¶1dissenting.
¶2In Moreno v. State, 755 S.W.2d 866 (Tex.Cr.App.), the Court makes cogent observa*862tions about a particular rule that comes to be characterized as “axiomatic,” viz:
This rule is by now axiomatic as well as committed to the memories of most. However, the drawback of such axiomatic law is that it becomes a rule which is often cited yet rarely seriously considered — a habit the State appropriately terms ‘lip service.’ ”
¶3At 867.
¶4“Lip service” is an avowal of allegiance that goes no further than expression in words; an utterance or expression from the lips only, and hence insincere.
¶5Yesterday the Houston (14th) Court of Appeals and today this Court give lip service to the precious right of an accused to go to trial clothed in a fundamental presumption of innocence before an impartial jury, free of prejudice inherently engendered by imposition of bodily restraints of “manacles, leg irons, and belly bands.”
¶6Furthermore, the Houston (14th) Court of Appeals and now this Court give lip service to the constitutional right of an accused to represent himself, unencumbered by presence of “standby” counsel, the victim of a prior assault during the course of an earlier trial who, himself, moved to withdraw on account of “a conflict of personalities.”
¶7Indeed, from the colloquies set out in the opinion of this Court it appears that the trial court sought to hold hostage exercise of one right against the other. Thus, understanding the “inconvenience and disadvantage” of such appearance before the jury, “is it still your desire to persist in self-representation in this cause,” at 2, and “do you still persist in self-representation,” at 3. That is to say to appellant, “Your other option is to go to trial with assistance of counsel, your past physical rejection of whom now serves to destroy your presumption of innocence.”
¶8In short, we render “lip service” to constitutional rights denied in exercise of discretion.
¶9I dissent.