Seidel v. Larson’s Empirical Analysis
1985
Citation profile
17 federal appellate · 8 district ·
How this case has been cited
Cited by 120 later decisions — most recently September 2015 · most notably In the Matter of John Joseph METZ, Debtor. DOWNEY SAVINGS AND LOAN ASSOCIATION, Appellant, v. John Joseph METZ, Appellee (1987), Hougland v. Lomas & Nettleton Co. (1989)
17 federal appellate · 8 district ·
Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.
Relationships
Applies 11 U.S.C. § 1322 · 28 U.S.C. § 1291
Relies on Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores · Hannahville Indian Community v. United States · United States v. McConney · Watt v. Alaska · Markham v. Cabell
Most-quoted passages
The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 120 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.
“(2) modify the rights of holders of secured claims, other than a claim secured by a security interest in real property that is the debtor’s principal residence, ... [and] [[Image here]] (5)notwithstanding paragraph (2) of this subsection, provide for the curing of any default within a reasonable time and maintenance of payments while the case is pending on any unsecured claim or secured claim on which the last payment is due after the date upon which the final payment under the plan is due; ...”
28 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the concurrence“Congress inserted the “secured only by a security interest” language because it intended to limit the ban on modification to lenders “engaged only in providing long-term home mortgage financing[, not] lenders primarily engaged in consumer or other areas of financing but who take security interests in a residence or homestead to secure non-home financing debts.” United Companies Fin. Corp. v. Brantley, 6 B.R. 178, 189 (Bankr.N.D.Fla.1980); see In re Banks 31 B.R. 173 , 174 n. 1 (Bankr.N.D.Ala.1982); In re DuPree, 6 B.R. 476, 477 (Bankr.S.D.Ohio 1980). Creditors who happened to take a security interest in the debtor’s home along with a security interest in other property of the debtor were meant to be excluded from the extra protection of subsection b(2)’s ban on modification; their rights could be modified by a Chapter 13 plan. See Note, Saving the Family Homestead: Home Mortgages Under Chapter 13, 43 Ohio St.L.J. 905, 918-19 (1982).”
2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the concurrencee.g. In Re Groff · Matter of Cotton“[S]ince this section [1322(b)(2)] only applies to modification of the rights of holders of claims by the chapter 13 plan, it does not affect the determination of the allowed secured claim through operation of section 506. Hence an underse-cured claim secured only by a security ■interest in the debtor’s principal residence may still be divided into an allowed secured claim and an allowed unsecured claim, with the lien declared void to the extent it secures a claim in excess of the allowed secured claim.”
2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the concurrencee.g. In Re Davis · In Re Hougland
How this case has been treated — in progress
Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.