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← 757 P2D 1028 - Kollodge v. State

Kollodge v. State’s Empirical Analysis

1988

Citation profile

19
cited by 19 later decisions
1
states following
June 2005
most recently cited

1 district · 18 state decisions

Relationships

Applies 29 U.S.C. § 185 (§ 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947 (Taft-Hartley Act))

Relies on Vaca v. Sipes · United Parcel Service, Inc. v. Mitchell · School Board of Nassau County, Florida, Et Al. v. Arline · Peterson v. Kennedy · Griffin v. International Union, United Automobile, Aerospace & Agricultural Implement Workers of America

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 19 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

  1. “We concluded that the school board in Ballard was acting as an administrative agency because it was “applying general policy to a particular person.” Id. The same analysis applies to Kollodge. Kollodge's complaint, like Ballard’s, requested reinstatement, back pay and compensatory damages. Kollodge’s relief in court turns on a review of the hearing conducted before hearing officer Hennen of the State Division of Labor Relations. In essence, this is an appeal of the decision rendered by the desig-nee of the Commissioner of Administration which resulted from the Division of Labor Relations’ hearing. Furthermore, the hearing involved the application of policy to a particular person (Kollodge) in his private capacity. Clearly, Kollodge’s claim is an appeal from an administrative agency. Therefore, it is subject to the thirty-day period of limitation contained in Appellate Rule 602(a)(2). After the hearing, the Department of Administration notified Kollodge of its decision in a letter dated July 26, 1982. The arbitration procedure mandated by step five of the grievance procedure was completed on January 23, 1983, the date of APEA’s final decision not to arbitrate. Kollodge did not file his complaint in the superior court until April 25, 1984, long past the thirty-day limit. Accordingly, we affirm the superior court’s grant of summary judgment.”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage
  2. “[T]he test for determining when an entity is acting as an “administrative agency” is functional. Whenever an entity which normally acts as a legislative body applies policy to particular persons in their private capacities, instead of passing on general policy or the rights of individuals in the abstract, it is functioning as an administrative agency within the meaning of Appellate Rule [602(a)(2)]. 2”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage
  3. “Additionally, Ballard’s complaint and appellate brief, like Kollodge’s, alleged that he was denied his state and federal constitutional due process rights.... Thus in Ballard , we implicitly held that a challenge to an administrative decision, even if it is a constitutional challenge, is subject to the thirty-day period contained in Appellate Rule 602.”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage

How this case has been treated — in progress

Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.