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← 754 F.2d 902 - Harrell v. Sharp

Harrell v. Sharp’s Empirical Analysis

754 F.2d 902 · 1985

Citation profile

242
cited by 242 later decisions
11
states following
October 2017
most recently cited

41 federal appellate · 1 district · 12 state decisions

How this case has been cited

Cited by 242 later decisions — most recently October 2017 · most notably Gianakas v. Gianakas (1990), In Re Sampson (1993)

41 federal appellate · 1 district · 12 state decisions — followed in 11 states

12601985199020002010decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

Relationships

Applies 11 U.S.C. § 523 · 11 U.S.C. § 727

Relies on Butler v. United States · Long v. Calhoun · Williams v. Williams · Charles Simms v. Hannah T Simms · Stewart v. Kutner

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 242 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

  1. “(a) A discharge ... does not discharge an individual debtor from any debt— (5) to a spouse, former spouse, or child of the debtor, for alimony to, maintenance for, or support of such spouse or child, in connection with a separation agreement, divorce decree ... or property settlement agreement, but not to the extent that— (B) such debt includes a liability designated as alimony, maintenance, or support, unless such liability is actually in the nature of alimony, maintenance, or support ...”
    32 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
  2. “a simple inquiry as to whether the obligation can legitimately be characterized as support.”
    22 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
  3. “Debtor contends that his obligation to pay post-majority educational expenses and child support is dischargeable because he was not required under relevant state law to support his son past the age of majority. We do not accept this argument. For several reasons we reject debtor’s premise, that an obligation is “actually in the nature of support” only if it could have been imposed under the relevant state law legal duty of support. First, the language of § 523(a)(5) does not refer to a particular state law legal duty of support. If Congress had intended dischargeability to be determined by whether an obligation could be imposed under state law, it might have addressed dischargeability in those terms. Congress chose instead to describe as not dischargeable those obligations in the “nature” of support. We believe that in using this general and abstract word, Congress did not intend bankruptcy courts to be bound by particular state law rules. This conclusion is directly supported by the legislative history of § 523(a)(5). The committee reports that accompanied the new bankruptcy code provide that “what constitutes alimony, maintenance, or support will be determined under the bankruptcy laws, not state law.” H.R.Rep. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 364 (1977), U.S.Code Cong. & Admin.News 1978, pp. 5787, 6319. We take this legislative history as another indication Congress did not intend discharge-ability to be determined by reference to a state law legal duty of support. Most circ”
    7 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority

How this case has been treated — in progress

Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.