Larry v. Yamauchi’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

4 federal appellate · 3 district · 1 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 13 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “When a court reviews an agency’s construction of the statute which it adminis ters, it is confronted with two questions. First, always, is the question whether Congress has directly spoken to the precise question at issue. If the intent of Congress is clear, that is the end of the matter; for the court, as well as the agency, must give effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of Congress. If, however, the court determines Congress has not directly addressed the precise question at issue, the court does not simply impose its own construction on the statute, as would be necessary in the absence of administrative interpretation. Rather, if the statute is silent or ambiguous with respect to the specific issue, the question for the court is whether the agency’s answer is based on a permissible construction of the statute.”

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. 814 F. Supp. 152 - Estey v. Commissioner, Maine Department of Human Services · 840 F. Supp. 493 - Baum v. Espy

2. “in connection with the Federal Government’s efforts to offset low-income household’s increased home energy costs [through a range of programs].... Since the idea of these new programs was essentially to hold low-income households harmless by permitting them to buy the same amount of energy they would have utilized in past years without having to diminish their already marginal incomes, the programs represented more of a wash transaction than any real increase in the recipient or benefitted households’ purchasing power.”

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. South Dakota, Department of Social Services v. Madigan · 814 F. Supp. 152 - Estey v. Commissioner, Maine Department of Human Services

3. “[t]he fundamental flaw in this argument is that Smith and Jones are not “similarly situated” for purposes of equal protection analysis. The one variable is household income. Smith and Jones are treated differently because they are different— Smith’s adjusted monthly income is three times that of Jones. If Smith’s income was equal to Jones’ income, both would be treated identically, all other things being equal, for food stamp purposes. Moreover, while Jones’ food stamp allotment is reduced by including the UR as income, that allotment is still substantially higher than that of Smith because of the disparity-in their incomes. Jones also receives more real income than Smith as a result of the utility allowance, assuming both tenants consume approximately the same amount of energy. Smith’s out of pocket expenses include $15 for rent plus his utility costs. In contrast, Jones pays nothing for rent and receives $45 to pay his utility bills.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. 840 F. Supp. 493 - Baum v. Espy