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76 W. Va. 322

Bailey v. Gollehon

West Virginia Supreme Court

Decided May 25, 1915

West Virginia Supreme Court · decided 1915-05-25

<p>1. Malicious Prosecution — Proof of Probable Cause — Province of Court — Verdict.</p> <p>If, in an action for malicious prosecution, sufficient facts to constitute probable cause for institution of the criminal proceedings are clearly established by admissions or uncontradicted evidence or both, it is the province of the court to deny right of recovery by direction of a verdict for the defendant or the setting aside of a verdict for the plaintiff, (p.328).</p> <p>2. Same — Burden of Proof — Malice—Lacle of Probable Cause.</p> <p>To warrant recovery in such an action, the plaintiff must establish both malice and lack of probable cause, (p. 328).</p> <p>3. Same — Defense—Probable Cause — Existence of Express Malice.</p> <p>If there was probable cause, the existence of express malice is immaterial, (p.328).</p> <p>4. Trial — Instructions—Cure of Erior.</p> <p>An erroneous instruction relating to an indecisive phase of the main issue in a ease, not binding as to such issue and accompanied by others fully and clearly advising the jury- of the rights of the party against whom such error was committed, is not prejudicial and does not warrant allowance of a new trial, (p. 330).</p>

Good law ✅— No negative treatment on recordhow we know

Reversed and remanded for new trial · Decided 1915-05-25

How this case has been cited

Cited by 16 later decisions — most recently November 1961

1 federal appellate · 14 state decisions

60191519201930194019501960decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

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Williams, Judge,

¶1(dissenting):

¶2Leaving out of consideration the direct testimony of defendant that he saw Bailey take the papers out of Harman’s pocket, and later saw him open the stove door, the remaining facts, that may be regarded as clearly established facts, are not sufficient to warrant the court in saying, as matter of law, that probable cause existed for believing Bailey guilty of the crime with which he was charged. No other witness corroborates defendant in respect to what he says he saw Bailey do, and Bailey flatly contradicts him. Their credibility, as well as the credibility of every other witness, was a jury question. I do not think the evidence Avarrants the assertion of fact in the opinion, that “Bailey was the only person in the room who was clearly and undoubtedly in a position from which the package could have been taken and put in the stove, without Harman’s knowledge.” ITarman had the papers in his right coat pocket, and was sitting at the table. Bailey swears that Peery was standing at Har-man’s right side, and was nearer to him than he was. Bailey is corroborated by Peery, who says he was standing so close to Harman that Bailey could not have taken the papers out of Harman’s pocket without his (Peery’s) knowing it. No witness, except defendant, says Bailey opened the stove door, and no one else present appears to have suspected that Bailey took the papers. He ivas proven to have a good reputation. The only material facts tending to show probable cause, not controverted, were the loss of the papers and the subsequent finding of their charred remains in the stove. It is not shown that Bailey had any motive for destroying them, and, apart from defendant’s testimony, there was as much ground to suspect Peery as Bailey, and not a sufficient ground to war*332rant a reasonable belief that either of them was guilty. The prosecuting attorney testified that all he knew of the commission of the alleged crime, at the time he advised the prosecution of Bailey, was what defendant had told him, and that he so advised because he believed his statements to be true. If what defendant says he saw was true, it amounted to more than probable cause; it was direct evidence of guilt. But if it was not true, there are not, in my opinion, sufficient uncontroverted facts to show probable cause, hence that question was properly submitted to the jury. The case was fairly tried upon all the evidence, and instructions, as to the law, whicK were even more favorable to defendant than the law warrants, and I do not think the court has any right to disturb the jury’s verdict. I would affirm the judgment.

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