Paschal v. State

<p>1.—Murder—Evidence—Intent to Kill—Motive.</p> <p>Upon trial of murder, there was no error in admitting testimony as to what occurred seven or eight years before the alleged homicide as to the treatment by the defendant of Tiis wife, the deceased, showing a continuous course of ill-treatment from almost the day of their marriage until the night when the fatal injuries were inflicted by the defendant,—to show specific intent to kill, animus, motive and malice. Following Hall v. State, 31 Texas Crim. Rep., 565.</p> <p>8.—Same—Assault to Murder—Charge of Court.</p> <p>Where, upon trial of murder, the evidence showed conclusively that the deceased died from injuries inflicted upon her by the defendant some days before, there was no error in the court’s failure to charge on the issue of assault with intent to murder. Davidson, Judge, dissenting.</p> <p>3. —Same—Aggravated Assault—Charge of Court.</p> <p>Where, upon trial of murder, the issue of aggravated assault was not raised by the evidence, hut the court, nevertheless, submitted a special charge requested by the defendant on aggravated assault, there was no reversible error.</p> <p>4. —Same—Instrument Used—Charge of Court—Cruel Treatment.</p> <p>Article 1150, Penal Code, provides that where the circumstances attending a homicide show an evil and cruel disposition, or that it was the design to kill,' the accused shall he deemed guilty of murder, though the instrument or means used may not in their nature be such as to produce death ordinarily; and where the acts of the defendant showed such state of facts, and the court properly submitted the same, there was no reversible error.</p> <p>5. —Same—Instrument Used—Charge of Court.</p> <p>Where the indictment alleged that the means used by’ the defendant in committing the homicide were unknown, and the evidence made it clear that what instrument he did use, if he used any, was one that the jury would be authorized to find was such from the mode and manner of its use likely to produce death, there was no error in the court’s charge in submitting a proper charge thereon.</p> <p>6. —Same—Evidence—Dying Declarations.</p> <p>Where, upon trial of murder, there was some conflict of testimony as to whether deceased, when she gave a dying declaration, was rational or irrational at the time, yet there was positive testimony that she, was sane and conscious of approaching death, and no special charge was submitted on this question, although invited by the court, there was no reversible error.</p> <p>[Rehearing denied April 7, 1915.—Reporter.]</p>