Vicknair v. State’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

2 federal appellate · 2 district · 19 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 24 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “The officer further testified that he had been instructed at the Houston Police Academy, as well as by his supervisors in the police department, that if a tail light lens on a motor vehicle was ‘cracked to the extent that you could observe white light coming through the rear’ this constituted a violation of the traffic laws of this State. The court of appeals rejected the officer’s “good faith” belief concerning the law governing stopping a motorist driving a motor vehicle having a “fractured” tail light lens: “This was a warrantless arrest. A peace officer may arrest an offender without a warrant for any offense committed in his presence or within his view. Tex.Code Pro. Ann. art. 6701d, § 153 (Vernon 1977). However, what this officer testified he observed did not constitute an offense under § 111 of art. 6701d, and the officer’s well-intentioned but mistaken belief that it did will not legitimate this search. Scott v. U.S., 436 U.S. 128 [ 98 S.Ct. 1717 , 56 L.Ed.2d 168 ] (1978). ‘Instead of motive or intent, the court must view the circumstances objectively to determine whether they support the justification.’ Nickerson v. State, 645 S.W.2d 888, 890 (Tex.App.-Dallas 1983). If the circumstances do not support the justification claimed for an arrest or search, the evidence illegally seized must be suppressed. Tex.Code Crim. Pro. art. 38.23 (Vernon 1979).””

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the dissent
   e.g. State of Texas v. Mazuca, Alvaro

2. “The sole reason the officer gave for stopping appellant’s vehicle was that he believed appellant had committed a tail light “infraction” of the traffic laws. Given what we have stated, we find and hold that the officer was not justified in stopping appellant’s vehicle for that reason, nor did he have probable cause to stop appellant’s vehicle. Also see and compare Willett v. State, 454 S.W.2d 398 (Tex.Cr.App.1970); Hall v. State, 488 S.W.2d 788 (Tex.Cr.App.1973); Pruitt v. State, 389 S.W.2d 475 (Tex.Cr.App.1965). Furthermore, the inarticulate hunch, suspicion, or good faith of the arresting officer was not sufficient to constitute probable cause for arrest, search, or detention of appellant and his passengers. Talbert v. State, 489 S.W.2d 309 (Tex.Cr.App.1973). Contrast the above cases with such cases as Praska v. State, 557 S.W.2d 83, 87 (Tex.Cr.App.1977); Drago v. State, 557 [553] S.W.2d 375, 377 (Tex.Cr.App.1977); and Soileau v. State, 156 Tex.Cr.R. 544 , 244 S.W.2d 224 , 226 (1970). The opinions in each of those cases clearly reveal that there was some evidence of an initial legitimate traffic stop. Such does not exist here. Because the evidence was seized as a result of an unlawful stop, it became inadmissible under Art. 38.23, supra.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the dissent
   e.g. State of Texas v. Mazuca, Alvaro

3. “After January 1, 1972, every motor vehicle, trailer, semitrailer and pole trailer, and any other vehicle which is being drawn at the end of a combination of vehicles, shall be equipped with at least two (2) tail lamps mounted on the rear which when lighted as required in Section 109, shall emit a red light plainly visible from a distance of one thousand (1,000) feet to the rear, except that passenger cars and trucks manufactured or assembled prior to model year 1960 shall have at least one (1) tail lamp.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. State v. Patterson