754 F. Supp. 449 - Warner v. Lawrence’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

3 district ·

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 3 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “Given the unique status of this court, it is not altogether clear whether Waldorf governs this case, or whether the propriety of the closing argument depends on local law. See Murray v. Fairbanks Morse, 610 F.2d 149 , 152 n. 4 (3d Cir. 1979) (in dictum treating this matter as an issue of local law). Although the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure apply to this court in the same manner as they apply to the ordinary United States District Courts, 48 U.S.C. § 1614 (b), the position of this court may be different from that of an ordinary United States District Court with respect to the Appellate Courts’ supervisory powers. See Barnard v. Thorstenn, 489 U.S. 546, 551-552 , 109 S.Ct. 1294, 1298-99 , 103 L.Ed.2d 559 (1989). The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, however, would almost certainly reach the same result under local law as under federal law. The reasoning of Waldorf, supra, 896 F.2d at 744 , that reference to the amount of damages in the closing argument is likely to encourage the jury to “irrationally inflate[ ] the damage award,” does not depend on the federal-law context but is equally applicable to Virgin Islands law. The Court of Appeals has long expressed reservations about the propriety of such closing arguments in Virgin Islands cases, although it has repeatedly declined to decide the issue. See Gumbs, supra, 823 F.2d at 771 . The Virgin Islands statute prohibiting ad damnum clauses in complaints, 5 V.I.C. § 5, does not affect the law concerning references to d”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. Dunn v. Owens-Corning Fiberglass

2. “A new trial may be granted if the verdict is against the weight of the evidence. See, e.g. Lind v. Schenley Indus., Inc., 278 F.2d 79, 88-90 (3d Cir.)(en banc), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 835 , 81 S. Ct. 58 , 5 L. Ed. 2d 60 (1960). The power to order a new trial on these grounds, however, is sparingly exercised, and a verdict may not be set aside merely because the judge would have reached a different result if he were the finder of fact. See id. Respect for the function of the jury, as dictated by the Seventh Amendment, requires the court to "abstain from interfering with the verdict unless it is quite clear that the jury has reached a seriously erroneous result. The judge's duty is essentially to see that there is no miscarriage of justice." 6A J. Moore & J. Lucas, Moore's Federal Practice ¶ 59.08[5] at 59-150, 59-152 (2d ed. 1989) quoted with approval in Lind, supra, 278 F.2d at 89 . Unless "the jury . . . fails properly to perform the functions confided to it by law," the court must let the verdict stand, lest "the judge. . . usurp the prime function of the jury as the trier of facts." Lind, supra, 278 F.2d at 90 ; see, e.g. EEOC v. Delaware Dep't of Health & Social Servs., 865 F.2d 1408 , 1413 (3d Cir. 1989).”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. Williams v. Rene

3. “so grossly excessive that it is not rationally related to any evidence adduced at trial.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. Joann's Launder Center, Inc. v. Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A.