Miller v. Keating’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

28 federal appellate · 3 district · 20 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 64 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “[t]he following are not excluded by the hearsay rule, even though the declarant is available as a witness: (1) Present sense impression. A statement describing or explaining an event or condition made while the declarant was perceiving the event or condition, or immediately thereafter. * * * H--”

   4 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. Government of the Virgin Islands v. Thompson · 719 F. Supp. 1183 - Cummiskey v. Chandris, S.A.

2. “[T]he record is empty of any circumstances from which the trial court could have inferred, by a preponderance, that the declarant saw [plaintiff] “cut in.” The disputed declaration itself does not proclaim it. Indeed, the district judge acknowledged as much in his opinion denying plaintiffs’ motion for a new trial. Nevertheless, he drew an inference of perception, reasoning that “the declarant would have made the declaration only if he was in a position to observe the collision.” Yet the statements reported by the Parrises — “the bastard tried to cut in” and “the s.o.b., or some words like that, tried to cut in” — alone, do not show more likely than not that the declarant saw the event. The declarant might have been drawing a conclusion on the basis of what he saw as he approached the scene of the accident. He might have been hypothesizing or repeating what someone else had said.”

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. People v. Cummings · 933 F. Supp. 2d 920 - Gainer v. Wal-Mart Stores East, L.P.

3. “[i]n some cases, however, the substance of the statement itself does contain words revealing [the declarant’s personal] perception. A statement such as, “I saw that blue truck run down the lady on the corner,” might stand alone to show perception if the trial judge finds, from the particular circumstances, that he is satisfied by a preponderance that the declarant spoke from personal perception.... [In other words,] the statement offered as an excited utterance may itself be a piece of the mosaic establishing its own admissibility.”

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. 129 Md. App. 360 - Parker v. State · 83 F. Supp. 2d 535 - Coyle v. Kristjan Palusalu Maritime Co., Ltd.