Williams v. Book’s Empirical Analysis
1953
Citation profile
8 state decisions
How this case has been cited
Cited by 8 later decisions — most recently June 1984
8 state decisions
Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.
Relationships
Relies on Hunter v. City of Pittsburgh · Risty v. Chicago R I & P Ry Co · Wheeler v. Herbert · State v. Morgan · Rein v. Johnson
Most-quoted passages
The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 8 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.
“The power of the legislature in the control of counties and other political subdivisions is unrestrained by requirements of due process. [Citations omitted.] In Hunter v. Pittsburgh, 207 U.S. 161 , 28 S.Ct. 40, 46 , 52 L.Ed. 151 , the Court answered the contention that taxpayers of a municipality could not be taxed for the benefit of a municipality with which it may be consolidated in this way: “The state, * * * may take without compensation such property, hold it itself, or vest it in other agencies, expand or contract the territorial area, unite the whole or a part of it with another municipality, repeal the charter and destroy the corporation. All this may be done, conditionally or unconditionally, with or without the consent of the citizens, or even against their protest. In all these respects the state is supreme, and its legislative body, conforming its action to the state Constitution, may do as it will, unrestrained by any provision of the Constitution of the United States.””
2 later decisions quote this exact passage“It will be seen that this section, as originally adopted, constituted an absolute limitation on the powers of municipalities to incur an indebtedness for any purpose whatever in excess of 5 per cen-tum upon the assessed valuation of the taxable property therein for the year preceding that in which said indebtedness might be incurred, but contained no requirement that any proposed indebtedness should be submitted to a vote of the electors. The first of the two amendments, by way of provisos, authorized an additional indebtedness not exceeding 10 per centum for the purposes therein named; while the second amendment authorized an additional indebtedness not exceeding 8 per centum to be incurred by cities having a population of 8,000 or more, for the specific purposes named in that proviso. The third proviso is, in effect, nothing more than a limitation upon the exercise of the powers conferred by the two added provisos. It declares that: “No such debt shall ever be incurred for any of the purposes in this section provided, unless authorized by a vote in favor thereof by a majority of the electors of such county, municipal corporation,” etc., incurring the same. This limitation must be construed as extending only to indebtedness created for the purposes named in the preceding provisos. It is true that section 4, taken as a whole, is a limitation upon power of municipalities to create indebtedness for any municipal purpose whatever. But to construe the third proviso otherwise than”
1 later decision quote this exact passage““The power of the legislature in the control of counties and other political' subdivisions is unrestrained by requirements of due process.” (authorities cited)”
1 later decision quote this exact passage
How this case has been treated — in progress
Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.