Kutzner v. State’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

54 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 54 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “(a) A convicting court may order forensic DNA testing under this chapter only if: (1) the court finds that: (A) the evidence: (i) still exists and is in a condition making DNA testing possible; and (ii) has been subjected to a chain of custody sufficient to establish that it has not been substituted, tampered with, replaced, or altered in any material respect; and (B) identity was or is an issue in the case; and (2) the convicted person establishes by a preponderance of the evidence that: (A) a reasonable probability exists that the person would not have been prosecuted or convicted if exculpatory results had been obtained through DNA testing; and (B) the request for the proposed DNA testing is not made to unreasonably delay the execution of sentence or administration of justice.”

   4 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the concurrence
   e.g. Dinkins v. State · Brewer v. State

2. “An appeal of a finding under Article 64.03 [denial of DNA testing] or 64.04 [trial court’s finding after DNA is tested] is to a court of appeals, except that if the convicted person was convicted in a capital case, the appeal of the finding is a direct appeal to the court of criminal appeals.”

   4 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the concurrence
   e.g. Fry v. State · Whitfield v. State

3. “a. The bill clarifies that the standard of proof with regard to getting a DNA test is ‘preponderance of the evidence.’ By taking out the ‘reasonable probability’ language, the intent is to clarify that the defendant does not have to meet two burdens. Despite the reasoning in Kutzner, the Legislature did not intend for the defendant to have to prove ‘actual innocence’ (a principle under habeas law) in order to meet his burden to have the test done. The defendant must prove that, had the results of the DNA test been available at trial, there is a 51% chance that the defendant would not have been convicted. b. The bill further clarifies that the defendant does not have to meet a two-prong test of not having been prosecuted or convicted. Rather, the intent was that the person would have to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that he would not have been convicted. Accordingly, the bill strikes the ‘prosecuted or’ language.”

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the concurrence
   e.g. Brewer v. State · Smith v. State