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75 Or. 403

Hirsch v. May

Oregon Supreme Court

Decided March 9, 1915

Oregon Supreme Court · decided 1915-03-09

<p>Pleading — Judgment on Pleadings — Statute.</p> <p>1. Where defendant answered admitting all the material allegations of the amended complaint with certain averments deemed sufficient to support equitable relief, and plaintiff tendered an issue at law upon the sufficiency of the answer together with a motion for judgment on the pleadings, the pleadings were completed, and the court might enter judgment thereon, within Section 79, L. O. L., providing that, when the pleadings are complete, the court may upon motion grant such judgment or decree as the moving party is entitled to thereon.</p> <p>Compromise and Settlement — Disputed Claim — Effect.</p> <p>2. Where plaintiff had claims against defendant the correctness of which was disputed and in settlement thereof they agreed upon a balance which the defendant promised to pay, such settlement constituted a new and valid agreement which was enforceable at law, unless set aside for fraud or mutual mistake; and a pleading that defendant relied on plaintiff’s oral statement did not show a “mutual mistake” between the parties.</p> <p>Action — Stay—Another Action Pending.</p> <p>3. In an action for the amount due under a compromise and settlement, defendant’s answer, not purporting to be a pleading, wherein he acted as plaintiff and being only a renewed attempt to get a detailed statement of accounts, which matter was decided against him on motion to make the complaint more definite and certain, was not a bill whieh should have been disposed of by decree on the equity side before judgment on the law side, within Section 390, L. O. L., providing that in an action at law where defendant is entitled to equitable relief he may with his answer file a complaint in equity in the nature of cross-bill staying the proceeding at law, which may be enjoined or allowed to proceed in accordance with the final decree.</p> <p>[As to when action is “pending,” see note in Ann. Gas. 1914D, 1007.]</p> <p>Action — Equitable Defenses.</p> <p>4. An equitable defense cannot be interposed against ab action at law.</p>

Relies on Smith v. Farra · Zeuske v. Zeuske · Coles v. Meskimen

Good law ✅— No negative treatment on recordhow we know

Affirmed · Decided 1915-03-09

How this case has been cited

Cited by 5 later decisions — most recently October 1930

5 state decisions

20191519201930decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

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Mr. Justice Buenett

¶1delivered the opinion of the court.

¶21. It is provided in Section 79, L. O. L.:

“… At any time when the pleadings in the suit or action are complete, or either party fails or declines to plead further, the court may, upon motion, grant to any party moving therefor, such judgment or decree as it may appear to the court the moving party is entitled to upon the pleadings.”

¶3The defendant had answered admitting all the material allegations of the amended complaint and had made certain averments which he deemed sufficient to support equitable relief. The plaintiff completed the pleadings by tendering an issue of law upon the sufficiency of the answer, at the same time moving for judgment on the pleadings. The whole case was thus submitted to the court, and it remains to determine whether the decision was correct.

¶42. The defendant himself avers that the plaintiff had claims against him, the correctness of which he disputed, and that in settlement thereof they agreed upon a balance which the plaintiff promised to pay. In Smith v. Farra, 21 Or. 395 (28 Pac. 241, 20 L. R. A. 115), this court decided thus:

“A settlement and compromise of a claim asserted on reasonable grounds and in good faith, which the parties, having equal knowledge of the facts, consider doubtful, constitute a new and valid agreement which will be enforced in law, although the matter compromised be not in fact doubtful in legal contemplation and the settlement be not what a court would have adjudged upon the facts of the case. ’ ’

¶5If the defendant would overturn this settlement, it must be either for fraud or for mutual mistake. It is not pretended that the plaintiff attempted to practice *408any fraud whatever in the matter. Neither is it apparent from the pleading that the mistake in the settlement, if any was made was mutual between the parties, and this is essential if one of them would upset the agreement or settlement for mere error. The answer of new matter is fatally defective in both these respects and constitutes no obstacle to the judgment sought by the plaintiff, especially as the defendant admitted all the allegations of the complaint. Under the conditions disclosed by this record, it would have been idle to prolong the litigation further.

¶63. There is nothing in the proposition that the so-called cross-bill should have been disposed of by a decree of the court on the equity side and the litigation then determined by a judgment on the law side. Both law and equity are administered by the same tribunal, and, the result being correct under the pleadings, it would be the extreme of technicality to haggle about whether it should be called a decree in equity or judgment at law.

¶7It is laid down in Section 390, L. O. L.:

“In an action at law, where the defendant is entitled to relief, arising out of facts requiring the interposition of a court of equity, and material to his defense, he may, upon filing his answer therein, also as plaintiff, file a complaint in equity, in the nature of a cross-bill, which shall stay the proceedings at law, and the case shall thereafter proceed as in a suit in equity, in which said proceedings may be perpetually enjoined by final decree, or allowed to proceed in accordance with such final decree.”

¶8The defendant’s answer falls far short of the requirements of this section. It does not purport to be a pleading wherein the defendant here acts as a plaintiff. It is nothing else than a renewed attempt to get from the plaintiff a detailed statement of account, a question *409which the defendant raised and which was decided against him on the motion to make the complaint more definite and certain.

¶94. In another aspect the pleader appears to have interposed an equitable defense against an action at law —something we have decided many times is not permissible: Coles v. Meskimen, 48 Or. 54 (85 Pac. 67); Zeuske v. Zeuske, 55 Or. 65 (103 Pac. 648, 105 Pac. 249, Ann. Cas. 1912A, 557); Donart v. Stewart, 63 Or. 76 (126 Pac. 608).

¶10Prom whatever angle we view the question it is manifest that the defendant never left the law side of the court and failed to make a case in any respect cognizable in chancery or available at law. The decision of the Circuit Court is affirmed.

¶11Affirmed. Rehearing Denied.

Mr. Chief Justice Moore, Mr. Justice McBride and Mr. Justice Benson concur.
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