754 So. 2d 1108 - State v. Scott’s Empirical Analysis
2000
Citation profile
6
cited by 6 later decisions
1
states following
May 2011
most recently cited
6 state decisions
Relationships
Relies on 421 So. 2d 874 - State v. Williams · 575 So. 2d 421 - State v. Richardson · 578 So. 2d 131 - State v. Yates · 694 So. 2d 549 - State v. Short · 737 So. 2d 252 - State v. Ratliff
Most-quoted passages
The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 6 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.
“We recognize that the reputation of an area is an articulable fact upon which an officer may rely and which is relevant in the determination of reasonable suspicion. State v. Richardson, 575 So.2d 421 (La.App. 4 Cir.), writ denied, 578 So.2d 131 (1991). We also note that deference should be given to the experience of the officers who were present at the time of the incident. State v. Taylor, 96-1843, p. 4 (La.App. 4 Cir. 10/29/97), 701 So.2d 766, 770 , writ denied, 98-2233 (La.1/8/99), 1999 WL 39785 , 734 So.2d 1224 . However, considering the totality of the circumstances, we must conclude that the officers lacked reasonable suspicion to stop Mr. Ratliff. Arguably, the fact that Mr. Ratliff kept his hand clenched the entire time the officers questioned him and his group and while he walked to the police car reasonably could have aroused the officers' suspicion. However, Mr. Ratliff and his friends were subjected to an investigatory stop before this happened. Officer Burns testified that he decided to conduct an investigatory stop simply because Mr. Ratliff was standing, with his arms folded and his fist closed, on the sidewalk in front of a house at 11:00 in the evening in an area known for drug trafficking. Officer Burns could point to no other factors in support of the stop. He observed no transactions between the members of the group or passing vehicles; none of the group attempted to flee when the officers' approached; no one was doing anything wrong. Although this Court ”
2 later decisions quote this exact passage“[T]he State did not produce sufficient evidence to support the conclusion that the officers acted on more than pure suspicion when they stopped and frisked the defendant. The record reveals that, at the time the officers decided to stop defendant, his- actions were consistent with those of someone waiting for a hotel employee or guest. There were no objective signs that defendant was engaged in drug-related or other criminal activity. Cf. State v. Smith, 96-0640 (La.App. 4 Cir. 4/30/97) , 694 So.2d 509 , writ denied, 97-1424 (La.11/14/97), 703 So.2d 1287 (suspect in alley in high-crime area seen holding unmarked medicine bottle commonly used to hold illegal drugs). Finally, we- note that the State has cited no cases tending to justify a finding of reasonable suspicion on the minimal facts presented here.”
2 later decisions quote this exact passage“LSA-C.Cr.P. art. 873 only requires the 24-hour sentencing delay for a motion for new trial or in arrest of judgment. This argument is without merit. CONCLUSION For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the defendant's convictions and sentences. CONVICTIONS AND SENTENCES AFFIRMED. NOTES [1] The deputies were not armed with firearms. Each of the deputies carried a can of pepper spray and a flashlight. Deputy Layfield also carried a metal extendable baton. [2] LSA-R.S. 14:2(A)(3) provides,”
1 later decision quote this exact passage
How this case has been treated — in progress
Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.