Stoner v. Graddick’s Empirical Analysis
751 F.2d 1535 · 1985
Citation profile
28 federal appellate · 17 state decisions
How this case has been cited
Cited by 59 later decisions — most recently July 2016 · most notably State v. Morrill (1985), State v. Littlejohn (1986)
28 federal appellate · 17 state decisions — followed in 12 states
Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.
Relationships
Applies 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996)
Relies on Strickland v. Washington · Jackson v. Virginia · Bonner v. City of Prichard · United States v. Marion · Rochin v. People of California
Most-quoted passages
The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 59 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.
“"The statute of limitations is the principal device, created by the people of a state through their legislature, to protect against prejudice arising from a lapse of time between the commission of a crime and an indictment or arrest. United States v. Harrington , 543 F.2d 1151 (5th Cir. 1976); United States v. Zane , 489 F.2d 269 , 270 n. 1 (5th Cir. 1973), cert. denied , 416 U.S. 959 , 94 S.Ct. 1975 , 40 L.Ed.2d 310 (1974). Statutes of limitations 'represent legislative assessments of relative interest of the state and the defendant in administering and receiving justice.' United States v. Marion , 404 U.S. 307 , 322 , 92 S.Ct. 455 , 464 , 30 L.Ed.2d 468 (1971). Limitations statutes, however, are not the only available protection against prejudice. United States v. Lovasco , 431 U.S. 783 , 789 , 97 S.Ct. 2044 , 2048 , 52 L.Ed.2d 752 (1977). The particular provisions of the Speedy Trial Clause of the Sixth Amendment are available with respect to prejudicial delay after formal indictment of information, or actual arrest. Lovasco , 431 U.S. at 788 , 97 S.Ct. at 2047 ; Marion , 404 U.S. at 313 -22 , 92 S.Ct. at 459 -64 ; cf. Fed.R.Crim.P. 48 (b). However, the Speedy Trial Clause is inapplicable where, as here, the delay concerns a period of time prior to indictment, information, or arrest. "Where the possibility of prejudice derives from pre-indictment delay, the defendant in a criminal case must first resort to the applicable statute of limitations. Id. at 323 , 92 S.Ct. at 464”
6 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority“"We would certainly expect that actual prejudice would be more likely in a case such as this than in a case involving significantly less delay. Over a greater period of time witnesses are more likely to die, documents may well disappear or be destroyed, and memories are much more likely to fade. However, the ultimate inquiry in any case is the same: whether substantial prejudice has occurred. If no substantial prejudice is proved, then the guidepost for judging impermissible delay is the Alabama statute of limitations."”
2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority“[T]he government concedes that the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment would require dismissal of the indictment if it were shown at trial that the pre-indictment delay in this case caused substantial prejudice to ap-pellee’s rights to a fair trial and that the delay was an intentional device to gain tactical advantage over the accused.”
2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
How this case has been treated — in progress
Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.