Callanan v. Runyun’s Empirical Analysis
75 F.3d 1293 · 1996
Citation profile
40 federal appellate · 8 district · 1 state decisions
How this case has been cited
Cited by 89 later decisions — most recently September 2024 · most notably Smith v. St. Louis University (1997), Tammy Scusa v. Nestle US a Company Inc (1999)
40 federal appellate · 8 district · 1 state decisions
Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.
Relationships
Relies on St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks · Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc. · Meritor Savings Bank, FSB v. Vinson · American Manufacturers Mutual Insurance v. United States · Granito v. United States
Most-quoted passages
The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 89 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.
“(1) he belongs to a protected group; (2) he was subject to unwelcome sexual harassment; (3) the harassment was based on sex; (4) the harassment affected a term, condition, or privilege of employment.”
5 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority“To begin with, the excluded testimony in this case, unlike the statistical evidence and specific factual allegations involved in our earlier decisions, see, e.g., Estes, 856 F.2d at 1102-04 , consisted largely of generalized, subjective assertions of a perceived bias in operations at the [employer’s] facility. Moreover, to the extent that the testimony did identify discrete acts of discrimination, the witnesses did not complain that Callanan’s own supervisors had engaged in any behavior that we could correctly characterize as improper. Cf id. at 1104 (mentioning that evidence of an employer’s past discriminatory acts may not be probative where the employees involved in the improper activity were unconnected with the employees who discriminated against the complainant). Lastly, and perhaps most importantly, the evidentiary ruling in this case was not the type of blanket pretrial exclusion that we have in the past viewed with such skepticism. See id. at 1103 (stating .that blanket pretrial exclusions are examined with “particular care”). Instead, in what must only be viewed as an extraordinary display of patience, the district judge in this case allowed Callanan to present her offer of proof in testimonial form and withheld a final ruling on the evidence until after the trial was completed. Under these circumstances, we think that the district court was in a unique position to adjudge the relevance and probative value of the testimony. As such, we cannot say that the district c”
2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority“To succeed on a Rule 59(e) motion [based on newly discovered evidence], the movant must show (1) the evidence was discovered after the summary judgment hearing; (2) the movant exercised due diligence to discover the evidence before the end of the summary judgment hearing; (3) the evidence is material and not merely cumulative or impeaching; and (4) a new hearing considering the evidence would probably produce a different result.”
2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
How this case has been treated — in progress
Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.