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← 756 F.3d 754 - In re Kellogg Brown & Root, Inc.

In re Kellogg Brown & Root, Inc.’s Empirical Analysis

756 F.3d 754 · 2014

Citation profile

59
cited by 59 later decisions
3
states following
February 2025
most recently cited

11 federal appellate · 11 district · 3 state decisions

Relationships

Applies 15 U.S.C. § 78M (§ 13 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934) · 28 U.S.C. § 1291 · 28 U.S.C. § 1292 · 28 U.S.C. § 1651 · 28 U.S.C. § 2106 · 41 U.S.C. § 8703

Relies on Hickman v. Taylor · Liteky et al United States · Kerr v. United States Dist. Court for Northern Dist. of Cal. · Upjohn Company v. United States · Fisher v. United States

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 59 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

  1. “confidential communication between attorney and client if that communication was made for the purpose of obtaining or providing legal advice to the client.”
    3 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
  2. “Harry Barko worked for KBR, a defense contractor. In 2005, he filed a False Claims Act complaint against KBR and KBR-related corporate entities, whom we will collectively refer to as KBR. In essence, Barko alleged that KBR and certain subcontractors defrauded the U.S. Government by inflating costs and accepting kickbacks while administering military contracts in wartime Iraq. During discovery, Barko sought documents related to KBR’s pri- or internal investigation into the alleged fraud. KBR had conducted that internal investigation pursuant to its Code of Business Conduct, which is overseen by the company’s Law Department. KBR argued that the internal investigation had been conducted for the purpose of obtaining legal advice and that the internal investigation documents therefore were protected by the attorney-client privilege. Barko responded that the internal investigation documents were unprivileged business records that he was entitled to discover. See generally Fed.R.Civ.P. 26(b)(1). After reviewing the disputed documents in camera, the District Court determined that the attorney-client privilege protection did not apply because, among other reasons, KBR had not shown that “the communication would not have been made ‘but for’ the fact that legal advice was sought.” United States ex rel. Barko v. Halliburton Co., 37 F.Supp.3d 1 , 5 (D.D.C.2014) (quoting United States v. ISS Marine Services, Inc., 905 F.Supp.2d 121 , 128 (D.D.C. 2012)). KBR’s internal investigation, the co”
    2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
  3. “(1) the mandamus petitioner must have no other adequate means to attain the relief he desires, (2) the mandamus petitioner must show that his right to the issuance of the writ is clear and indisputable, and (3) the court, in the exercise of its discretion, must be satisfied that the writ is appropriate under the circumstances.”
    2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority

How this case has been treated — in progress

Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.