Volume 75 — Florida Reports

<p>1. Where the trial court concurs in the verdict rendered by a jury, by denying a- motion for a new trial, and there is evidence to support such verdict an appellate court should not disturb it in the absence of any showing that the jurors must have been improperly' influenced by considerations outside the evidence.</p> <p>2. If reasonable men might have found the verdict complained of, and the trial judge has refused to set it aside, an appellate court should not disturb it, and the appellate court is not justified in substituting its standard of what is reasonable for that of the jury.</p> <p>3. It is generally with great reluctance that courts set aside verdicts of juries upon a consideration of the testimony alone, and a second verdict upon the same state of facts, although the judges might have come to a different conclusion, is too strongly fortified by the judgment of twelve men, to warrant an appellate court in disturbing it except for strong reason.</p>

<p>An allegation' of ownership by the complainant of a note and mortgage given to secure the note described “or any renewals thereof,” in the following language “that on or about October or November, 1914, the said The Dutton Bank consolidated with' your orator, and your orator became the owner of the said note given by the defendant, Hague Strickland, and of the mortgage given to secure same,” with the further allegation that the note sued on is a renewal of the original note, and it appearing from the bill that the note sued on was made by the original maker to the complainant the alleged successor in interest of ,the payee of the original note, will be held a sufficient showing of ownership of the indebtedness and the mortgage to withstand an attack made upon the bill by demurrer.</p>

<p>1. A married woman by her next friend may maintain a bill in equity against her husband and a third person to cancel a deed to the latter by which the homestead was (attempted to be conveyed where it appears that there has been no proper acknowledgment of the execution of the deed by the wife.</p> <p>2. Objection to a bill in chancery upon the ground of multifariousness will not avail a defendant where he is interested in every important phase of the litigation, and he cannot complain because other matters are involved in which he has no interest if such other matters do not constitute the main object of the suit.</p>

<p>Appeal from Circuit Court for Washington County, A. G. Campbell, Judge.</p>

<p>Writ of error to Circuit Court for Palm Beach County, H. Pierre Branning, Judge.</p>

<p>Where an order made by a Civil Court of Record granting a new trial on the evidence is affirmed by the Circuit Court on writ of error, and such order does not appear to be erroneous, a writ of certiorari will not be granted by this court to review the affirmance of such order.</p>

<p>1.. Private- ownership of land riparian to navigable waters in this State extends ordinarily to high.water mark. ‘</p> <p>2. While a verdict should not be directed for one party when there is evidence" on which the jury may lawfully find for the opposite party, yet where the burden is on the plaintiff to prove all the elements essential to sustain his claim to relief, and he fails to make such -proof, a verdict may be directed for the defendant.</p> <p>Judgment affirmed,.</p> <p>ON REHEARING.</p> <p>1. At common law lands which were bounded by and extended to the high water mark of waters in which the tide ebbed and flowed were riparian or litteral to such waters.</p> <p>2. The title t'o-the soil under the waters where, the.tide ebbs and flows and in this State all navigable waters, between high and low water mjark is in the State of Florida, subject to the powers of Congress to regulate commerce. The title to such land however is held by the State in trust for .the people who have the rights of navigation, fishing, bathing and commerce upon and in the waters.</p> <p>3. At common law a riparian proprietor whose land extends to high water mark of tide waters had the right of ingress and egress to and from the lot over the waters upqn which his land bordered. In this State he enjoys such right and that of unobstructed view over the wpters and in common with the public the right of navigation, bathing and fishing in such waters.</p> <p>4. A riparian owner of lands that are bounded by or extend to the high water mark of tide waters ,or navigable streams and lakes bias no right without consent.of the State to erect or build any structure upon the submerged land between the ordinary high and 1'ow water marks of such waters.</p> <p>5. A declaration in an action for damages for interfering, with . one’s rights as a common law riparian owner, of land on a bay, which declaration alleges a right in the abutting land owner to build wharves, piers and docks upon the submerged land-to the channel of the bay may be treated as a valid declaration by eliminating the allegations as to the right to build wharves, docks and piers to the channel as surplus-age.</p> <p>6. The American State Papers are received in evidence without other proof of their authenticity than -the published volume.</p> <p>7. The rights of a riparian owner at common law constitute property of which such owner cannot be deprived by the State.under the Constitution, without just ctolnpensation.</p> <p>8. Chapter 4802 Laws of Florida, 1899, entitled “An Act to grant the water front of the City of Pensacola” is ineffectual to justify a railroad company under a grant from the city of the submerged land between high and low water mark lying in front 'of the land of a riparian owner, in depriving such riparian owner of his common l|aw rights as such without just compensation.</p>

<p>Appeal from Circuit Court , for.. .Polk County, F. ,A. Whitney, Judge. .</p>

<p>A bill oí exceptions is authenticated by the trial judge and it cannot be amended by certiorari in the appellate court.</p>

<p>Writ of Error to Circuit Court for Calhoun County, C. L. Wilson, Judge.</p>

<p>1. The established principle is that a court created within and for a particular territory is bound in the exercise of its powers by the limits of such territory, and that no judicial process, whatever form it may assume, can have any lawful- authority outside of the limits of the jurisdiction of.the court or judge by whom it is issued.</p> <p>2. There is no statutory authority in this State for the service of a writ of summons issued from a County Judge’s Court in a civil case upon a sole defendant outside- of the limits of the territorial jurisdiction of the court issuing it, and therefore the service of such process beyond the territorial jurisdiction of such court gives to the court no jurisdiction over such defendant.</p>

<p>HABEAS CORPUS — LICENSE TAX ON AUTOMO BILES WHILE IN SERVICE OF MILITARY ORGANIZATIONS OF UNITED STATES.</p> <p>Where a partnership composed 'of individuals residing in the City of Jacksonville are -engaged in, and presumably licensed to do, a general business of running ¡auto busses and other motor driven vehicles for hire over the streets and public highways in and around said city, who, as an incident of their general business 'of Petro-Motor-Carriers, enter into a side contract with the commanding officer of a military encampment of United States soldiers located within a few miles of said city, by which they acquire a monopoly 'of conveying such military officers and soldiers back and forth between such city and such encampment iat a reduced fare paid by each individlal soldier carried, and by which they agree to observe such rules and regulations in the operation of such vehicles as are prescribed in such contract, under penalty only of forfeiture of such contract for non-compliance therewith. Such motor vehicles, or their operation not being under military control and tha United States not having any interest or ownership therein or control thereover. Petro-Motor-Carriers for hire, and HELD, further that such not the grant of such |a franchise as will exempt such partnership from the payment of the license tax imposed by the State, county ’or municipality for conducting the business of Petro-Motor-Carriers for hire, and HELD, further that such partnership was not exempt from, but was liable for the payment of such license.</p>

<p>Writ of Error to Circuit Court for Orange County, J. W. Perkins, Judge.</p>

<p>Writ of Error to Circuit Court for DeSoto County, John S. Edwards, Judge.</p>

<p>Appeal from Circuit Court for Orange County, J. W. Perkins, Judge.</p>

<p>1. An appeal to the Circuit Court from a. judgment of conviction in a Court Of a County Judge should be made returnable as writs of error áre returnable by statute, that is to spy, it should be made “returnable to a day either in term time or vacation, more than thirty days, and not more than ninety days from the date of the writ."</p> <p>2. The rule is that mandamus is the proper remedy to compel its exercise where a Court refuses to exercise jurisdiction which it clearly possesses. ' ‘</p>

<p>1. ''Under the statutes of this State whei'e a justice of th© peace - is disqualified or unable .from any cause to try. any .criminal case in which a warrant is made returnable befor.e him, he may make an order that th© cause be “transferred for other and further proceedings to'' the County Judge’s ' Court,” and thereupon the cause may be tried by the County Judge at the .. County sejat, the. County Judge haying jurisdiction throughout th© county, including the justice’s district wherein the 'cause originated or was made returnable. ’ '</p> <p>2. Errors of procedure in a criminal cause before a justice of the peace or the County Judge may be reviewed on proper appellate proceedings duly taken to the Circuit Court.</p>

<p>1. A bill in chancery which seeks an accounting from the agents of the Complainants of money spent, profits made and obligations incurred, ana. other appropriate relief, upon the alleged grounds that the agents practiced fraud upon their principals in the business which they -were employed to transact, such fflauds consisting in engaging in transactions beyond the scope of their employment as such agents; wasteful and dishonest .expenditure of funds handled by them for’ their principal ; participating in fraudulent Contracts with persons and corporations with whom they were associated in business in order to defraud their principals; and bad faith and corrupt practices from the inception of their employment, with the end-in view of securing the profits for themselves . which the business in hand might have produced for their principals, is not subject t'o demurrer as being without equity.</p> <p>2. Equity will lend its aid where there is not a complete and adequate remedy at law.</p> <p>3. A court of chancery having jurisdiction for one purpose will retain the bill as to (all other matters germain and necessary to the attainment of justice between the parties.</p> <p>4. Where it is not clear that the remedy at law is full and adequate equity will entertain jurisdiction in a cause’between principal (and agent to, compel an accounting -and for other appropriate relief where.the relations between the parties involve complicated accounts and fraudulent practices by one to benefit himself at the expense of the other.</p>

<p>. Writ.of Error to Criminal Court of Record for Dade County, Jas. T. Sanders, Judge.</p>

<p>1. The fact that one may be a contract creditor of a partnership does not entitle him to intervene land be made a party to a suit brought to dissolve such partnership.</p> <p>2. The interest which will entitle ,a person to intervene must be in the matter in litigation, and of such a direct and immediate character that the intervenor will either gain tor lose by the direct legal operation and effect of the judgment. In other words, the interest must be that created by |a claim to the demand in suit or some part thereof, or a claim to or lien upon the property or some part 'of it, which is the subject of the litigation.,</p> <p>3. Persons having an interest in the subject of a suit in equity and who are either necessary or proper parties to such suit, if not made so by the complainant, mjay come in by way of application to intervene and be made parties complainant or. defendant, to the end that, their interests may be adjudicated and protected in such suit.</p>

<p>Writ of Error to Criminal Court of Record for Dade County, Jas. T. Sanders, Judge.</p>

<p>1. The rule is that the prayer for relief in a chancery suit must be predicated upon ¡appropriate allegations of the bill and that the nature and extent of the relief granted is determined by the pleadings in the cause and the proof in support of the allegations of the pleadings.</p> <p>2. Under the prayer for general relief any relief may be given which the nature of the case may require ¡and which is agreeable to the ease made by the pleadings and proof and n'ot inconsistent with the relief specifically prayed for</p> <p>3. The Chancellor having found that the deed upon which the defendant based its claim to the property involved w¡as fraudulent and should therefore be cancelled, was warranted in proceeding to make his decree effectual by directing that the defendant restore to the complainant the possession of the property of which it had wrongfully, ab'out th© time of the institution of the suit, dispossessed him.</p>

<p>Appeal from Circuit Court for Alachua County, .J. T. Wills, Judge.</p>

<p>Appeal from Circuit Court for Alachua County, J. T. Wills, Judge.</p>

<p>1. The statutes of Florida have no force as such beyond the limits of the State.</p> <p>A. A life insurance policy which by its terms does not become a completed contract until delivery on payment of first premium is to be construed as a contract made in the State where the first premium is paid and the policy delivered.</p> <p>3. Section 315'4 General Statutes, 1906, does not affect the rights of an insurer under a contract m]ade in another State; and neither the law nor the public policy of this State forbids the payment of the proceeds of insurance policies to an administrator of a person who dies in this State while a resident of and domiciled therein, when the policy contracts are mjade in another State without reference to the laws of this State and such contracts expressly provide that the policies shall be payable to the administrator of the insured, and payment to the administrator of the insured is authorized by the law of such other state.</p>

<p>When the appellant does not include a pleading in the written directions to the clerk of the trial court under the rule for making up the transcript of the record for the appellate court, a certiorari to bring up a certified copy of such pleading to be made a part of the transcript in the cause will ordinarily not be granted before a due amendment to the directions to the clerk requiring such pleading to be made a part of the transcript on appeal.</p>

<p>Appeal from Circuit Court for Hillsborough County, F. M. Robles, Judge.</p>

<p>Writ of Error to Criminal Court of Record for Hills-borough County, W. S. Graham, Judge.</p>

<p>Writ of Error to Circuit Court for Jackson County, C. L. Wilson, Judge.</p>

<p>1. An allegation that the defendant was “duly sworn-according to law,” is a sufficient allegation that the defendant was “lawfully required to depose the truth,” as used in the statute defining perjury.</p> <p>2. Where testimony is not wholly irrelevant or improper it may not be stricken after being admitted without objection.</p> <p>3. In a prosecution for perjury the giving of the alleged false testimony mjay be proven by witnesses who heard it.</p> <p>4. Where it does not clearly appear that a juror was subject to challenge for cause-, the. ruling of the court denying the challenge will not be disturbed, particularly where- it does not appear that the defendant was forced to exhaust his peremptory challenges to his injury.</p> <p>5. It is not error to refuse requested charges (1) that are in substance covered by charges given; (2) that have no basis in the evidence under the issue; (3) that are not relevant to the Issues being tried, or (4) that are incorrect as propositions of law.</p> <p>6. A judgment of Conviction will not be reversed on writ of error-even if technical errors were committed in rulings on the •admissibility of evidence or in charges given or refused or in other matters of procedure, where the evidence of guilt is clear and ample and no fundamental rights of the defendants were violated, and it appears from the whole record that such technical errors, if any, were not prejudicial to the defendant.</p>

<p>Writ of error to Court of Record for Escambia County, C. M. Jones, Judge.</p>

<p>Appeal from Circuit Court for Alachua County, J. T. Wills, Judge.</p>

<p>Writ of Error to Circuit Court for Duval County, Daniel A. Simmons, Judge.</p>

<p>Writ of Error to Circuit Court for Seminole County, J. W. Perkins, Judge.</p>

<p>1. The matter Of extending the time for the taking of testimony in an equity suit is within the sound judicial discretion of the judge of the court below, and although reviewable on appeal, his action will not be disturbed unless an abuse of discretion is plainly made to appear.</p> <p>2. The foregoing rule applies with special force in a proceeding for divorce where no final decree can be rendered without testimony.</p>

<p>While the findings and conclusions of a chancellor, where the testimony is not taken before him, but before a master or examiner, by reason whereof he is not afforded an opportunity of seeing and hearing the witnesses, are not entitled to the same weight as the verdict of a jury, yet even in that case they should not be disturbed by an appellate court, unless they are clearly shown to be erroneous.</p>

<p>1. A peremptory writ of mandamus'was issued against the clerk of the Circuit Court of Broward County, and the Board of Commissioners of Everglades Drainage District, as respondents! commanding the respondents to . accept certain money tendered by the relator below, it being the correct amount, to redeem and cancel certificates’ numbered 1043 'and 1078; which had' been, issued to 'the 'said Board, under a siale of certain lands in the Everglades Drainage District, which were subject to assessment and sale for drainage taxes. The Sale was made, and the certificates issued, on June 7th, 1915, for the unpaid taxes for the year 1914,- and' Chapter 7303, Daws of- Florida, which extend the time in which to redeem^certificates covering lands sold for non-payment 'of drainage taxes, went into effect June 5th, 1917, therefore, at the time Chapter 7303, Laws of Florida, went into effect two yeiars had not elapsed from the time of the sale, and the title to the land embraced in said certificates had not vested in the Board of Commissioners of Everglades Drainage District, and the said certificates were held subject to redemption, and the Circuit Judge was correct in granting the peremptory writ of mandamus ordering the respondents to accept the money and permit the slaid certificates to be cancelled and redeemed.</p> <p>2. Chapter 7303, Laws of Florida, extends the time for ninety days within which to redeem or cancel certificates' covering lands sold for non-payment of drainage taxes where said certificates were not two years old at the time said Chapter 7303, Laws of Florida, went into effect. The question of whether this Act, Chapter 7303, Laws of Florida, provides for the redemption or cancellation of such drainage certificates where they are two years, or more, old, is not decided, as that question is not here involved.</p>

<p>1. A plea of nul tiel Record is a proper plea in a scire facias on a recognizance bond, and it is error for the Judge- to sustaiin a demurrer to such plea. But where it appears on the face of the record that such plea was interposed for the purpose of proving a variance between the certificates of bail bond forfeiture filed by the Judge and the scire facias and the appearance bond, and the State offers in evidence the certificate of the Judge, together with such bail bond, which show upon their face the variance, and the defendants below object to the introduction of said bond and certificate on the ground of such variance, and thei trial judge overruled such objections, holding that as a matter of law the variance is immaterial, then the error in sustaining the demurrer to such plea is harmless, beqause the defendants, by their objection to the evidence upon the ground that there is a variance, received all the> benefits which they could have had under the plea of nul tiel record.</p> <p>2. The estreatment of the appearance bond in this case was a statutory proceeding. The proper certificate 'of the Judge, together with the bond itself, was filed in the Circuit Court. The proper writ or scire facias was issued by the clerk of the Circuit Court, and served by the sheriff upon the defendants. The defendants filed several pleas, among them, a plea of non est factum. Issues was joined on this plea. .The burden, primarily, of disproving this plea rested upon the S^ate. The State 'offered in evidence the said certificate of the Judge and the appearance bond. Objection was made to the introduction of the bond on the ground that the execution had not been proven. The objection was overruled. No evidence was offered by defendants, no jury was requested, land the case was tried by the Judge, who entered judgment for the State: Held, that the Judge properly overruled the objection that the execution of the bond had not been proven. The certificate of the Judge recited the fact of the .giving of the bonded by the defendants, and the default of the principal to appear, ¡and the failure of defendants to produce his body in court. The introduction of this certificate of the Judge in evidence by the State was prima facie proof of the execution of the bond by the defendants, and after its introduction in evidence, the burden shifted to the defendants to show by proper evidence that they had not executed the bond.</p> <p>3. . Section 3950 of tile General Statutes of Florida, requires the Judge to file |a certificate where a bond has been estreated, which certificate shall state that the sureties agreed to pay the State of Florida a sum certain unless .their principal should appear at a particular term of the court to answer certain criminal charge or charges; and that the said principal has failed to appear in the court to answer such charge, and that the sureties have' been called upon, and have failed to produce the body of their said principal in court as their bond required. This certificate has to be under the hand of the Judge, ¡and said section 3950 provides th© same shall, in any court of this State, have all the force and validity of other record evidence', and shall be prima facie proof of all the facts set forth therein. When this certificate has been introduced in evidence, it becomes prima facie evidence of the execution of the bond, of the) failure of the principal to lappear, of the calling of. the sureties to produce th© body of their principal, of the estreature of the bond, and of the filing of the said bond in the Circuit Court, and shifts the burden of proof to the defendants to proveí any matter set up as a defense for the purpose of evading liability 'on the part of th© sureties.</p> <p>4. The plea of nul tiel record in a suit on a forfeited recognizance bond, puts in issue only the existence of the recognisance</p> <p>5. Section 3953 of the General Statiites, was not intended to vest in Circuit Judges unlimited discretion in the matter of determining .whether or not the sureties on a bail bond have offered a sufficient excuse for not producing in court the body of their principal. While their discretion is large, yet, all questions' of law arising in such proceedings must be disposed of in. accordance with what is the law (and the proper procedure; and the findings of the Circuit Judges in those cases are subject to review by this court just as they are in other cases.</p> <p>6. Where a Circuit Judge commits an error by improperly sustaining a demurrer to a good plea, but upon an examination of the entire record in the case, it is ascertained that no injury or harm resulted therefrom, this court will not reverse the judgment 'on account of such harmless error.</p> <p>7. In a bail bond it is necessary to name the court at which the defendant is to appear, and the date of such appearance, but a mere misnomer of the court, or mis-description in its name, will not invalidate the bond if the court is so described that the defendant and his sureties may kn'ow in what court to appear even though the technical n|ame of the court may be omitted and a mere description of the court given, this would be sufficient to bind the principal and the sureties. In a case where the appearance bond described the court as being the criminal court in and for Duval County, when in fact, the offence with which such defendant was charged, was triable only in the criminal Court of record of Duval County, the fact that the words “of record” are omitted in designating the court at which the defendant was to appear, is not such a variance as to invalidate the appearance bond, and relieve the sureties. The words “criminal court of Duval county” in the bond are merely descriptive of the court, and refer to the character 'of the business transacted in such court rjather than to the technical name of the court.</p> <p>8. It is necessary in a criminal appearance bond that the offense with which the defendant is charged be stated in the bond; but it is not necessary in ;a recognizance to describe the offense with legal accuracy, or in the terms of the statute; nor is it necessary to set it forth with the technical precision required in an indictment. It is only necessary that the offence be substantially described; and n'o clerical efror in the description of the offense will invalidate a recognizance. The bjail bond herein described the offence with which the defendant was charged as being “with carnal intercourse with unmarried female under eighteen,” while thei certificate of the judge described the offence as being “carnal intercourse with an unmarried female under eighteen years.” The name of the offence is “carnal intercourse with an unmarried female under eighteen years.” The word “with” which appears in the bond immediately preceding the deScripti'dn of the offence is merely surplusage, and the only variance between the bond and the certificate of the Judge is, that the word “years” is left out of the bond. This is not a material variance; the bond sufficiently identifies the of-fence charged.</p> <p>9. From certain pleas filed herein it is shown that the defendant appeared at the criminal court of record, the only court having jurisdiction in Duval County of the 'offence with which he was cbjarged, at the proper time as required in the bond, and the 'only reason given in the pleas why he did not remain in the court was, that lio information charging him with such offence as described in the bond was filed in that court. He appearing in that court at the proper time, should have remained in attendance upon the Court until given leave by the court to depart, and having failed to obtain the leave of court permitting his departure, it was proper to es-treat his bond and bring action against *his surties to recover the penalty thereon.</p>

<p>Writ of Error to Circuit Court for Duval County, Daniel A. Simmons, Judge.</p>

<p>Writ of Error to Circuit Court for Duval County, Daniel A. Simmons, Judge.</p>

<p>Writ of Error- to Circuit Court for Duval County, Daniel A. Sinunons, Judge.</p>

<p>Defendants offered in evidence a certified copy of the minutes showing order of the Circuit Judgee (allowing bail, to be approved by the said Judge. The State objected on the ground that such evidence was immaterial. It appears that the bond ordered by the court was taken and approved by the sheriff. Held, that the taking, approving iand filing the bond by the sheriff, instead of its approval by the Judge, does not render the bond invalid.</p>

<p>Appeal from Circuit Court for Holmes County, D. J. Jones, Judge.</p>

<p>The findings of the Chancellor on the facts where the evidence is taken before a Special master should hot be disturbed by an appellate court unless such findings are clearly shown, to/ have been erroneous..</p>

<p>Writ of Error to Circuit Court for Duval County, George Couper Gibbs, Judge.</p>

<p>1. An indictment charging murder in the first degree includes the lower degrees of murder as well as manslaughter and the accused may be Convicted under such indictment of either degree of murder or of manslaughter of which the evidence may show him to be guilty.</p> <p>2. If the defendant be convicted of an offense lesser in degree but included within the higher offense charged .in the indictment, such verdict shall not be set aside by the court upon the ground that such verdict is contrary to the evidence if the evidence produced in such case would have supported a verdict of guilty of the greater'offense.</p> <p>3. A necessity brought about by a person who acts under its compulsion can nbt be relied upon to justify his conduct. The aggressor in a personal difficulty, and not reasonably free from fault, can not acquit himself of liability for its consequences on the ground of self defense, unless after having begun the difficulty, he in good faith declines the combat and his adversary has become the aggressor.</p> <p>4. A sudden transport of passion caused by adequate provocation if it suspends the exercise of judgment, and dominates volition so as to exclude premeditation and a previously formed design may not excuse or justify a homicide, but may be sufficient to reduce a homicide below murder in the first degree, although the passion does not entirely dethrone the actor’s reason.</p> <p>5. An adequate provocation to cause a sudden transport Of passion that may suspend the exercise of judgment and dominate volition so as to exclude premeditation and a previously formed design, is one that is calculated to excite such anger as might obscure the reason or dominate the volition of an ordinary reasonable man.</p> <p>6. Evidence examined and held sufficient to support a verdict of murder in the second- degree.</p>

<p>Appeal from Circuit Court for Jackson County, C. L. Wilson, Judge.</p>

<p>Appeal from Circuit Court for Duval County, Daniel A. Simmons, Judge.</p>

<p>Writ of Error to Circuit Court for Manatee County, F. M. Robles, Judge. '</p>

<p>1. One may lawfully repel an attack upon him, although made by an-officer .whb tries to arrest him, if he. does not know that the person'trying to make the arrest'is an officer; and this is true regardless of whether or not the party attacked fias committed some offense which subjects him to arrest.</p> <p>2. When an arresting officer makes known his identity, he comes within the protection of the law, and the citizen is, bound to submit, at least to the point of ascertaining the character of the charge and the extent of the officer’s authority; but when he goes forth upon the public highway confronting travelers with commands to halt, hold up their hands, and so forth, without making known his official capacity, the person accosted has a right to defend himself.as a reasonably prudent man would do under similar circumstances unless he otherwise has knowledge of the official capacity of his interceptor.</p>

<p>Writ of Error to Circuit Court for Escambia County, A. GL Campbell, Judge.</p>

<p>1. Indictments should be upheld where the crime charged is substantially in the language of the statue- denouncing it and the allegations are not so vague, indistinct (and indefinite as to mislead the accused and embarrass him in the preparation of his defense or expose him after conviction or acquittal to substantial danger of a new prosecution for the same offense.</p> <p>2. An indictment charging the defendant with obtaining money under false pretense should directly and clearly allege that the person from whom the m'oney or other thing of value was received was deceived by the false pretense or false token. Deception is an essential element of the statutory crime of obtaining money under false pretenses, and should not be left to inference in an indictment charging such an offense.</p> <p>3 An indictment for obtaining money under -false pretenses which describes the false token used as “a certain printed 'or lithographed paper” resembling an “ordinary twenty dollar bill of the United Spates of America” is a sufucient description of the false token alleged to have been used by the defendant.</p>

<p>Writ of Error to Circuit Court for Hillsborough County, F. M. Robles, Judge.</p>

<p>1. An indictment charging embezzlement should describe the ' property alleged to hjave been embezzled with the same particularity that is required in an indictment charging larceny.</p> <p>2. An indictment charging that the defendant borrowed a shot gun and afterwards embezzled find fraudulently converted the said shot gun to his own use sufficiently describes the property.</p> <p>3. An indictment charging the crime of- embezzlement alleged that the defendant on a certain date “did -borrow” from another -certain personal property to-wit: one shot gun. Heldk that the indictment sufficiently alleged that the defendant received the shot gun into his possession.</p>

<p>J.. The selling by any person of intoxicating liquors in a county in this State which county under thé provisions of Article XIX' of the Constitution has voted against the sale of such liquors, is a misdemeanor — but the selling of such liquors by one in such a County after having been before convicted of the like offense is a felony.</p> <p>2. The allegation "of former conviction is'á material element In the crime of selling intoxicating liquors as a second offense in a county which has voted against such sale, and should be specifically land clearly alleged in the indictment and not left to inference.</p> <p>3. A motion to quash an indictment reaches defects which are apparent, whether the same be of form or substance; but when ah indictment is attacked by a motion in arrest of judg- * ment the objection should go to some substantial matter to • be' fatal.</p> <p>4. An indictment charging the defendant with the'sale of intoxicating liquors as a second offense in a County which had voted against the sale of such liquors, which alleges that the defendant “ha'd theretofore prior to said sale pleaded guilty” * * * “of the like offense” is fatally defective because such allegation is not equivalent to an allegation that the defendant “had been before convicted' of tlie like, 'offense.”</p> <p>5. The rule'is well established that an indictment should allege every necessary element constituting the offense charged and no such element should be left to inference.</p> <p>6. The word “convicted” as used in the statute denouncing the sale of intoxicating liquors as a second offense in a county which has voted against the sale of such liquors, means adjudication by a court of competent jurisdiction of the defendant’s guilt. It involves all the proceedings from the charge to judgment and sentence.</p>

<p>Appeal from Circuit Court for Lake County', W. S. Bullock, Judge.</p>

<p>Writ of Error to Circuit Court for Bay. County, D. J. Jones, Judge.</p>

<p>Appeal from Circuit Court for Clay County, George Couper Gibbs, Judge.</p>

<p>1. Where In a deed of conveyance of land the grantors “re: served unto themselves and from, the 'operation of the deed, all the timber of any kind and nature, standing oh said land,” the grantee takes no title to the timber standing on the land; and where the deed 'of conveyance'or the attending circumstances do not indicate a purpose .to. remove the standing timber from the land, the owner thereof does not lose title thereto by mere failure to remove the standing timber.</p> <p>2. Ejectment is an appropriate remedy to recover'the possession ' of standing timber by the person entitled to its possession.</p>

<p>.Appeal from Circuit Court for Dade County, H. Pierre Branning, Judge.</p>

<p>Writ of Error to Circuit Court for Baker County, J. T. Wills, Judge.</p>

<p>Writ of Error to Circuit Court for Hamilton County, C. L. Wilson, Judge.</p>

<p>Writ of Error to Circuit Court for Hamilton Coúnty,. Cary A. Hardee, Referee.</p>

<p>A civil case at law cannot be transferred from the Circuit Court in which it is pending, to another Circuit Court because of the disqualification of the judge to try it, except on consent of all the parties to the action. Sec. 19 Art. V. Const.</p>

<p>Appeal from Circuit Court for Hillsborough County, F. M. Robles, Judge.</p>

<p>Chis court does not take judicial notice of city ordinances, and where the ordinance attacked is not before the Court, its validity will not be inquired into.</p>

<p>Chapter 4513 Laws of 1895 which was an act to provide for the crejation of the city of Pensacola, and which contains the following provision: “Section 11. The Courts in this State shall take judicial cognizance of the ordinances of the city, and the printed copy officially published by the city may be read as evidence in any trial in which the same may be competent evidence without proof of the due passage and ¡ap^' proval of said ordinance. Until the publication of the ordL nance of the city, a certified copy from the Comptroller’s Office of an ordinance may be read with the same effect as, if it had been officially published,” merély requires the courts of this State to accept a certain medium of proof of the existence of the city’s ’ordinances and not to take judicial notice of the ultimate fact of the ordinances; existence.</p>

<p>Writ of Error to Circuit Court for Volusia County, J. W. Perkins, Judge.</p>

<p>Writ of Error to Circuit Court for Lee County, F. A. Whitney, Judge.</p>

<p>1. In view of the high degree of care and attention a common carrier owes to its passengers, the negligence and the resulting injury to the plaintiff alleged in this case, give rise to a cause of action for damages sustained, the recovery under the statute to be diminished in proportion to the contributory-negligence, if any, of the plaintiff.</p> <p>2. Where there is substantial evidence upon which the jury might predicate a finding f'or the plaintiff, it is not error to refuse to direct a verdict for defendant.</p> <p>3. Where the charges given conform substantially to the law and the evidence, and the charges refused are in the main covered by other charges given, and the verdict and entire record indicate that errors, if any, in giving or refusing charges were harmless, the judgment will not be reversed, no material error of law or procedure appearing.</p>

<p>A court of chancery will entertain jurisdiction 'of a suit by a widow against the administrators of her husband’s estate to compel them to set aside to her provisions, and clothing necessary for her maintenance, her wearing apparel, household goods ¡and farming utensils which she is. entitled under the statute to retain, but which are alleged to be fraudulently withheld from her by the administrators.</p>

<p>1. Equity will reform a written instrument where because of mutual mistake it does not contain the true agreement of the parties only when the proof is full and satisfactory as to the mistake.</p> <p>2. The right to the reformation of an instrument is not absolute, but depends on an equitable showing.</p> <p>3. While equity will reform a written instrument when by a mistake it does not contain the true agreement of the parties yet it will only do so when the mistake is plain and the proof full and satisfactory. The writing should be deemed to be the sole expositor of t'h'e intent of the parties until the contrary is established beyond reasonable controversy.</p> <p>4. Courts of equity view with disfavor suits brought long after the transactions in issue have occurred, and long after death has closed the lips of those familiar with the occurrences remote in point 'of time.</p> <p>5. In a suit for the reformation of a written instrument, when the evidence is conflicting and the finding of the chancellor thereon does not clearly appear to be erroneous, it will hot be disturbed on appeal.</p> <p>6. Where a deed of conveyance reserves from a tract of land conveyed jail the land above a stated number of acres, such 'reservation “to be taken.• from, the west,end of, said lands,” the reservation in the deed 'of conveyance will not be reformed so as to make it read “from the east end” instead of “from the west end,” where the parties to the conveyance and those who may'have'known of the 'circumstances of the transaction have long since died, and the evidence does not show beyond reasonable controversy that .a mutual mistake was in fact made by the parties to the conveyance in designating the location of the lands reserved.</p>

<p>Writ of Error to Circuit Court for Jackson County, C. L. Wilson, Judge.</p>

<p>1. The findings of the chancellor on the evidence, will not be disturbed unless such findings are clearly shown to 'be erroneous.</p> <p>2. On the facts in this case it is held that the dedication of the streets extends to the waters of New River.</p> <p>3. Where a dedication' to the public use is mjade of a street or roadway, and the same is used by the public, it is the duty 'of the city as trustee of the public rights in and to the streets within whose corporate limits they are, to maintain the public uses against encroachments, and this applies to territory taken into the corporate limits after the dedication as well as to territory included in the corporate limits at the time of the dedication.</p>

<p>Appeal from Circuit Court for Marion County, W. S. Bullock, Judge.</p>

<p>Writ of Error to Circuit Court for Manatee County, F. M. Robles, Judge.</p>

<p>Appeal from Circuit Court for Hillsborough County, F. M. Robles, Judge.</p>

<p>Appeal from Circuit Court for Osceola County, J. W. Perkins, Judge.</p>

<p>1. The provision in Article III, Section 16, of the Constitution in relation to what shall be 'expressed in the title of a bill is mandatory, and should be strictly construed in all cases within the mischiefs intended to be arrested.</p> <p>2. .A contract entered into for the purpose of carrying out the provisions of a void .enactment of the legislature, can not be the basis of a trust agreement. .</p> <p>3. The title “AN- ACT to Enlarge and 'Extend the Franchises bf 'St. Cloud Sugar.Belt Railway Company,” is not. sufficiently broad to carry a grant -of 3840 acres per mil®.of the public lands of the State, and there is nothing in this title to apprise the legislature and the people that the Act contained a land grant different from that provided for by the Act of 1879, |and such grant, not being within the subject -expressed in the title, is void.</p>

<p>1. A bill in. equity which prays that a married w'oman’s separate statutory property may be charged to pay for the price of services performed in preparing plans and specifications for a building to be erected upon a lot owned by her is demurrable for lack tof equity if it fails to allege that the building was erected upon the lot or that the amount due was upon an agreement made, by her in writing for the benefit of her separate property.</p> <p>2. A married woman is not bound in personam by her, contract, but her separate property may be charged in equity and sold for its purchase money or for money or labor expended in improving it or upon an agreement in writing made by her for its benefit.</p>

<p>1. “That the complainant is the 'owner in fee simple” is a sufficient allegation as to the title of the complainant in a suit to remove cloud upon title.</p> <p>2. It being incumbent upon the complainant to ¡allege in his bill, every fact clearly and definitely, that is necessary to entitle him to relief, it was necessary then that the complainant in this cause should, in addition to the ¡allegation that he is the 'owner in fee simple of the land involved, have also by proper allegations described the interests of the respondents setting forth their nature and in what way the alleged interests constitute clouds upon his title.</p> <p>3. If the complainant did not know the nature of the alleged interests, and failed upon diligent effort to ascertain the same, then he should, in addition to the allegation “that the exact nature of the interest, 'or interests, is to your orator unknown” h¡ave also alleged what effort and search he had made to learn the same, and should have prayed for a discovery by the defendants named, of the nature and character of such interest,or interests, claimed.</p> <p>4. A bill of complaint brought to quiet, 'or remove, cloud from title to rqal estate against unknown defendant, should so describe the alleged cloud, and show by clear and definite allegations its invalidity as to advise the unknown defendants of the nature of the case they are called upon to meet, and that the court may know what decree to render supposing the bill to be true.</p>

<p>1. A suspension from office, under Section 15, Article IV of the' Constitution, does not destroy but merely suspends the right acquired by an election to the office.</p> <p>2. A suspended officer may be reinstated by the Governor or, if the term for which he was elected has not expired, he automatically may “resume the duties of the office” if his suspension is not concurred in by the Senate.</p> <p>3. Where an incumbent is suspended from office, the appointment contemplated by law to fill the office is merely to exercise all the authority of the office, the duration of the authority under the appointment depending on whether the person suspended is reinstated or is removed or resumes the duties of the office because of action or non-action of the Senate.</p> <p>4. While an officer may be suspended from office “for the commission of any felony” the office is not “deemed vacant” under Section 298 of the General Statutes of 1906, except upon “conviction,” and a conviction is not operative while a supersedeas is effective.</p> <p>5. When an office becomes vacant, it may be filled as the law provides.</p>

<p>Appeal from Circuit Court for Duval County, Daniel A. Simmons,- Judge.</p>

<p>1. Under the provision of the constitution that the Supreme Court shall have the power to issue “all writs necessary or proper to the complete exercise of its jurisdiction,” the Supreme Court should not, assuming that it has the power to do so, in a case on appeal, enjoin' the holding Of a local option election when an injunction hp.s been refused by a circuit judge, unless it clearly appears that the election has been called in violation of law and that no other adequate remedy is afforded by law.</p> <p>2. The provisions of the constitution should be interpreted with reference to their relation to each other unless a different intent is clearly manifest.</p> <p>3. A “primary election” by qualified electors who' are members of a political party, to elect party candidates and committeemen and delegates under the statute, is not a “State election” to choose officers by any or all electors qualified under the constitution.</p> <p>4. It is not cleiar that the organic provision that no local option election shall “take place within sixty days” before “any State or National election,” has reference to a statutory “primary election” to nominate p¡arty candidates for office, &e., as well as to a “State election” to choose officers.</p> <p>5. It does not clearly appear that the irregularities and illegalities complained of in the proceedings for calling the local option election will render the election invalid.</p>

<p>1. Where one 'of the acts of negligence charged against a railway company for personal injuries, is the absence of proper ' light or lights, it is not necessary for the pleader to allege any purpose that such light would serve, or the various ways in which an injury might occur by reason of their absence.</p> <p>2. In actions against railroad companies when negligence is charged, it is only necessary to allege the ultimate facts that show the negligence of the defendant coupled with an averment that they were negligently done.</p> <p>3. While a railroad company is not held to as high a degree of care to prevent injury to trespassers as is required by law in the cases 'of passengers, employees and licensees, yet under the statute where injury by the operation of the train of a railroad company is shown, there is liability of the defendant for damages unless the railroad company shall make it appear that it had exercised all ordinary and reasonable care and diligence to avoid the injury.</p> <p>4. A railroad company owes a duty both to a passanger and a licensee, but the degree of care and diligence that it is required to exercise towards a trespasser is not so great as towards a licensee.</p> <p>5. A railroad company is liable for injury to a trespasser, if by the exercise of proper care and diligence under all the circumstances of the ease it could have avoided injuring him.</p> <p>6. Under Sections 3148 and 3149 of the General Statutes of 1906, a plaintiff is not debarred from recovering against a railroad company for personal injuries unless the injury was caused by his own negligence, or by his consent, and where the negligence of the plaintiff and the defendant produces the injury, the plaintiff’s damages are to be diminished by the jury in proportion to the default attributed to him.</p> <p>7. . Where a railroad company has knowledge of, and acquiesces in the use by the public of a foot path along its right-of-way, in the vicinity of a settlement, there is imposed upon it an obligation to exercise all ordinary and reasonable care and diligence commensurate with the existencies of the case to prevent injury to persons using the same.</p> <p>8. Where a railroad Company has knowledge of, and acquiesces in the use of a footpath over its right-of-way by the public, it is bound to (anticipate that persons are apt to be using this foot path and should be on the lookout for them and exercise all ordinary and reasonable care and diligence to avoid injury to them.</p>

<p>It was not reversible error for the Chancellor to confirm a sale of land made on the legal siales day in October, 1916, by a Special Master upon the foreclosure of a mortgage on such land, upon objection thereto, upon the ground that such sale was made subject to the taxes due on the land for the years 1914 and 1915, where it appears that the final decree ordering such sale was entered on September 11th, 1915, “nunc pro tunc as of August 1st, A. D. 1915.” Neither was the fact that the property was sold for $13,000.00 a sufficient ground upon whch to refuse a confirmation of the sale in the absence from the record of any proof that the property sold was worth more, and that this amount was a grossly inadequate consideration therefor.</p>

<p>Appeal from Circuit Court for Pasco County, O. K. Reaves, Judge.</p>

<p>1. Where a wife’s property has become the subject of larceny, the 'ownership thereof in an indictment for such larceny can be properly laid in either the husband or the wife, where they live together — in her beqause of her legal ownership,, and in him because of his special ownership as custodian.</p> <p>2. Where an indictment lays the ownership of stolen property in one who is its lawful custodian and entitled to its possession, the 'ownership is sufficiently alleged, and it is not a fatal variance if the proof shows thtat the legal title to the property was in some one other than the person in whose possession it was and who had the care and management of it.</p>

<p>1. A bill in equity praying relief in the nature of specific performance and for injunction, brought by the grantee of property or franchise under a statute, should, contain positive alle- . gations of all ultimate facts essential to show clearly and definitely the happening or performance of all conditions precedent</p> <p>2. A bill in equity praying relief in tbe nature of specific performance and for injunction, brought by the grantee of property or franchise under £ statute, which does not contain positive allegations of all ultimate facts essential to show clearly and definitely the happenings or performance of conditions precedent, is obnoxious to demurrer.</p>

<p>1. To constitute the crime of living in an open state of adultery, there must be a living together openly as if the legal relation of husband and wife existed between the parties; a mere occasional illicit intercourse is not sufficient, but there must be a living or residing together openly as if the Conjugal relation existed, coupled with acts of sexual intercourse.</p> <p>2. The mere living together of two persons of opposite sexes, either of whom is married to a third person, does n'ot constitute the offense of living in an open' state of adultery.</p> <p>3. The offense of living in an open state of adultery, may be established by eircumstantiial evidence, but acts of sexual intercourse must be clearly established by circumstances which raise the unavoidable presumption of their Commission.</p>

<p>1. Upon the prosecution of one charged with murder, evidence offered by the State to show that the deceased was a member of a group of young men who were accustomed to Commit breaches of the peace upon the premises where defendant was employed, and with one of whom he had had a difficulty and concerning whom he had said that he would put a stop to . their carousals if he had to kill one of them “just to see how he looked dead,” is admissible as tending to show a premeditated design on the part of the defendant to kill a human being, and as tending to show who began the difficulty, even though it is not shown that the deceased was personally known to the defendant.</p> <p>2. Upon the trial of 'one charged with murder in the first degree, error in admitting evidence to show premeditation is cured by a verdict of manslaughter.</p> <p>S. Error in excluding a question framed to elicit competent and relevant testimony may be cured by the subsequent admission of the' testimony from another witness.</p> <p>4. The rule upon the subject 'of the admission in evidence of dying declarations requires that it he first shown to the satisfaction of the court that the deceased not only considered death imminent, but that he believed that he was without hope of recovery.</p> <p>5. Á dying declaration to be admissible must also be confined to the res gestae, and there is no merit in an objection that there is other testimony upon the same matters.</p> <p>6. If a ruling by the trial court admitting testimony does not clearly appear to have been erroneous, the ruling will not be disturbed.</p> <p>7. A motion should be made to strike an improper answer of a witness to ia proper question propounded. If that course is not followed the party objecting will not be heard to complain here, because for aught that appears the objection was abandoned in the lower court. .</p> <p>8. A question propounded to a witness called to testify as to dying declarations which sought to elicit information as to whether the deceased realized his condition to be serious, and whether he had any hope of recovery, is proper.</p> <p>9. In examining a witness upon the subject of dying declarations it is improper and may lead to reversible error to lead the witness and suggest a thought. Such practice may be productive of harmful results when the witness ascribes the thought so suggested tb the deceased ¡and undertakes to clothe it.in his, the witness’ own words. The better practice is to request the witness to repeat what the dying man said about the difficulty. If any part of the testimony is inadmissible as evidence it may be stricken on motion.</p> <p>10. A motion to strike testimony should be restricted specifically to that part 'of it which is objectionable. When the motion to strike is so broad as to include proper evidence it will be denied although some parts of it is inadmissible.</p> <p>11. If the trial judge errs in allowing one witness to give improper evidence, it is no ground for reversal that he refuses to allow another witness to give the same evidence.</p> <p>12. The instructions of the court to the jury should he considered in their entirety, and if when so considered it appears that the charge so far as it bears upon iany subject is sound, an assignment of error based upon an- isolated portion of the charge will fail, even though when such portion considered alone is-erroneous. ■</p> <p>13. An'instruction upon justifiable homicide in which the expression “present imminent danger” is Used in lieu of the statutory phrase “imminent danger,” may be erroneous when considered with reference to the facts in the qase.</p> <p>14. An instruction upon the law of- self defence which directs the jury that-the defence is not-available unless the defendant’s “belief of danger is real,” is hot erroneous, because the imminency of danger to the defendant when he'struck the fatal blow must not only be reasonably apparent, but the defendant must also believe the danger to be imminent.. ■</p> <p>15. ‘ Instructions to the jury are required to be applicable to the evidence and a requested instruction Upon the “defendant’s theory” which is not applicable to the evidence is Correctly refused.</p> <p>16. An assault upon one with a deadly weapon is not in law ipso ' facto a- justification of that one in taking'the other’s life. The' existence 'of imminent danger reasonably apparent is a ■ ■ matter of fact for the jury t'o determine from the evidence.</p> <p>17. An instruction that ia person who occupies the position with his employer of “Quarter Boss” is clothed with no legal authority to make arrests and has no more power in that regard ' " than any other private citizen, is not erroneous. '</p> <p>18. An instruction which 'directs the jury that a “deputy sheriff or other officer has no authority to molest, apprehend or iattempt to arrest any person, although such person may be • ’ guilty of a breach of the peace, unless such offence was com- . mitted'in the presence of the deputy sheriff,, or amounted to a felony, unless the 'deputy sheriff* of other officer is authorized to make such arrest by reason of’ a warrant duly issued by a court of competent jurisdiction,” does not correctly state the law; but such instruction will not be deemed sufficient to cause a reversal of the judgment when the evidence shows that the defendant made no attempt to arrest the deceased.</p> <p>19. An instruction upon the law of self defence that th© defendant may not avail himself ’of that defence, if he killed the deceased in a difficulty brought about by the defendant's wrongful act in being the aggressor, 'is not erroneous.</p> <p>20. Evidence examined and-found sufficient to support a verdict of manslaughter. • • .</p>

<p>The findings of the Chancellor on the facts, where the evidence is taken before a Special Master, should not be disturbed by an appellate court unless such findings are clearly sh'own to be erroneous.</p>

<p>Writ of Error to Circuit Court for Dade County. H. Pierre Branning, Judge.</p>

<p>PROHIBITION — REVIVAL OF JOINT SUIT AT LAW AGAINST REPRESENTATIVES' OF DECEASED JOINT DEFENDANT.</p> <p>Where a joint suit at law in assumpsit to recover upon a j'oinfr promissory note is instituted against two or more parties makers of such note, and one of such parties subsequently dies, the trial judged under our statutes, has no jurisdiction or power t'o enter an order in such cause to the effect that ■ said cause be separated and should .continue as two separate actions, the one against the surviving defendants and the other against the personal representatives of such deceased defendant ¡and requiring'the personal representatives' of such deceased defendant to appear and plead to the declaration in said cause, and that said cause proceed against such personal . representatives as a separate suit -against them in their representative capacity, and that said original cause shall proceed against the surviving defendants as a separate action from the 'one carved out of it against such personal representátives of - such deceased defendant, and prohibition will li« to estop such unauthorized procedure.</p>

M. Jones, Judge. , STATEMENT. On October 9th, 1917, Hiliiard filed his bill in chancery in the Court of Record of Escambia County, against J. C. Yan Pelt, as Sheriff, alleging that Hilliard was engaged in and carried on the business of a restaurant keeper at No. 222 South Palafox Street,,in the City of Pensacola, and in connection with said'business received and stored in his place of business beer and liquors, which was the property of Hilliard’s customers, serving the same…

<p>Writ of Error to Court of Record for Escambia County, C. M. Jones, Judge.</p>

<p>1. The fact of a previous difficulty between the witness and the defendant was pertinent evidence as tending to show the attitude of the witness, but the details or particulars of such difficulty were n'ot ladmissible.</p> <p>2. Where testimony has already been brought out by the defendant in a criminal prosecution, even if such testimony is not strictly admissible, the defendant cannot object to its repetition when no harm is shown from the repetition.</p> <p>3. It is not error to refuse requested charges (1) that are in substance Covered by charges given; (2) that have no basis in the evidence under the issue; (3) that are not relevant to the issue being tried, or (4) that are incorrect as propositions of law.</p> <p>4. A judgment of conviction will not be reversed on writ of error even if technical errors were committed in rulings on the admissibility of evidence, or in the charges given or refused or in other matters of procedure, where the 'evidence of guilt is clear and ample and no fundamental rights of the defendant were violated, and it appears from the whole record that such technical errors, if any, were not prejudicial to the defendant.</p>

<p>Appeal from Circuit Court of Volusia County, J. W. Perkins, Judge.</p>

<p>A-Writ of Error to a Judgment of the Circuit Court within and for the County of Jackson.</p>

<p>A Writ of Error to a. Judgment of the Court of Record within and for the County of Escambia.</p>

<p>A Writ of Error to a Judgment of the Circuit Court within and for the County of Pasco.</p>

<p>A Writ of Error to a Judgment of the Court of Record within and for the County of Escambia.</p>

<p>An Appeal from Orders of the Circuit Court within and for the County of Manatee.</p>

<p>An Appeal from an Order of the Circuit Court within and for the County of Polk.</p>

<p>An Appeal from an Order of the Circuit Court within and for the County of Escambia.</p>

<p>An Appeal from an Order and Decree of the Circuit Court within and for the County of Lake.</p>