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← 757 F.2d 1161 - United States v. Smith

United States v. Smith’s Empirical Analysis

757 F.2d 1161 · 1985

Citation profile

46
cited by 46 later decisions
1
cited 1 times by the Supreme Court
4
states following
May 2016
most recently cited

31 federal appellate · 4 state decisions

How this case has been cited

Cited by 46 later decisions (1 by the Supreme Court) — most recently May 2016 · most notably Mathews v. United States (1988), United States v. Restrepo (1991)

31 federal appellate · 4 state decisions

2201985199020002010decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

Relationships

Applies 18 U.S.C. § 3161 (§ 101 of the Speedy Trial Act of 1974) · 21 U.S.C. § 802 (§ 102 of the Controlled Substances Act) · 21 U.S.C. § 828 (§ 308 of the Controlled Substances Act) · 21 U.S.C. § 841 (§ 401 of the Controlled Substances Act) · 21 U.S.C. § 849 (§ 409 of the Controlled Substances Act)

Relies on Blockburger v. United States · Ashe v. Swenson · Brown v. Ohio · Costello v. United States · United States v. Russell

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 46 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

  1. “[I]f the government were to try to prove the same factual issue in two trials, an adverse decision in the first trial would prevent relitigation of that same issue if it was critical to the first prosecution.... Since the ... jury did not determine any issues adverse to the government, collateral estoppel does not apply, (citations omitted.)”
    2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
  2. ““Binding precedent in this Circuit states that a defendant who wishes to rely upon an entrapment defense may not rely upon defenses that conflict with the claim of entrapment. Although defendants may assert inconsistent defenses in other contexts, the unusual nature of entrapment defense, focusing on the state of mind of the defendant prior to commission of the defense, United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423 , 93 S.Ct. 1637 , 36 L.Ed.2d 366 (1973), justifies this requirement. The doctrine facilitates the truth-finding function of a criminal trial and saves the prosecutor from presenting essentially two cases against the defendant, one relating to the offense and the other relating to predisposition prior to the offense. The wisdom or consistency of that doctrine is a matter beyond the reach of this panel. Cf. United States v. Henry, 749 F.2d 203 (5th Cir.1984) (en banc); United States v. Demma, 523 F.2d 981 (9th Cir.1975) (en banc). “The cases setting forth this principle also establish for this Court a workable means of determining the precise degree of inconsistency between defenses that the law will tolerate. The consistency of the defenses presented by a defendant depends largely on what part of the prosecution’s case he or she admits is true. While this court has often held that a defendant asserting entrapment must admit all the criminal acts upon which the prosecution builds its case, United States v. Nicoll, 664 F.2d 1308 (5th Cir. Unit B), cert. denied, 457 U.S. 1118”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority

How this case has been treated — in progress

Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.