75 Wash. 2d 456 - Kendrick v. Davis’s Empirical Analysis
1969
Citation profile
11 federal appellate · 2 district · 50 state decisions
How this case has been cited
Cited by 68 later decisions — most recently February 2004 · most notably 118 Wash. 2d 498 - Tomlinson v. Clarke (1992), 88 Wash. 2d 777 - Cascade Security Bank v. Butler (1977)
11 federal appellate · 2 district · 50 state decisions
Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.
Relationships
Relies on 70 Wash. 2d 915 - Sigman v. Stevens-Norton, Inc. · 56 Wash. 2d 230 - Strong v. Clark · 18 Wash. 2d 839 - Ryan v. Plath · 26 Wash. 2d 246 - Dill v. Zielke · 54 Wash. 2d 161 - Nelson v. Bailey
Most-quoted passages
The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 68 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.
“Simply stated, we have in this case (1) a valid forfeitable real-estate contract properly recorded; (2) a purchaser in default; (3) a vendor declaring a forfeiture according to contract terms; and (4) a mortgagee of the purchaser who is unknown to the vendor, but whose security interest is properly recorded____ Defendants contend that the duty of notice should be on the vendor because he knew that under the terms of the contract the purchaser could have and might have assigned or mortgaged his interest after the execution of the contract and also because prior to his declaration of forfeiture the vendor could have obtained a title search to determine whether anyone might have obtained such interests. We think the obligation is otherwise. The burden is on the mortgagee to notify the vendor of his interest in the contract. No undue burden is thus placed on the mortgagee as he would have actual knowledge both of the identity of the vendor and of the vendor’s right to declare a forfeiture of the contract upon the purchaser’s default. Conversely, the vendor would not have notice of any mortgage or assignment unless and until he either received notice from the mortgagor or purchaser or made a title search himself.”
4 later decisions quote this exact passage““It is unnecessary to labor the proposition that these instruments were mortgages and not quitclaim deeds and assignments as they purport to be, since on their face they carry the label of security transactions. An instrument may in form be a deed or an assignment, but, if the intent is to use the property as securi ty, it will be a mortgage.” (Citation omitted.) 452 P.2d at 225-26 (emphasis added).”
1 later decision quote this exact passagee.g. Rush v. Anestos“The recording of an instrument is constructive notice only to those parties acquiring interests subsequent to the filing and recording of the instrument. The recording of an instrument does not constitute notice to antecedents in the chain of title.”
1 later decision quote this exact passage
How this case has been treated — in progress
Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.