Hernandez v. State’s Empirical Analysis
1988
Citation profile
4 state decisions
How this case has been cited
Cited by 4 later decisions — most recently October 2016
4 state decisions
Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.
Relationships
Relies on Utica Mutual Insurance v. Talley · Boutwell v. State · Rudd v. State · Mitchell v. State · Moreno v. State
Most-quoted passages
The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 4 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.
““... Section 22.011(a)(2) defines certain sexual contacts with a child as offenses. Consent is irrelevant to statutory rape. Section 22.011(d) does not refer to consent. We decided in Boulding the defendant had demonstrated the promiscuity defense applied when he proved the complainant was fourteen years old and had engaged promiscuously in sex before the offense, [footnote omitted]. Although our constitutional analysis was contrary to Boutwell, our analysis of the promiscuity issue agreed with the Court of Criminal Appeals’ Bout-well analysis. Therefore, we follow Bout-well and our Boulding analysis of the promiscuity defense. We hold section 22.-011(d) does not require a defendant to raise consent before he can assert the promiscuity defense. Consent is simply irrelevant to statutory rape. Under the old statute, a defendant could use promiscuity to prove a child was capable of consent if he proceeded on the theory the child had consented. In section 22.011(d) the legislature has mandated acquittal of statutory rape charges when the child is over fourteen and under seventeen and has been promiscuous before the indicted offense.” “... The purpose of the newer statutory rape statute was to prevent imposition upon females under the age of seventeen by older and presumably more experienced males, [footnote omitted]_ Nevertheless, the newer statutory scheme does not protect sexually ‘promiscuous’ girls unless the State can allege forcible rape in the indictment and prove beyond a”
1 later decision quote this exact passagee.g. Pawson v. State““(a) A person commits an offense if the person: (1) intentionally or knowingly: (A) causes the penetration of the ... female sexual organ of another person who is not the spouse of the actor by any means, without that person’s consent; ⅝ * ⅜ * ⅜ * (2) intentionally or knowingly: (A) cause the penetration of the ... female sexual organ of a child by any means; [[Image here]] (c) In this section: (1) “Child” means a person younger than 17 years of age who is not the spouse of the actor. (d) It is a defense to prosecution under Subsection (a)(2) of this section that: (1) the child was at the time of the offense 14 years of age or older and had prior to the time of the offense engaged promiscuously in conduct described in that subseetion[.]” 1”
1 later decision quote this exact passagee.g. Pawson v. State“... Nevertheless, this court cannot usurp the functions of the legislature to correct even the most lamentable errors. The legislature provided promiscuity of the victim as a complete defense.”
1 later decision quote this exact passagee.g. Pawson v. State
How this case has been treated — in progress
Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.