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76 F. Supp. 12

Richards v. Social Security Administration

Massachusetts District Court

Decided February 26, 1948

Massachusetts District Court · decided 1948-02-26

Cited by 10 later decisions — most recently August 1957

2 federal appellate · 5 district ·

Key passage — most relied on by later courts

““Definition of ‘living with’: Wife or widow. — A wife shall be deemed to be ‘living with’ her husband at the time of [sic] her application for a benefit is filed, and a widow shall be deemed to have been living with her husband at the time of his death, if, at such time, either of the three following conditions exist: “(a) The husband and wife were at such time members, of the same household. . “A husband and wife we,re members of the same household if they were living together, and customarily lived together, in the same place of abode. “A husband and wife who customarily lived together in the same place of abode but who were not actually doing so at such time, may nevertheless be members of the same household, if they were apart only temporarily and intended to resume living together in the same place of abode. “(b) If the wife was at such time receiving regular contributions from her husband toward her support. - “Contributions must be substantial, and ■ may .be made in cash or other medium. In determining the sufficiency-of .contribu.•tions under this subsection, the surround-ting circumstances -with'. respect to both the time when contributions' are made and the- amount thereof shall be taken into consideration. “(c) If the husband had, at such timie been ordered by any court to contribute to- his wife’s support. “This condition is' met if the husband is legally obligated to contribute to the support of his wife at such time by virtue of any order, judgment, or decree of”

quoted by 1 later decision, including 130 F. Supp. 65 - Colbert v. Hobby

““(1) In determining whether an applicant is the wife, husband, widow, widower, child, or parent of a fully insured or currently insured individual for purposes of this subchapter, the Administrator shall apply such law as would be applied in determining the devolution of intestate personal property by the courts of the State in which such insured individual is domiciled at the time such applicant files application, or, if such insured individual is dead, by the courts of the State in which he was domiciled at the time of his death, or if such insured individual is or was not so domiciled in any State, by the courts of the District of Columbia. Applicants who according to such law would have the same status relative to taking intestate personal property as a wife, hus band, widow, widower, child, or parent shall be deemed such. “(2) A wife shall be deemed to be living with her husband if they are both members of the same household, or if she is receiving regular contributions from him toward her support, or he has been ordered by any court to contribute to her support; and a widow shall be deemed to have been living with her husband at the time of his. death if they were both members of the same household on the date of his death, or she was receiving regular contributions from him toward her support on such date, or he had been ordered by any court to contribute to her support.””

quoted by 1 later decision, including Ferenz v. Hobby

Applies 42 U.S.C. § 405 (§ 205 of the Social Security Act of 1935)

Relies on Gediman v. Cameron

Good law ✅— No negative treatment on recordhow we know

Decided 1948-02-26

View the full empirical analysis of this case →

SWEENEY, District Judge.

¶1The plaintiff brings this action to review a decision of the Social Security Administration as provided in Section 205(g) of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C.A. § 405 <&)•

¶2The plaintiff is the widow of one Melvin Richards, who died in Florida in September 1945. She filed a claim for herself and her minor daughter. The daughter’s claim was allowed and the widow’s was denied on the ground that she was not “living with her husband at the time of his death”, within the meaning of Section 209(n) of the Act.

¶3Findings of Fact

¶4The plaintiff and Melvin Richards were married in Massachusetts in 1930, and lived here together as husband and wife until August 1935. On October 31, 1935, the husband pleaded guilty to a complaint charging him with desertion and nonsupport of his wife. The Court placed Richards on probation for one year, and ordered him to make payments weekly for the support and maintenance of his family. In October 1936, the term of probation was extended for one year. At or about this time Richards again deserted his wife and moved to Florida where he lived until his death. He defaulted his appearance before the District Court in Salem in 1937, and a capias was issued for his arrest. It was never served, however, and the Commonwealth made no effort to compel him to return to Massachusetts and assume his proper burden. Section 209(n) of the Act, in defining the phrase “living with”, as used in Section 202(e), includes one who is receiving regular contributions from her husband towards her support or “… he had been ordered by any court to contribute to her support”. This is a broad interpretation of the phrase “living together” as used in the Act, and to accomplish the intent of Congress should be broadly construed. The Referee took the position that, since the Massachusetts District Court was limited in its support order to a term not exceeding six years, see section 5 of Chapter 273 of the Massachusetts General Laws (Ter.Ed.), the Congressional interpretation of “living together” should be construed to mean an order which had not expired, either by virtue of its own time limitation or for any other reason. Such an interpretation would put the burden on some one, either the 'Court or one of the parties litigant, to see that the order was kept alive until the death of the absent husband. I think that this is an unreasonable interpretation, particularly in view of the fact that the husband had absented himself from the control of the Court or the state’s authorities. Under these circumstances, I think that the running of the time limitation of the statute should be treated as being suspended in the same manner in which the Statute of Limitations is tolled when a fugitive from justice is absent from the jurisdiction of the authority issuing a warrant of arrest.

¶5I am unable to find any Federal cases in point, and the only Massachusetts case I can find which seems to cover an analogous situation is Gediman v. Cameron, 306 Mass. 138, 27 N.E.2d 696. There it was pointed out that the rights of a wife to recover a personal judgment against her husband for support of herself or child are governed entirely by statute. The decision pointed out that these statutes should be construed as exclusive of all other remedies. They were intended to cover proceedings between living parties. While as between the living parties a limitation of six years seems adequate provision, it can have no effect on a matter such as the Social Se*14curity Act. It was intended to have a limitation upon the power of the Court to adjust proceedings between two living individuals. As between the deceased and his widow, there was outstanding an order for him to contribute to her support.

¶6Conclusion of Law

¶7On the basis of the foregoing I conclude and rule that the plaintiff, Greta P. Richards, was living with her husband at the time of his death within the meaning of the Social Security Act. The decision of the Administration is therefore reversed.

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