76 Md. App. 465 - Russo v. Ascher’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

2 district · 22 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 26 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “the question of fact presented was: when did Mrs. Baysinger have knowledge of circumstances which would cause a reasonable person in her position to undertake an investigation which, if pursued with reasonable diligence, would have led to knowledge of the wrong? While the sparse record of facts before the trial judge demonstrated that Mrs. Bay-singer’s suspicions concerning the cause of her infection included the intrauterine device, it also showed that she initiated a preliminary investigation by discussing her suspicions with Dr. Cho, and that Dr. Cho told her he had “no way of determining whether her infection was caused by the Saf-T-Coil or by some other unrelated occurrence or instrumentality.” The record further discloses that at that time Dr. Gallaher had no idea of what caused her illness, and consequently further investigation by way of inquiry of Dr. Gallaher would have been fruitless. We further note that while the record indicates that Mrs. Baysinger entertained various suspicions concerning the cause of her illness, there is no evidence that she then suspected, or reasonably should have suspected, wrongdoing on the part of anyone. Whether a reasonably prudent person should then have undertaken a further investigation is a matter about which reasonable minds could differ, and it was therefore inappropriate for resolution by summary judgment.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. Lumsden v. Design Tech Builders, Inc.

2. “[W]e think that the words of § 5-109 expressly place an absolute five-year period of limitation on the filing of medical malpractice claims calculated on the basis of when the injury was committed, i.e., the date upon which the allegedly negligent act was first coupled with harm. The purpose of the statute, readily evident from its terms, was to contain the “long-tail” effect of the discovery rule in medical malpractice cases by restricting, in absolute terms, the amount of time which could lapse between the allegedly negligent treatment of a patient and the filing of a malpractice claim related to that treatment. The statute is a response to the so-called crisis in the field of medical malpractice claims ... and contains no room for any implied exceptions.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. 111 Md. App. 233 - Edmonds v. Cytology Services of Maryland, Inc.