Volume 76 — North Carolina Court of Appeals Reports

1. Schools 13.1 — temporary teacher — failure to hire for permanent position — no violation of statute The General Assembly did not intend that the "temporary personnel" authorized by G.S. <cross_reference>115C-295</cross_reference> be included within the term "probationary teacher" contained in G.S. <cross_reference>115C-325</cross_reference> (a)(5). Thus, where plaintiff alleged and the forecast of evidence showed that she was hired as a "temporary teacher" for a term which ended on a specified date, she was not a probationary teacher and a board of education's failure to employ her for a permanent position was not a violation of G.S. <cross_reference>115C-325</cross_reference> (m)(2). 2. Contracts 34 — tortious interference with freedom of contract — insufficient forecast of evidence Summary judgment was properly entered for defendant on plaintiff's claim that defendant tortiously interfered with plaintiff's freedom of contract by influencing the hiring process for a school music teacher position to plaintiff's detriment where defendant submitted affidavits averring that defendant was not consulted prior to the hiring decision, that defendant played no role in the hiring or interview process for the music teacher vacancy, and that any friction between plaintiff and defendant had no relation to the decision not to hire plaintiff, and where plaintiff's affidavit merely restated the conclusory allegations of the complaint, and plaintiff submitted no forecast of evidence<page_number>Page 496</page_number> showing that defendant was involved in the hiring decision or that such involvement constituted tortious interference.

1. Municipal Corporations 30.6 — zoning — denial of variance — no error The board of aldermen, sitting as a board of adjustment, did not have legal authority under G.S. <cross_reference>160A-338</cross_reference> (d) to grant petitioners' requested variance from an R-1 zoning classification to allow duplexes on petitioners' lots. A board of adjustment has a quasi-judicial power to vary or modify zoning regulations only so long as the spirit of the ordinance continues to be observed; construction of a duplex would violate the spirit as well as the letter of the R-1 zoning classification. G.S. <cross_reference>160A-338</cross_reference> (d). 2. Municipal Corporations 31.2 — constitutionality of zoning ordinance — not properly raised The issue of whether a zoning ordinance was unconstitutional was not properly before the Court of Appeals because the board of aldermen, sitting in their quasi-judicial capacity as the board of adjustment, only had the authority to grant or deny a variance under the ordinance; the superior court, and hence the Court of Appeals through derivative appellate jurisdiction, had the statutory power to review only the issue of whether the variance was properly denied; the constitutionality of the zoning ordinance was a separate issue not properly a part of these proceedings since the denial of the variance request never addressed the validity of the zoning ordinance; and the superior court sat in the posture of an appellate court and was not in a position to address constitutional issues that were not before the board.<page_number>Page 647</page_number>