Munson v. State’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

1 federal appellate · 48 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 53 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “Nonetheless, because the jury’s verdict does not specify whether appellant was found guilty of malice-aforethought murder or kidnapping murder or armed-robbery murder, the verdict must be interpreted as one of felony murder in order that appellant receive the benefit of the rule that a defendant cannot be convicted of felony-murder and the underlying felony.... To determine which felony formed the basis for felony-murder where more than one underlying felony is charged, one must look first to the information and second to the evidence. (Citations omitted).”

   4 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the dissent
   e.g. Wilson v. Sirmons · Williams v. State

2. “Appellant relies primarily on Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68 , 105 S.Ct. 1087 , 84 L.Ed.2d 53 (1985). Ake, however, has not been extended to include investigative or expert assistance other than a psychiatrist. See Woodard v. State, 743 P.2d 662, 664-67 (Okla. Crim. App. 1987); Standridge v. State, 701 P.2d 761, 764 (Okla. Crim. App. 1985). After Ake, the United States Supreme Court declined to specify what, if any, showing would entitle an indigent accused to investigative or other expert assistance, finding no deprivation of due process where the defendant "offered little more than undeveloped assertions that the requested assistance would be beneficial ... ." Caldwell v. Mississippi, 472 U.S. 320, 324 , [n. 1], 105 S.Ct. 2633 , 2637 n. 1, 86 L.Ed.2d 231 (1985). Most recently, only Justices Marshall and Brennan have agreed to confront the issue of "whether and when an indigent defendant is entitled to non-psychiatric expert assistance." Johnson v. Oklahoma, 484 U.S. 878 , [880], 108 S.Ct. 35, 37 , 98 L.Ed.2d 167 (1987) (Marshall, J., dissenting to certiorari denial, joined by Brennan, J.). It has been held that the effective assistance guarantee of the due process clause requires a reversal on appeal from a denial of such assistance "only where a defendant has established prejudice by clear and convincing evidence." Mason v. Arizona, 504 F.2d 1345, 1352 (9th Cir.1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 936 , 95 S.Ct. 1145 , 43 L.Ed.2d 412 (1975). Here, we cannot say appellant has demons”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the concurrence
   e.g. Hawkins v. State

3. “Here, the information contained the essential elements for the crimes of first degree malice aforethought murder, kidnapping, and armed robbery, is sufficient to bar future prosecution for the same offense, and appellant has not shown that he was misled by it. See Wolfenbarger v. State, 710 P.2d 114, 115 (Okl.Cr.App. 1985), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1182 , 106 S.Ct. 2915 , 91 L.Ed.2d 544 (1986). (emphasis added)”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the dissent
   e.g. Lambert v. State