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75 N.M. 274

404 P.2d 110

Hummer v. Betenbough

New Mexico Supreme Court

Decided July 12, 1965

New Mexico Supreme Court · decided 1965-07-12

Relies on McElhinney v. Kelly · Hyatt v. Wroten · In Re Estate of Eiker

Good law ✅— No negative treatment on recordhow we know

Decided 1965-07-12

How this case has been cited

Cited by 40 later decisions — most recently July 2009 · most notably Galvan v. Miller (1968), Roybal v. Morris (1983)

2 district · 38 state decisions

14019651970198019902000decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

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NOBLE, Justice

¶1(dissenting).

¶2I agree that even without the Betenbough brothers’ disclaimer and waiver of the right to inherit from their sister, the residuary-clause of the will is invalid because of the undue influence exerted by them on their sister. But, I am convinced that there is no evidence in this case from which it can be said that such undue influence extended to the gift of the home to testatrix’ sister.

¶3The basis of the influence exerted by the brothers is clearly stated in a former decision by this court involving all of the property owned by the testatrix, except the home given to Isa McClish. In Hughes v. Betenbough, 70 N.M. 283, 373 P.2d 318, this court said that Alice Whitmire (testatrix here) conveyed certain real estate to her brother, C. G. Betenbough, who executed an agreement to provide for his sister during her lifetime. Mrs. Whitmire brought suit to cancel the deed. In an effort to settle the litigation, on the following day after an effort to have the suit dismissed proved futile, the brothers took Mrs. Whitmire to an attorney “for the purpose of having her draw a will naming them as residuary legatees by which they would take the same property by will.” C. G. Betenbough and his wife executed a declaration of trust whereby they agreed to hold the property in trust for Mrs. Whitmire during her lifetime and, upon her death, to convey the same according to her last will and testament.

“On August 10, 1946, Mrs. Whitmire was again taken by the two brothers to the attorney’s office where she executed her last will and testament which named C. G. Betenbough and T. Betenbough as co-executors. She bequeathed $1.00 each to her former husband and to Buford Horton, her son; devised certain property to the two daughters of Buford Horton, appellees herein, a house and personal items to a sister, and left the residue and remainder to ‘T. Betenbough and C. G. Betenbough, their heirs and assigns, to share and share alike.’ ”

¶4As a part of the settlement of the suit to cancel the deed, it was agreed that Buford Horton was the sole heir at law of Mrs. Whitmire, and after identifying the suit then pending, the brothers disclaimed all right, title and interest to any and all property of Mrs. Whitmire and renounced all right of inheritance by will or by descent and distribution from their sister. Title to all of the property, except the home left to Isa McClish, was quieted in testatrix’ granddaughters (the protestants here).

¶5No rule of law has been pointed to by the majority supporting the holding that there must be evidence concerning the reasons for the basis of the gift of the house to testatrix’ sister. On the contrary, the proof that the undue influence extended to the gift to Isa McClish must be clear, cogent and convincing. McElhinney v. Kelly, 67 N.M. 399, 356 P.2d 113. I think it is clear that the majority agree that there is actually no proof that the undue influence affected the gift to Isa McClish. No determination of such a fact was made by the trial court. This court can certainly not make such a finding without weighing the evidence.

¶6The majority say that the general rules they have quoted require a holding that the entire will is vitiated by the undue influence exerted by the brothers. The question of whether part of a will not affected by undue influence can be probated is one of first impression in New Mexico, but most states hold that if a part of the will, not caused by undue influence, can be separated from the rest, leaving it intelligible and complete in itself, only the portion caused by undue influence will be invalidated and the rest admitted as valid. 1 Page on Wills (BoweParker Rev.) § 15.12. The following are some of the cases so holding. Hyatt v. Wroten, 184 Ark. 847, 43 S.W.2d 726; Pepin v. Ryan, 133 Conn. 12, 47 A.2d 846; Wombacher v. Barthelme, 194 Ill. 425, 62 N.E. 800; In re Eiker, 233 Iowa 315, 6 N.W.2d 318; McCarthy v. Fidelity Nat. Bank & Trust Co., 325 Mo. 727, 30 S.W.2d 19, 69 A.L.R. 1122; 16 Iowa L.Rev. 119; 36 U.Mo.Bull. 48 L.Ser. 35; In re Peppler, 132 N.J.Eq. 421, 28 A.2d 474.

¶7Agreeing that the residuary clause was induced by undue influence, we then examine the will to determine whether the remainder, not so affected, can be separated from it. 1 Page on Wills, supra, § 15.12, p. 742, has this to say with respect to undue influence exerted as to the residuary clause:

“If undue influence has been exerted as to the residuary clause only, the residuary clause is invalid but the other gifts are valid; …

¶8I suggest that there is nothing in the general rules quoted by the majority which requires invalidating more than the residuary clause in the Whitmire will. It is clear that the remainder of the will, omitting the residuary clause, is intelligible and complete in itself and that the residuary clause, affected by undue influence, can be separated from the remainder as to which there is no proof of undue influence. It has not been suggested that this is the usual case outlined in the quotation from 1 Page on Wills, supra, § 15.12, where undue influence was exerted to cause an unequal distribution between heirs of equal degree to the testatrix. Under those circumstances, the author of Page thinks the entire will is the product of undue influence because the remainder does not express the testator’s will.

¶9Under our statement in Hughes v. Betenbough, supra, of the facts concerning the brothers’ undue influence, controlling upon us in this case, it is not impossible to determine to what extent specific legacies have been tainted by the undue influence. Their purpose to secure the property that had been deeded to them was made clear in Hughes v. Betenbough, supra.

¶10I think only the residuary clause should be invalidated, and the remainder admitted to probate. I, therefore, dissent from the majority opinion.

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