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← 75 Md. App. 486 - Mendelson v. Mendelson

75 Md. App. 486 - Mendelson v. Mendelson’s Empirical Analysis

1988

Citation profile

32
cited by 32 later decisions
2
states following
May 2012
most recently cited

32 state decisions

How this case has been cited

Cited by 32 later decisions — most recently May 2012 · most notably Horsey v. Horsey (1993), 81 Md. App. 575 - Lieberman v. Lieberman (1990)

32 state decisions

2001988199020002010decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

Relationships

Relies on Dickey v. Dickey · Bar Ass'n of Balto. City v. Carruth · First National Bank v. Department of Health & Mental Hygiene · Hood v. Hood · Makovi v. Sherwin-Williams Co.

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 32 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

  1. “The court may modify any provision of a deed, agreement, or settlement with respect to alimony or spousal support executed on or after April 13, 1976, regardless of how the provision is stated, unless there is: (1) an express waiver of alimony or spousal support; or (2) a provision that specifically states that the provisions with respect to alimony or spousal support are not subject to any court modification.”
    2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
  2. “[T]he separation agreement states that the support shall terminate upon the death of either party or upon the remarriage of appellee. This language ... is plain and unambiguous. Since neither death nor appellee’s remarriage has occurred, the termination provisions have not been activated. Appellant argues that appellee has lived with Mr. Epstein for six years in a relationship that has all the attributes of marriage. The problem with that assertion is that a relationship with “all the attributes of marriage” does not amount to marriage. Marriage, within the meaning of the plain language of the separation agreement, means undergoing a ceremony and obtaining a marriage license. See, [F.L.] § 2—401. Appellee and Mr. Epstein have not complied with these legal requirements for marriage. Furthermore, it is firmly settled that Maryland does not permit common law marriages to be formed within its borders. Since appellee has not remarried, the court did not err in refusing to terminate the contractual spousal support.”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
  3. “incorporation” to mean that “the court will identify the separation agreement and approve it as valid.” This is really saying the same thing, although in more general terms. 2 . Section 8-103(a) is derived ultimately from 1931 Md.Laws, ch. 220, which first statutorily validated spousal agreements concerning support, property rights, and personal rights but made clear that provisions in such agreements affecting the care, custody, education, or maintenance of infant children were subject to court modification”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority

How this case has been treated — in progress

Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.