Commonwealth v. Freeman’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

3 federal appellate · 54 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 58 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “[T]he trooper’s subsequent actions were inconsistent with his statement to Freeman that she was free to leave, as he: returned to Freeman’s vehicle; questioned her about the second vehicle; pointed out the inconsistent statements from the vehicle’s occupants when she denied traveling with that vehicle; and, ultimately and most significantly, asked her to step out of the vehicle prior to the request for consent. Such directive constituted a greater show of authority than had previously been made (other than the physical stop of Freeman’s vehicle itself). See Strickler, — Pa. -, 757 A.2d at 896 (citing Ferris v. State, 355 Md. 356 , 735 A.2d 491, 505 (1999) (stating that “a request that an individual move in some manner has been consistently regarded by this Court as persuasive evidence that a fourth amendment seizure has occurred” (citation omitted))). Moreover, given everything that had come before, although these events occurred after express conferral of advice that Freeman was free to depart, they would have suggested to a reasonable person that such advice was no longer operative.”

   5 later decisions quote this exact passage
   e.g. 2016 Pa. Super. 181 - Commonwealth v. Valdivia · 2001 Pa. Super. 308 - Commonwealth v. Ortiz

2. “the existence and nature of any prior seizure; whether there was a clear and expressed endpoint to any such prior detention; the character of police presence and conduct in the encounter under review (for example—the number of officers, whether they were uniformed, whether police isolated subjects, physically touched them or directed their movement, the content or manner of interrogatories or statements, and “excesses” factors [sic] stressed by the United States Supreme Court); geographic, temporal and environmental elements associated with the encounter; and the presence or absence of express .advice that the citizen-subject was free to decline the request for consent to search.”

   3 later decisions quote this exact passage
   e.g. Commonwealth v. Kim · 2002 Pa. Super. 383 - Commonwealth v. Reppert

3. “... Freeman’s consent, even if voluntarily given, will not justify the otherwise illegal search unless the Commonwealth can demonstrate that Freeman’s consent was an “independent act of free will” and “not the product of the illegal detention.” Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 501 , 103 S.Ct. 1319, 1326 , 75 L.Ed.2d 229 (1983). See generally Strickler, - Pa. at - n. 4, 757 A.2d at 889 n. 4. In this regard, we deem the three factors articulated in Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590 , 95 S.Ct. 2254 , 45 L.Ed.2d 416 (1975), relevant to this inquiry: the temporal proximity of the detention and the consent, any intervening circumstances, and particularly, the purpose and flagrancy of the officer’s unlawful conduct. See id. at 603-04 , 95 S.Ct. at 2261-62 . Here, although we do not view the trooper’s actions as flagrant, the record does not establish the necessary break in the sequence of events that would isolate Freeman’s consent from the prior coercive interaction. To the contrary, the evidence supports the conclusion that the trooper’s initiation of a second seizure and receipt of Freeman’s consent were integrally connected. As Freeman’s consent was invalid, the fruits of its conferral must be suppressed.”

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage
   e.g. 2016 Pa. Super. 181 - Commonwealth v. Valdivia · 2000 Pa. Super. 305 - Commonwealth v. Phinn