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← 75 F. Supp. 2d 446 - Cavanagh v. Grasmick

75 F. Supp. 2d 446 - Cavanagh v. Grasmick’s Empirical Analysis

1999

Citation profile

17
cited by 17 later decisions
1
states following
May 2016
most recently cited

12 district · 2 state decisions

Relationships

Applies 20 U.S.C. § 1400 (Education for All Handicapped Children Act of 1975) · 20 U.S.C. § 1401 · 20 U.S.C. § 1403 · 20 U.S.C. § 1412 · 20 U.S.C. § 1414 · 20 U.S.C. § 1415 · 29 U.S.C. § 794 · 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Civil Rights Act of 1871 / Section 1983 (Ku Klux Klan Act))

Relies on Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc. · Matsushita Electric Industrial Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corporation · Pennhurst State School and Hospital v. Halderman · Immigration & Naturalization Service v. Cardoza-Fonseca · Board of Education of Hendrick Hudson Central School District Bd of Ed Westchester County v. Rowley

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 17 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

  1. “The IDEA was drafted to “assure that all handicapped children have available to them ... a free appropriate public education which emphasizes special education and related services designed to meet their unique needs.” The “centerpiece” of this “free appropriate public education” is the individualized education program (“IEP”) which is a collaboratively developed plan for a disabled child’s education. “The IEP is supposed to be the joint product of discussions among the child’s parents, teachers, and local school officials and must specify goals and short-term objectives for the child, any related services, and the criteria and evaluation procedures that will be used.” This written plan must be appropriately reviewed and revised. The IDEA mandates that all disabled children are entitled to a FAPE. The Supreme Court has not set forth a precise formula for determining what constitutes a FAPE. More generally, it has stated that the child must receive “access to specialized instruction and related services that are individually designed to provide educational benefit.” Moreover, although a school system is not required to maximize a child’s potential ... it is imperative that the educational placement “be likely to produce progress, not regression or trivial educational advance.””
    1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
  2. “(a) whether the educational program set out in the child’s IEP has been revised; (b) whether the child will be able to be educated with non-disabled children to the same extent; (c) whether the child will have the same opportunities to participate in non-academic and extracurricular services; and (d) whether the new placement option is the same option on the same continuum of alternative placements.”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
  3. “[i]f * * * [the modifications to the student's IEP] * * * did not affect the educational placement of the child, then the * * * `stay-put' provision is inapplicable”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority

How this case has been treated — in progress

Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.