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← 756 FSUPP 121 - United States v. Caming

United States v. Caming’s Empirical Analysis

1991

Citation profile

4
cited by 4 later decisions
June 1996
most recently cited

2 federal appellate ·

Relationships

Applies 18 U.S.C. § 3500 · 31 U.S.C. § 5324 (§ 1354 of the Money Laundering Control Act of 1986)

Relies on Miranda v. State of Arizona Vignera · Chimel v. California · New York v. Belton · South Dakota v. Opperman · United States v. Lefkowitz

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 4 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

  1. “In light of the circumstances of the arrest, which occurred between 10:00 a.m. and 10:30 a.m. on a business day, and defendant’s statement that the Club’s parking lot holds “about 150 cars,” Caming Aff. ¶ 3, Special Agent Pinzino’s explanation is entirely credible. Common sense dictates that on a morning during the work-week, a tennis club parking lot is not apt to be full since the majority of patrons would normally be engaged in their regular employment; more likely, such a lot would be closer to empty. The Court accordingly finds that since Arnold Marshel, the Club’s owner, was apparently a target of the investigation, the Special Agents’ decision not to stake out positions within the Club’s parking lot, where their presence would likely be conspicuous, and to arrest defendant as he exited the Club’s parking lot, indicates nothing more than Agents’ sound exercise of judgment in the execution of an arrest warrant. The record fails to suggest that the Agents, by deliberately waiting to arrest defendant as he exited the Club, improperly manipulated the situation in order to conduct a search of defendant’s vehicle.”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
  2. “When a police officer has made a lawful custodial arrest of the occupant of an automobile, he may, as a contemporaneous incident of that arrest, search the passenger compartment of the vehicle .... Where, however, it appears that the search and not the arrest was the real purpose in effecting a warrant-less search of the premises, “and that the arrest was a pretext for or at most an incident of the search,” the search is unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment. [Citations omitted.]”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
  3. “presents no evidence that the Agents contrived to arrest defendant in his car so as to conduct a pretextual warrantless search of the vehicle. Here, the Agents surveilled defendant’s Manhattan apartment building for three and one-half hours, from 5:00 a.m. to 8:30 a.m., in an attempt to arrest defendant as he exited the building. Only when this attempt proved unsuccessful did the Agents search for defendant elsewhere. [Footnote omitted.]”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority

How this case has been treated — in progress

Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.