76 So. 2d 587 - Chase v. Burley’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

21 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 21 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “"It appears obvious to the Court that the automobile of Mr. Walker was there or it would not have struck the automobile of Mrs. Prophit, as it only traveled the distance of one-half to three-fourths the way across the west lane of Marie Place. The law holds us to see those things that we should see and it appears to the Court that both Mrs. Evans and Mrs. Prophit could have seen and should have seen the automobile of Mr. Walker. "In the case of Chase v. Burley, La. App., 76 So.2d 587 , the Court stated: "`We take this occasion to point out the fact that there seems to be a somewhat prevalent idea among automobile drivers to the effect that when one has brought a vehicle to a stop, as required by law, before entering an intersection with a favored street he has fulfilled the requirements of the law. This is but a part, indeed the least effective part, of a motorist's duty. The very purpose of stopping is to permit the opportunity for a full and complete observation in both directions along the favored street in order to ascertain the presence of approaching traffic which might interfere with free and safe passage across such favored highway. In the fulfillment of this duty Mrs. Ethel Chase completely failed and it follows that this negligence was a proximate and effective cause of the collision.' "In the case of Gautreaux v. Southern Farm Bureau Casualty Company, La.App., 83 So.2d 667 , the Court stated: "`In the present instance, Mrs. Barrow's negligence was undoubtedly a pro”

   3 later decisions quote this exact passage
   e.g. Solomon v. Travelers Indemnity Co. · 111 So. 2d 885 - Evans v. Walker

2. “"It is undisputed that Miss Harkness moved into the intersection at a low rate of speed, and she herself testified that she could have stopped instantly if she had perceived the approach of the Gibson car. Certainly she could have observed such approach at a point where she had a clear and unobstructed view to the south and at which point she could have brought her car to a stop. In short, we are convinced that Miss Harkness was guilty of negligence in failing to exercise that degree of caution which was commensurate with the existing condition, and she must be held negligent for her failure to see that which she was legally required to observe. There is no ground for argument on the point that Miss Harkness looked but once to her left, and she did so before actually entering the intersection. In negotiating the crossing of any intersecting street on which there is two-way movement of traffic the danger of interference with approaching traffic first comes from the left and a failure to make proper observation in this direction is unquestionably a convincing element of negligence. "Counsel for defendant urges and cites authority to the point that Miss Harkness had the right to assume that Gibson would stop before entering the intersection. This might have been true if Miss Harkness had been on a right-of-way street and if Gibson had been required by any statute or ordinance to bring his vehicle to a stop before entering, but neither of these conditions is present. Further, we ”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. 99 So. 2d 408 - Gerrets v. Reed