¶1Defendant was charged and convicted of burglary, as party to a crime, contrary to secs. *371943.10 (1) (a) and 939.05, State. Defendant raises two questions on this review:
¶21. Did the defendant knowingly and intelligently waive his constitutional rights prior to giving the police an incriminating statement which was admitted in evidence?
¶32. Was the imposition of a three-year sentence consecutive to the term he was already serving an abuse of discretion?
¶4In State v. Hernandez, 61 Wis.2d 253, 257, 212 N.W.2d 118 (1973), we stated that the United States Supreme Court, in Miranda v. Arizona,
¶5The burden is on the state to establish beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was informed of his constitutional rights as set forth in Miranda and that he understood them and intelligently waived them. State v. Hernandez, 61 Wis.2d 253, 258, 212 N.W.2d 118 (1973). In Miranda the burden was described as “a heavy burden ... to demonstrate that the defendant knowingly and intelligently waived his privilege against self-incrimination and his right to retained or appointed counsel.” 384 U.S. at 475.
¶6In the case before us a Miranda-Goodchild hearing was held on February 25, 1975. The State called City of Oak Creek Police Officer Gary Kenyon who testified that he arrested the defendant at his home in Caledonia, Wisconsin at approximately 8:40 a.m. on June 9, 1974; *372that he took the defendant to the Oak Creek Police Department where they arrived at about 9 a.m.; and that there was no interrogation of the defendant until about ten minutes later. Officer Kenyon further testified that he read the defendant his constitutional rights from a card that he had in his possession. The questioning of the officer proceeded as follows:
“Q. Did you read off that card verbatim, in other words, word for word what’s on that card? A. Yes. I did.
“Q. Would you read the same card ?
“A. You have the right to remain silent. Anything you say can and will be used against you in a Court of law. You have the right to talk to a lawyer and have him present with you while you are being questioned. If you cannot afford to hire a lawyer, one will be appointed to represent you before any questioning, if you wish one.
“Q. All right. In addition to — Was that the substance of your admonishment to the defendant? A. Then, I read the waiver on the back.
“Q. All right.
“A. Do you understand these, each of these rights that I have explained to you? Having these rights in mind, do you wish to talk to us, now?
“Q. Did the defendant answer either one or both of those questions? A. Yes.
“Q. Did he answer whether or not he understood his rights? A. He acknowledged by shaking his head yes that he understood them.
“Q. Now, with respect to your question asking him regarding the waiver of those rights, what did he say? A. Yes. He said he couldn’t afford an attorney then and he was willing to speak about them.
“Q. All right. Did you question the defendant at that point? A. Yes. I did.
“Q. Regarding what? A. A burglary of the Rexall Pharmacy Drug Store at 9555 South Howell Avenue, City of Oak Creek. ((
“Q. Did you proceed initially on a question and answer basis? A. Yes.
“Q. Did the defendant give answers to the questions you asked? A. Yes. He did.”
¶7*373The officer testified that the defendant affirmatively stated he understood his rights and wished to waive them. But, the officer also stated that the defendant said “he couldn’t afford an attorney.” The questioning should have stopped at this point.
¶8“The defendant may waive effectuation of these rights, provided the waiver is made voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently. If, however, he indicates in any manner and at any stage of the process that he wishes to consult with an attorney before speaking there can be no questioning. . . .” Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. at 444, 445.
¶9In this case, the State relied heavily on the defendant’s confession. The only other evidence presented by the State was a police officer’s testimony that the defendant’s car was parked near the store burglarized. Applying the Wold> test
¶10In view of our holding we need not discuss the question of sentencing.
¶11*374Although the defense counsel did not raise the issue in the trial court or in this court, we note that the warning given to the defendant was incomplete. The officer should have advised the accused that the accused could decide at any time to exercise these rights and not answer any questions or make any statements, or in other words, that the accused had the right to stop answering questions at any time. State v. Hernandez, supra; Jones v. State, 69 Wis.2d 337, 342-343, 230 N.W.2d 677 (1975); Grennier v. State, 70 Wis.2d 204, 213, 234 N.W.2d 316 (1975).
¶12By the Court. — Judgment and orders reversed.
¶13384 U.S. 436, 86 S. Ct. 1602, 16 L. Ed.2d 694 (1966).
¶14 In Wold v. State, 57 Wis.2d 344, 356, 357, 204 N.W.2d 482 (1973), a case involving improperly admitted evidence, the court said:
“. . . The test of harmless error is not whether some harm has resulted, but, rather, whether the appellate court in its independent determination can conclude there is sufficient evidence, other than and uninfluenced by the inadmissible evidence, which would convict the defendant beyond a reasonable doubt. This test is based on reasonable probabilities. ... A possibility test is the next thing to automatic reversal. In determining guilt ‘beyond a reasonable doubt/ the human mind should not work on possibilities, but on reasonable probabilities.” (Citations omitted.)
¶15See also State v. Dean, 67 Wis.2d 613, 533, 227 N.W.2d 712 (1975).
¶16Because the court is of the opinion that the admission of improper evidence here was not harmless error under the formulation of Wold v. State, supra, that formulation of the harmless error test is accepted for purposes of this opinion.