.</p> <p>The evidence briefly reviewed and the action of the lower court in setting aside the verdict sustained.</p> <p>Under our practice the acceptance of a verdict is little more than a formal prerequisite to the discharge of the jury from further consideration of the cause, and does not imply that the verdict is approved by the court as a proper determination of the issues tried.</p> <p>Whether motions to set aside a verdict as against evidence fall within the rule which requires motions in arrest to be filed within twenty-four hours after the verdict is rendered, qucere. If so, the trial court has discretionary power to entertain them, although filed later.</p>

Action for rent of a house, brought to the Court of Common Pleas for Litchfield County and tried to the court, Welch, J. ; judgment for plaintiff, and appeal by defendant. The following facts were found: The defendant’s wife was his agent to hire a furnished house for the summer. The house in question was shown her by the plaintiff’s broker, and the bounds of the house-lot pointed out.

Action by an administrator cum testamento annexo, for the construction of the will of Cornelia S. Chase of Hartford ; brought to the Superior Court for Hartford County and reserved (,Shumway, The will was dated March 1st, 1895. The testatrix died December 10th, 1901. She was a widow with two adopted daughters.

Action to recover damages for personal injuries caused by a defective highway, heard in damages to the Superior Court in New Haven County, Roraback, J. ; facts found and judgment rendered for $400, and appeal by the defendant.

Ineobmation in the nature of quo warranto, brought to and tried by the Superior Court (G-ager, J.') in Fairfield County ; demurrer to replication sustained and judgment rendered for respondent, from which the relator appealed.

Action to recover the amount of a legacy, brought to and tried by the Superior Court in Windham County, Shumway,; facts found and judgment rendered for the plaintiff, and appeal by one of the defendants.

<p>Action for work and labor in constructing a wooden building, brought by appeal from a justice of the peace to the Court of Common Pleas in Hartford County and tried to the jury before Coats, J.; verdict and judgment for the plaintiff, and appeal by the defendant.</p>

Action for damages for personal injuries alleged to have been caused by the negligence of the defendant’s servant, brought to the Superior Court in Hartford County and tried to the jury before Rorabaok, J.; verdict and judgment for the plaintiff for $500, and appeal by the defendant.

<p>Opinion filed with the clerk of the City Court of Waterbury.</p>

<p>Opinion filed with the clerk of the Superior Court, New Haven County.,</p>